Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.5, 1998

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle's Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in Luxembourg Compromise. In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence speeches, memoirs, or government documents suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations even in the least likely case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leaders geopolitical ideology even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary source research.

Disentangling the Reform Gridlock: Higher Education in Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.7, 2002

For more than a decade, bemoaning the many roadblocks to reforming important aspect of German politics has become commonplace. Explanations emphasize formal and informal veto points, such as the role of political institutions and the lack of elite and societal support for reform initiatives. Against this background, I was interested in factors that place policy issues on the political agenda and follow up with concrete courses of action; i.e., in factors that lead to a disentangling of the reform gridlock. I emphasize the importance of agenda setting in the emergence of higher education reform in Germany. Globalization, European integration and domestic pressures combined to create new pressures for change. In response, an advocacy coalition of old and new political actors has introduced a drawn-out and ongoing process of value reorientation in the direction of competition, including international competition, and greater autonomy. The result has been a burst of activities, some moderate, some more far-reaching in their potential to restructure German higher education.

The Politics of Budget Consolidation in Britain and Germany: the Impact of Blame-Avoidance Opportunities. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.2, 2005

According to parts of the literature, blame avoidance opportunities, i.e. the necessity and applicability of blame avoidance strategies, may differ among countries according to the respective institutional set-ups and between governing parties according to their programmatic orientation. In countries with many veto actors, a strategy of "Institutional Cooperation" among these actors is expected to diffuse blame sufficiently to render other blame avoidance strategies obsolete. In contrast, governments in Westminster democracies should resort to the more unilateral strategies of presentation, policy design and timing. At the same time, parties of the left are expected to have an easier time implementing spending cuts while right parties are less vulnerable when proposing tax increases. Evidence from the politics of budget consolidation in Britain and Germany does not corroborate these hypotheses. Instead, it seems that party competition conditions the effects institutions and the partisan complexion of governments have on the politics of blame avoidance.

Coalition Formation in Parliament and during the Policy Process

In modern democratic systems, usually no single collective actor is able to decisively influence political decision-making. Instead, actors with similar preferences form coalitions in order to gain more influence in the policy process. In the Swiss political system in particular, institutional veto points and the consensual culture of policy-making provide strong incentives for actors to form large coalitions. Coalitions are thus especially important in political decision-making in Switzerland, and are accordingly a central focus of this book. According to one of our core claims - to understand the actual functioning of Swiss consensus democracy - one needs to extend the analysis beyond formal institutions to also include informal procedures and practices. Coalitions of actors play a crucial role in this respect. They are a cornerstone of decision-making structures, and they inform us about patterns of conflict, collaboration and power among actors. Looking at coalitions is all the more interesting in the Swiss political system, since the coalition structure is supposed to vary across policy processes. Given the absence of a fixed government coalition, actors need to form new coalitions in each policy process.

Europeanization and the inclusive strategies of executive actors

In Europeanized policy domains, executive actors are considered especially powerful because they are directly responsible for international negotiations. However, in order to avoid failing in the ratification process, they are also highly dependent on the support of domestic, non-state actors. We argue that in Europeanized decision-making processes, state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively seek collaboration with - and support from - domestic actors. We apply stochastic actor-based modelling for network dynamics to collaboration data on two successive bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the European Union (EU). Results confirm our hypotheses that state actors are not passively lobbied, but actively look for collaboration with other actors, and especially with potential veto players and euro-sceptical actors from both the conservative Right and the Left.

Reactive, Slow and...Innovative? Decision-making Structures and Policy Outputs

Consensus democracies like Switzerland are generally known to have a low innovation capacity (Lijphart 1999). This is due to the high number of veto points such as perfect bicameralism or the popular referendum. These institutions provide actors opposing a policy with several opportunities to block potential policy change (Immergut 1990; Tsebelis 2002). In order to avoid a failure of a process because opposing actors activate veto points, decision-making processes in Switzerland tend to integrate a large number of actors with different - and often diverging - preferences (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Including a variety of actors in a decision-making process and taking into account their preferences implies important trade-offs. Integrating a large number of actors and accommodating their preferences takes time and carries the risk of resulting in lowest common denominator solutions. On the contrary, major innovative reforms usually fail or come only as a result of strong external pressures from either the international environment, economic turmoil or the public (Kriesi 1980: 635f.; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Sciarini 1994). Standard decision-making processes are therefore characterized as reactive, slow and capable of only marginal adjustments (Kriesi 1980; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2009; Sciarini 2006). This, in turn, may be at odds with the rapid developments of international politics, the flexibility of the private sector, or the speed of technological development.

