Inclusion of the European Nordic model in the debate concerning social protection reform: the long-term development of Nordic welfare systems (1890-2005) and their transferability to Latin America in the twenty-first century

Includes bibliography

Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’

This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.

Influencing the European Union from Outside. Switzerland, the European Water Framework Directive, and Micropollution Regulation in the Rhine River Basin

This paper sheds light on an unusual political influence mechanism, i.e. the influence of a non-EU member state on agendas and policies at the level of the EU and EU members states. Borrowing both from the literatures on policy diffusion as well as on the influence of small member states in EU decision-making, we argue that such an influence is fostered by both structural and agency-related factors. We illustrate this potential influence with a case study on the regulation of micropollutants in waterbodies. Adopting a mixed-method approach, we show that the upstream location of Switzerland, its integration into transnational networks as well as joint water basin institutions provides the country with structural opportunities to diffuse policy innovation to the EU’s policy agenda and member states’ policies. In addition, agency-related factors matter as the EU or member states can point to Switzerland as a successful example or pioneer, especially since the Swiss policy is in line with an overall EU strategy on reducing negative impacts of chemicals on humans and the environment.

Major differences in organization and availability of health care and medicines for HIV/TB coinfected patients across Europe

OBJECTIVES The aim of the study was to investigate the organization and delivery of HIV and tuberculosis (TB) health care and to analyse potential differences between treatment centres in Eastern (EE) and Western Europe (WE). METHODS Thirty-eight European HIV and TB treatment centres participating in the TB:HIV study within EuroCoord completed a survey on health care management for coinfected patients in 2013 (EE: 17 respondents; WE:21; 76% of all TB:HIV centres). Descriptive statistics were obtained for regional comparisons. The reported data on health care strategies were compared with actual clinical practice at patient level via data derived from the TB:HIV study. RESULTS Respondent centres in EE comprised: Belarus (n = 3), Estonia (1), Georgia (1), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1), Poland (4), Romania (1), the Russian Federation (4) and Ukraine (1); those in WE comprised: Belgium (1), Denmark (1), France (1), Italy (7), Spain (2), Switzerland (1) and UK (8). Compared with WE, treatment of HIV and TB in EE are less often located at the same site (47% in EE versus 100% in WE; P < 0.001) and less often provided by the same doctors (41% versus 90%, respectively; P = 0.002), whereas regular screening of HIV-infected patients for TB (80% versus 40%, respectively; P = 0.037) and directly observed treatment (88% versus 20%, respectively; P < 0.001) were more common in EE. The reported availability of rifabutin and second- and third-line anti-TB drugs was lower, and opioid substitution therapy (OST) was available at fewer centres in EE compared with WE (53% versus 100%, respectively; P < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS Major differences exist between EE and WE in relation to the organization and delivery of health care for HIV/TB-coinfected patients and the availability of anti-TB drugs and OST. Significant discrepancies between reported and actual clinical practices were found in EE.

How quota-based procedures affect the self-ascribed fit and motivation of European women and men striving for leadership positions

The consequences of quota-based hiring policies on women’s and men’s self-ascribed fit and motivation to apply for leadership positions were investigated in the European context. 389 management students (195 women, 194 men) from Switzerland, Germany, and Austria received job advertisements varying in their gender policies. Interestingly, women’s and men’s self-ascribed fit and motivation to apply did not differ when no policy was included. Instead, participant’s agency was the relevant predictor leading to higher perceived fit, resulting in higher inclination to apply. When women were either explicitly invited to apply or preferentially treated when equally qualified, they reported higher fit and inclination to apply compared to both the control condition and men. In contrast, when a quota of 40% women should be established, neither women’s fit nor motivation to apply were increased beyond the levels of the control or men’s. Men were not affected by the different policies.

Discretion and Accountability: The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 30/2014

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrated the relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his independence. The paper also explains the inter-temporal interactions between the principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players. The second part is devoted to analysis of the functioning of ESMA in the context of its delegated powers. After the presentation of main aspects of the regulatory framework establishing ESMA, the paper continuous with an analysis and interpretation of the discretionary powers of ESMA. The rather rigid position of the Court of Justice in relation to the Meroni doctrine seems to be unsuitable to delegation of complex regulatory tasks. This is particularly evident in the case of financial markets. Finally, the judgment does not examine in any detail whether and how the principals - i.e. the EU and Member States - are best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and regulations and whether there are different but more effective accountability mechanisms.

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.