Letter to H.H. Collier of Austin, Texas to the care of Cruger and Moore of Houston, Texas and New Orleans

Letter to H.H. Collier of Austin, Texas to the care of Cruger and Moore of Houston, Texas and New Orleans. The letter is from his sister, E. Richards. She writes about family life, her job as a teacher and politics (3 ¼ pages, handwritten), Jan. 23, 1841.

In The Circle : jazz Griots and the Mapping of African American Cultural Memory in Poetry

Ma thèse de doctorat, In the Circle: Jazz Griots and the Mapping of African American Cultural History in Poetry, étudie la façon dont les poètes afro-américains des années 1960 et 1970, Langston Hughes, David Henderson, Sonia Sanchez, et Amiri Baraka, emploient le jazz afin d’ancrer leur poésie dans la tradition de performance. Ce faisant, chacun de ces poètes démontre comment la culture noire, en conceptualisant à travers la performance des modes de résistance, fût utilisée par les peuples de descendance africaine pour contrer le racisme institutionnalisé et les discours discriminatoires. Donc, pour les fins de cette thèse, je me concentre sur quatre poètes engagés dans des dialogues poétiques avec la musicologie, l’esthétique, et la politique afro-américaines des années 1960 et 1970. Ces poètes affirment la centralité de la performativité littéraire noire afin d’assurer la survie et la continuité de la mémoire culturelle collective des afro-américains. De plus, mon argument est que la théorisation de l’art afro-américain comme engagement politique devient un élément central à l’élaboration d’une esthétique noire basée sur la performance. Ma thèse de doctorat propose donc une analyse originale des ces quatre poètes qui infusent leur poèmes avec des références au jazz et à la politique dans le but de rééduquer les générations des années 2000 en ce qui concerne leur mémoire collective.

Constructive Universalism: Sen and Sensitivity to Difference

Amartya Sen’s capability approach is, on the one hand, in line with universalism such as exhibited in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s human need theory. On the other hand, his approach puts priority on people’s “self-evaluation” of capabilities and needs. The latter emphasis makes his approach distinctly sensitive to people’s differences such as gender, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, etc.. One could ask, however, how successfully the former commitment to universalism relates to this latter feature that places importance on taking difference seriously. This question is especially relevant with respect to global justice and gender, for example. To offer a potential answers to this question is main goal of this paper.

Well-Being Freedom and The Possibility of Public-Provision Unit in Global Context

The purpose of this paper is, first, to investigate the interconnections of substantive freedoms, which are indispensable for every individual to “lead the kind of lives they have reason to value” (Sen, 1999b, p.10,18), and which have legitimate and ethical reasons to be publicly secured, second, to investigate a conception of public-provision unit that embodies “the right to well-being freedom”, and a conception of decision-making unit that corresponds to it, based on the perspective of Sen’s capability theory and its extension, comparing with that of Rawls’ Theory of Justice and A Law of People. If we intend to construct such a public-provision unit, which conducts redistribution as a whole, and which receives every individual who cannot belong to any fixed local group, what kind of a body should we assume as a public-provision unit? And further, what kind of a body should we assume as a decision-making unit, which is responsible for deciding or revising the basic conceptions of public provision unit?

An Egalitarian Argument in Favour of Free Access to Healthcare and Rationing

La pensée égalitariste a traditionnellement promu l’idéal d’un système de santé universel, gratuit et accessible à tous les membres de la société. J’appuie cette position en répliquant tout d’abord à la critique qui prétend que les riches tireraient plus d’avantages que les pauvres de la gratuité du système de santé. J’ouvre ensuite la réflexion sur ce qui me semble être un enjeu crucial pour l’avenir des systèmes modernes de santé : le rationnement de l’offre. Cette idée ne plaît généralement pas à la population, aux décideurs politiques et à de nombreux égalitaristes. Je considère pourtant que les principaux arguments invoqués contre le rationnement sont incohérents ou faussement égalitaristes. La gratuité des services de santé n’est pas incompatible avec la limitation de l’offre publique.

Social Opportunities and Individual Responsibility: The Capability Approach and the Third Way

The fashionable widespreading of Sen’s ideas coincides with a new mood in the shaping of public policies in affluent societies. In Europe indeed, an “opportunity”-based approach to social security has been implemented through the European Employment Strategy. Public action tends to rely on a procedural concern with individual opportunities or potentialities in the labour market. The underlying ethics is that individuals are then responsible to use these background opportunities in order to lead the kind of life they value most. More broadly, the discourse and practice of the so-called “Third Way” shares with the capability approach an appeal for a procedural and enabling depiction of the role of the State. The paper intends to clarify the relation between procedural and opportunity-based approaches to social justice, among them the capability approach, and these new patterns of public action. Our vision goes in the way of a yet renewed, but deeper action of the welfare state, where social agency is envisaged as the very condition of individual agency. Drawing on the various critics of mainstream equality of opportunity, two opposed approaches to responsibility are identified: on the one hand, responsibility is conceived of as i) a “luck vs. choice” fixed starting point, ii) a backward-looking conception and iii) a highly individualistic framework. On the other hand, responsibility is envisaged as i) an outcome of public policies rather than a starting point, ii) a forward-looking conception, and iii) a combined institutional-individual framework. We situate here Sen’s capability approach, as well as critics of the luck egalitarianism path. The Third Way rhetoric is assessed against both these perspectives. The issue eventually boils down to an ethical reflection on the articulation of responsibilities, and to a pragmatic and substantial concern for the content of what providing security should mean in practice.

Economic Incentives and Liberal Equality

In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are more problematic. I argue that in non-ideal circumstances justice may permit and even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the fact that those who receive non-compensatory payments are not entitled to them. In some circumstances, justice may require us to accede to unreasonable demands for incentive payments by hard bargainers. This leads to a kind of paradox: from a systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive payments can be justified even though those who receive them have no just claim to them.

Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of Justice

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.