A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2007

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, October 2007

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, June 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Signalling, mating success and paternal investment in sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus): A theoretical model

I present an optimisation model that links paternal investment, male display and female choice. Although deviced for sticklebacks, it readily applies to other fish with male guarding behaviour. It relies on a few basic assumptions on the ways hatching success depends on paternal investment and clutch size, and male survival on paternal investment and signaling. Paternal investment is here a state-dependent decision, and signal a condition-dependent handicap by which males inform females of how much they are willing to invest. Series of predictions are derived on female and male breeding strategies, including optimal levels of signaling and paternal investment as functions of clutch size, own condition, and residual reproductive value, as well as alternative strategies such as egg kleptoparasitism. Some predictions already have empirical support, for which the present model provides new interpretations. Other might readily be tested, e.g. by simple clutch-size manipulations.

Health investment complementarities under competing risks

Applying the competing--risks model to multi--cause mortality,this paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the positive complementarities that occur between disease--specific policy interventions. We argue that since an individual cannot die twice, competing risks imply that individuals will not waste resources on causes that are not the most immediate, but will make health investments so as to equalize cause--specific mortality. However, equal mortality risk from a variety of diseases does not imply that disease--specific public health interventions are a waste. Rather, a cause--specific intervention produces spillovers to other disease risks, so that the overall reduction in mortality will generally be larger than the direct effect measured on the targeted disease. The assumption that mortality from non--targeted diseases remains the same after a cause--specific intervention under--estimates the true effect of such programs, since the background mortality is also altered as a result of intervention. Analyzing data from one of the most important public health programs ever introduced, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) of the United Nations, we find evidence for the existence of such complementarities, involving causes that are not biomedically, but behaviorally, linked.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, July 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

2009-2013 Iowa Transportation Improvement Program

The Iowa Transportation Improvement Program (Program) is published to inform Iowans of planned investments in our state's transportation system. The Iowa Transportation Commission (Commission) and Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) are committed to programming those investments in a fiscally responsible manner. Iowa's transportation system is multi-modal; therefore, the Program encompasses investments in aviation, transit, railroads, trails, and highways. A major component of the Program is the highway section. The FY2009-2013 highway section is financially balanced and was developed to achieve several objectives. The Commission's primary highway investment objective is the safety, maintenance and preservation of Iowa's existing highway system. The Commission has allocated an annual average of $321 million to achieve this objective. This includes $185 million in 2009 and $170 million annually in years 2010-2013 for preserving the interstate system. It includes $114 million in 2009, $100 million in 2010 and $90 million annually in years 2011-2013 for non-interstate pavement preservation. It includes $38 million annually in 2009 and 2010, and $35 million annually in years 2011-2013 for non-interstate bridges. In addition, $15 million annually is allocated for safety projects. However, due to increasing construction costs, flattened revenues and overall highway systems needs, the Commission acknowledges that insufficient funds are being invested in the maintenance and preservation of the existing highway system. Another objective involves investing in projects that have received funding from the federal transportation act and/or subsequent federal transportation appropriation acts. In particular, funding is being used where it will complete a project, corridor or useable segment of a larger project. As an investment goal, the Commission also wishes to advance highway projects that address the state's highway capacity and economic development needs. Projects that address these needs and were included for completion in the previous program have been advanced into this year's Program to maintain their scheduled completion. This program also includes a small number of other projects that generally either represent a final phase of a partially programmed project or an additional segment of a partially completed corridor. The TIME-21 bill, Senate File 2420, signed by Governor Chet Culver on April 22, provides additional funding to cities, counties and the Iowa DOT for road improvements. This will result in additional revenue to the Primary Road Fund beginning in the second half of FY2009 and gradually increase over time. The additional funding will be included in future highway programming objectives and proposals and is not reflected in this highway program. The Iowa DOT and Commission appreciate the public's involvement in the state's transportation planning process. Comments received personally, by letter, or through participation in the Commission's regular meetings or public input meetings held around the state each year are invaluable in providing guidance for the future of Iowa's transportation system. It should be noted that this document is a planning guide. It does not represent a binding commitment or obligation of the Commission or Iowa DOT, and is subject to change. You are invited to visit the Iowa DOT's Web site at iowadot.gov for additional and regular updates about the department's programs and activities.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, August 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Balance Between Investment Protection and Sustainable Development in BITs: the Example of Switzerland

The objective of this article is to examine how substantive and procedural rights granted to foreign investors by Swiss bits are gradually being balanced with social and environmental provisions. Switzerland has enjoyed a long bit practice, as it signed its first treaty with Tunisia fifty years ago. Swiss bits rely on the post-establishment model and include usual standards of treatment. From 1981, they also systematically provide for a dispute settlement mechanism for disputes arising between an investor and a host State. Since the Switzerland - El Salvador bit in 1994, sustainable development concerns have been expressly inserted in some Swiss bits, as well as in several recent free trade agreements. Provisions on this theme are however far from being systematic in Switzerland's bit practice and essentially remain declaratory in nature. The trend towards wider inclusion of sustainable development provisions in bits still faces several practical and political challenges.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, September 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Firm investment in imperfect capital markets: A structural estimation

We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.