Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) Fail to Be Equitable in an Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans' sense of fairness. In the game, a "proposer" is given a sum of money and is told they can split it however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with some studies finding the animals share humans' disposition to behave 'fairly' and others concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a "dictator game" where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject's offer by refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner's cooperation in the task. Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a conspecific's reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual cost associated with behaving prosocially.

Closed-loop control of mean arterial blood pressure during surgery with alfentanil: clinical evaluation of a novel model-based predictive controller

BACKGROUND: In contrast to hypnosis, there is no surrogate parameter for analgesia in anesthetized patients. Opioids are titrated to suppress blood pressure response to noxious stimulation. The authors evaluated a novel model predictive controller for closed-loop administration of alfentanil using mean arterial blood pressure and predicted plasma alfentanil concentration (Cp Alf) as input parameters. METHODS: The authors studied 13 healthy patients scheduled to undergo minor lumbar and cervical spine surgery. After induction with propofol, alfentanil, and mivacurium and tracheal intubation, isoflurane was titrated to maintain the Bispectral Index at 55 (+/- 5), and the alfentanil administration was switched from manual to closed-loop control. The controller adjusted the alfentanil infusion rate to maintain the mean arterial blood pressure near the set-point (70 mmHg) while minimizing the Cp Alf toward the set-point plasma alfentanil concentration (Cp Alfref) (100 ng/ml). RESULTS: Two patients were excluded because of loss of arterial pressure signal and protocol violation. The alfentanil infusion was closed-loop controlled for a mean (SD) of 98.9 (1.5)% of presurgery time and 95.5 (4.3)% of surgery time. The mean (SD) end-tidal isoflurane concentrations were 0.78 (0.1) and 0.86 (0.1) vol%, the Cp Alf values were 122 (35) and 181 (58) ng/ml, and the Bispectral Index values were 51 (9) and 52 (4) before surgery and during surgery, respectively. The mean (SD) absolute deviations of mean arterial blood pressure were 7.6 (2.6) and 10.0 (4.2) mmHg (P = 0.262), and the median performance error, median absolute performance error, and wobble were 4.2 (6.2) and 8.8 (9.4)% (P = 0.002), 7.9 (3.8) and 11.8 (6.3)% (P = 0.129), and 14.5 (8.4) and 5.7 (1.2)% (P = 0.002) before surgery and during surgery, respectively. A post hoc simulation showed that the Cp Alfref decreased the predicted Cp Alf compared with mean arterial blood pressure alone. CONCLUSION: The authors' controller has a similar set-point precision as previous hypnotic controllers and provides adequate alfentanil dosing during surgery. It may help to standardize opioid dosing in research and may be a further step toward a multiple input-multiple output controller.

Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Control of recycle processes using neural networks combined with PID controller

This thesis is focused on the control of a system with recycle. A new control strategy using neural network combined with PID controller was proposed. The combined controller was studied and tested on the pressure control of a vaporizer inside a para-xylene production process. The major problems are the negative effects of recycle and the delays on instability and performance. The neural network was designed to move the process close to the set points while the PID accomplishes the finer level of disturbance rejection and offset reductions. Our simulation results show that during control, the neural network was able to determine the nonlinear relationship between steady state and manipulated variables. The results also show the disturbance rejection was handled by PID controller effectively.

Marker-Based Embodied Interaction for Handheld Augmented Reality Games

This article deals with embodied user interfaces for handheld augmented reality games, which consist of both physical and virtual components. We have developed a number of spatial interaction techniques that optically capture the device's movement and orientation relative to a visual marker. Such physical interactions in 3-D space enable manipulative control of mobile games. In addition to acting as a physical controller that recognizes multiple game-dependent gestures, the mobile device augments the camera view with graphical overlays. We describe three game prototypes that use ubiquitous product packaging and other passive media as backgrounds for handheld augmentation. The prototypes can be realized on widely available off-the-shelf hardware and require only minimal setup and infrastructure support.

The TViews Table Role-Playing Game

The TViews Table Role-Playing Game (TTRPG) is a digital tabletop role-playing game that runs on the TViews table, bridging the separate worlds of traditional role-playing games with the growing area of massively multiplayer online role-playing games. The TViews table is an interactive tabletop media platform that can track the location of multiple tagged objects in real-time as they are moved around its surface, providing a simultaneous and coincident graphical display. In this paper we present the implementation of the first version of TTRPG, with a content set based on the traditional Dungeons & Dragons rule-set. We also discuss the results of a user study that used TTRPG to explore the possible social context of digital tabletop role-playing games.

A Simple Computer Game for Learning Mathematics

It is sometimes unquantifiable how hard it is for most people to deal with game addiction. Several articles have equally been published to address this subject, some suggesting the concept of Educational and serious games. Similarly, researchers have revealed that it does not come easy learning a subject like math. This is where the illusive world of computer games comes in. It is amazing how much people learn from games. In this paper, we have designed and programmed a simple PC math game that teaches rudimentary topics in mathematics.