Comportamento dos cromossômios no gênero Hypselonotus (Hemiptera -Coreidae)

The three species studied have 19 chromosomes, being one heterochromosome, one pair of microchromosomes and 8 pairs of autosomes. The microchromosomes of Hypselonotus fulvus are amongst the largest we know. During the synizesis, in Hypselonotus fulvus, we can see in several strands that scape from the chromatic knot a place in which they are widley open. As, in that phase the chromosomes have both ends converging to the same place, the openings suggest a side-to-side pairing of the chromosomal threads. The tetrads are like that studied by Piza (1945-1946). The bivalents are united side by side at their entire length. The unpaired part at the midle of the bivalents gives origin to the arms of the cross-shapede tetrads. The chromosomes have a kinetochore at each end. The bivalents sometimes unite their extremities to form ring-shaped figures, which open themselves out before metaphase. The tetrads are oriented parallelly to the spindle axis. At telophase the kinetochores repeli one another, the chiasmata, if present, slip toward the acentric extremities and the chromosomes rotate in order to arrange themselves parallelly to the axis of the new spindle. Separation is therefore through the pairing plane. In the spermatogonial anaphase of Hypselonotus subterpunctatus the chromosomes are curved to the poles, like those described by PIZA (1946) and PIZA and ZAMITH (1946). The sex chromosomes in Hypselonotus interruptus and Hypselonotus fulvus appears longitudinally divided. It is oriented with the ends in the plane of the equator and its chomatids separate by the plane of division. In the second division the sex chromosome, provided as it is with an actve klnetochore at each end, orients itself with its length parallelly to the spindle axis and passes undivided to one pole. Sometimes it is distended between the poles. This corresponds to case (a) established by PIZA (1946) for the sex chromosomes of Hemiptera In Hypselonotus subterpunctatus the sex chromosome, in the first division of the spermatocytes, orients like the tetrads and divides transversaly. In the second division, as its kinetochore becomes inactive, it remans monocentric, does not orient in the spindle, and is finally enclosed in the nearer nucleus. In the secondary telophase it recuperates its dicentricity like the autosomal chromatids. This behavior corresponds to case (c) of PIZA (1946).

Development of methodology for treating pressure waves from explosions accounting for modeling and data uncertainties

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2012

List of species of mammals, principally rodents, obtained by W. W. Price, S. E. Meek, G. K. Cherrie and E. S. Thompson, in the States of Iowa, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Nevada and California, with descriptions of new species, by D. E. Elliot.

v.1:no.10(1898)

A Methodology to measure shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation aimed at providing a research basis to investigate the link between both magnitudes

Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.

Free and fragmenting filling length

The filling length of an edge-circuit η in the Cayley 2-complex of a finite presentation of a group is the minimal integer length L such that there is a combinatorial null-homotopy of η down to a base point through loops of length at most L. We introduce similar notions in which the full-homotopy is not required to fix a base point, and in which the contracting loop is allowed to bifurcate. We exhibit a group in which the resulting filling invariants exhibit dramatically different behaviour to the standard notion of filling length. We also define the corresponding filling invariants for Riemannian manifolds and translate our results to this setting.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

The demand elasticity on tolled motorways

This paper analyses the elasticities of demand in tolled motorways in Spain with respect to the main variables influencing it. The demand equation is estimated using a panel data set where the cross-section observations correspond to the different Spanish tolled motorways sections, and the temporal dimension ranges from the beginning of the eighties until the end of the nineties. The results show a high elasticity with respect to the economic activity level. The average elasticity with respect to petrol price falls around -0.3, while toll elasticities clearly vary across motorway sections. These motorway sections are classified into four groups according to the estimated toll elasticity with values that range from -0.21 for the most inelastic to -0.83 for the most elastic. The main factors that explain such differences are the quality of the alternative road and the length of the section. The long-term effect is about 50 per cent higher than the short term one; however, the period of adjustment is relatively short.