Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Increasing quasiconcave production and utility functions with diminishing returns to scale

In microeconomic analysis functions with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) have frequently been employed. Various properties of increasing quasiconcave aggregator functions with DRS are derived. Furthermore duality in the classical sense as well as of a new type is studied for such aggregator functions in production and consumer theory. In particular representation theorems for direct and indirect aggregator functions are obtained. These involve only small sets of generator functions. The study is carried out in the contemporary framework of abstract convexity and abstract concavity.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An Atkinson-Gini family of social evaluation functions

We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and inequality indices which merge the features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Yitzhaki (1983) and Kakwani (1980)) indices. Income inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity. These ocial evaluation functions can be interpreted as average utility corrected for the illfare of relative deprivation. They can alternatively be understood as averages of altruistic well-being in a population. They moreover have a simple graphical interpretation.

Self-selection consistent functions

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.

The mean dehn functions of Abelian groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

The Cuntz semigroup, the Elliott conjecture, and dimension functions on C*-Algebras

We prove that the Cuntz semigroup is recovered functorially from the Elliott invariant for a large class of C¤-algebras. In particular, our results apply to the largest class of simple C¤-algebras for which K-theoretic classification can be hoped for. This work has three significant consequences. First, it provides new conceptual insight into Elliott's classification program, proving that the usual form of the Elliott conjecture is equivalent, among Z-stable algebras, to a conjecture which is in general substantially weaker and for which there are no known counterexamples. Second and third, it resolves, for the class of algebras above, two conjectures of Blackadar and Handelman concerning the basic structure of dimension functions on C¤-algebras. We also prove in passing that the Kuntz-Pedersen semigroup is recovered functorially from the Elliott invariant for all simple unital C¤-algebras of interest.

Characterisation of neutron spectra in mixed high energy fields in lineal accelerators: response functions validation

Actualment, la resposta de la majoria d’instrumentació operacional i dels dosímetres personals utilitzats en radioprotecció per a la dosimetria neutrònica és altament dependent de l’energia dels espectres neutrònics a analitzar, especialment amb camps neutrònics amb una important component intermitja. En conseqüència, la interpretació de les lectures d’aquests aparells es complicada si no es té un coneixement previ de la distribució espectral de la fluència neutrònica en els punts d’interès. El Grup de Física de les Radiacions de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (GFR-UAB) ha desenvolupat en els últims anys un espectròmetre de neutrons basat en un Sistema d’Esferes Bonner (BSS) amb un contador proporcional d’3He com a detector actiu. Els principals avantatges dels espectròmetres de neutrons per BSS són: la seva resposta isotròpica, la possibilitat de discriminar la component neutrònica de la gamma en camps mixtos, i la seva alta sensibilitat neutrònica als nivells de dosi analitzats. Amb aquestes característiques, els espectròmetres neutrònics per BSS compleixen amb els estándards de les últimes recomanacions de la ICRP i poden ser utilitzats també en el camp de la dosimetria neutrònica per a la mesura de dosis en el rang d’energia que va dels tèrmics fins als 20 MeV, en nou ordres de magnitud. En el marc de la col•laboració entre el GFR - UAB i el Laboratorio Nazionale di Frascati – Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (LNF-INFN), ha tingut lloc una experiència comparativa d’espectrometria per BSS amb els feixos quasi monoenergètics de 2.5 MeV i 14 MeV del Fast Neutron Generator de l’ENEA. En l’exercici s’ha determinat l’espectre neutrònic a diferents distàncies del blanc de l’accelerador, aprofitant el codi FRUIT recentment desenvolupat pel grup LNF. Els resultats obtinguts mostren una bona coherència entre els dos espectròmetres i les dades mesurades i simulades.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

3-T direct MR arthrography of the wrist: value of finger trap distraction to assess intrinsic ligament and triangular fibrocartilage complex tears.

PURPOSE: To determine the value of applying finger trap distraction during direct MR arthrography of the wrist to assess intrinsic ligament and triangular fibrocartilage complex (TFCC) tears. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Twenty consecutive patients were prospectively investigated by three-compartment wrist MR arthrography. Imaging was performed with 3-T scanners using a three-dimensional isotropic (0.4 mm) T1-weighted gradient-recalled echo sequence, with and without finger trap distraction (4 kg). In a blind and independent fashion, two musculoskeletal radiologists measured the width of the scapholunate (SL), lunotriquetral (LT) and ulna-TFC (UTFC) joint spaces. They evaluated the amount of contrast medium within these spaces using a four-point scale, and assessed SL, LT and TFCC tears, as well as the disruption of Gilula's carpal arcs. RESULTS: With finger trap distraction, both readers found a significant increase in width of the SL space (mean Δ = +0.1mm, p ≤ 0.040), and noticed more contrast medium therein (p ≤ 0.035). In contrast, the differences in width of the LT (mean Δ = +0.1 mm, p ≥ 0.057) and UTFC (mean Δ = 0mm, p ≥ 0.728) spaces, as well as the amount of contrast material within these spaces were not statistically significant (p = 0.607 and ≥ 0.157, respectively). Both readers detected more SL (Δ = +1, p = 0.157) and LT (Δ = +2, p = 0.223) tears, although statistical significance was not reached, and Gilula's carpal arcs were more frequently disrupted during finger trap distraction (Δ = +5, p = 0.025). CONCLUSION: The application of finger trap distraction during direct wrist MR arthrography may enhance both detection and characterisation of SL and LT ligament tears by widening the SL space and increasing the amount of contrast within the SL and LT joint spaces.