Strengthening executive-legislative consultation on foreign policy.

Item 1017-A, 1017-B (microfiche)

Presidential vetoes, 1789-1988 /

Mode of access: Internet.

Realities and ideals; social, political, literary and artistic.

Partly republished from various sources.

Price-support program. : Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, first [-second] session, on proposed modifications of the general farm program.

Pt. 9 has subtitle: Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, second session, on the Veto message of the President on H.R. 12, the Agricultural act of 1946 (H. Doc. 380).

Report to the General Assembly : public fire protection charges.

"Section 9-223(b) required the ICC to conduct at least three public forums by December 31, 2007 ... to evaluate the purpose and use of each fire protection charge imposed by any municipality or public fire protection district, and submit its findings and recommendations to the General Assembly prior to the end of the veto session in 2008."--Cover letter.

Presidential vetoes, 1789-1988 /

Includes index.

A CONFLITUOSA RELAÇÃO DAS ASSEMBLEIAS DE DEUS BRASILEIRAS E A TELEVISÃO: DA PROIBIÇÃO À ACEITABILIDADE

Esta pesquisa busca abordar e analisar os caminhos da mídia televisiva nas igrejas Assembleias de Deus no Brasil, aqui trabalhadas no plural devido às muitas ramificações da denominação, em suas construções das representações simbólicas, imaginárias, culturais e midiáticas. O objetivo é analisar a dimensão simbólica na proibição do uso da televisão na denominação religiosa em questão, e os argumentos para o veto entre os fiéis, a discreta aceitabilidade da TV diante das novas concepções teológicas das ADs ao longo dos anos, investimento em canal aberto (Rede Boas Novas de Televisão) e proposta de um programa televisivo como marca midiática da denominação (Programa Movimento Pentecostal). Para viabilidade desse trabalho, a metodologia adotada consiste em pesquisa bibliográfica histórica, com foco nos temas fundamentais para o desenvolvimento das pesquisas do imaginário, identidade, cultura, nação e televisão, aliada à pesquisa documental, que tem como meta os registros históricos, que melhor elucidarão os caminhos e a ligação da TV com as Assembleias de Deus.

An Analysis on the Decline in the Authoritative Powers of the Papacy and its Application to Challenges to Authoritative Powers Faced By the Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council

The organizational authority of the Papacy in the Roman Catholic Church and the permanent membership of the UN Security Council are unique from institutions that are commonly compared with the UN, like the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations, in that these institutional organs possessed strong authoritative and veto powers. Both organs also owe their strong authority during their founding to a need for stability: The Papacy after the crippling of Western Roman Empire and the P-5 to deal with the insecurities of the post-WWII world. While the P-5 still possesses similar authoritative powers within the Council as it did after WWII, the historical authoritative powers of the Papacy within the Church was debilitated to such a degree that by the time of the Reformation in Europe, condemnations of practices within the Church itself were not effective. This paper will analyze major challenges to the authoritative powers of the Papacy, from the crowning of Charlemagne to the beginning of the Reformation, and compare the analysis to challenges affecting the authoritative powers of the P-5 since its creation. From research conducted thus far, I hypothesize that common themes affecting the authoritative powers of the P-5 and the Papacy would include: major changes in the institutions organization (i.e. the Avignon Papacy and Japan’s bid to become a permanent member); the decline in power of actors supporting the institutional organ (i.e. the Holy Roman Empire and the P-5 members); and ideological clashes affecting the institution’s normative power (i.e. the Great Western Schism and Cold War politics).