Direct Democracy and Institutional Trust: Relationships and Differences across Personality Traits

Direct democracy plays a prominent role in the explanation of institutional trust. To date, however, empirical findings on the effects of direct democracy remain inconclusive. In this article, we argue that this inconclusiveness can be partly ascribed to the diverse effects direct democracy has on individuals. In other words, direct democracy influences institutional trust, but how and to what degree depends on individuals’ personality traits. Running hierarchical analyses of unique survey data from a random sample of eligible Swiss voters, we document three findings: First, we show that the number of ballot measures is not directly associated with institutional trust. Second, we demonstrate that the Big Five personality traits affect the propensity to trust. Third, some of these traits also alter the relationship between direct democracy and institutional trust, suggesting that certain personality types are more likely to be sensitive to popular votes than others and that not everyone is equally likely to respond to political stimuli, even in highly democratic environments.

Taking the multidimensionality of democracy seriously: institutional patterns and the quality of democracy

Democracies come in all shapes and sizes. Which configuration of political institutions produces the highest democratic quality is a notorious debate. The lineup of contenders includes ‘consensus’, ‘Westminster’, and ‘centripetal’ democracy. A trend in the evaluation of the relationship between empirical patterns of democracy and its quality is that the multidimensional nature of both concepts is increasingly taken into account. This article tests the assertion that certain centripetal configurations of proportionality in party systems and government, and unitarism in the remaining state structure, might outperform all other alternatives both in terms of inclusiveness and effectiveness. Analyzing 33 democracies, the results of interactive regression models only partially support this claim. Proportional–unitary democracies have the best track record in terms of representation, but there are little differences in participation, transparency, and government capability compared with other models.

Representing Afghanistan: The United States and Democracy's Imposition

There is an ongoing mission in Afghanistan; a mission driven by external political forces. At its core this mission hopes to establish peace, to protect the populace, and to install democracy. Each of these goals has remained just that, a goal, for the past eight years as the American and international mission in Afghanistan has enjoyed varied levels of commitment. Currently, the stagnant progress in Afghanistan has led the international community to become increasingly concerned about the viability of a future Afghan state. Most of these questions take root in the question over whether or not an Afghan state can function without the auspices of international terrorism. Inevitably, the normative question of what exactly that government should be arises from this base concern. In formulating a response to this question, the consensus of western society has been to install representative democracy. This answer has been a recurring theme in the post Cold War era as states such as Bosnia and Somalia bear witness to the ill effects of external democratic imposition. I hypothesize that the current mold of externally driven state-building is unlikely to result in what western actors seek it to establish: representative democracy. By primarily examining the current situation in Afghanistan, I claim that external installation of representative democracy is modally flawed in that its process mandates choice. Representative democracy by definition constitutes a government reflective of its people, or electorate. Thus, freedom of choice is necessary for a functional representative democracy. From this, one can deduce that because an essential function of democracy is choice, its implementation lies with the presence of choice. State-building is an imposition that eliminates that necessary ingredient. The two stand as polar opposites that cannot effectively collaborate. Security, governing capacity, and development have all been targeted as measurements of success in Afghanistan. The three factors are generally seen as mutually constitutive; so improved security is seen as improving governing capacity. Thus, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a deteriorating security environment moving forward has demonstrated the inability of the Afghan government to govern. The primary reason for the Afghan government’s deficiencies is its lack of legitimacy among its constituency. Even the use of the term ‘constituency’ must be qualified because the Afghan government has often oscillated between serving the people within its territorial borders and the international community. The existence of the Afghan state is so dependent on foreign aid and intervention that it has lost policy-making and enforcing power. This is evident by the inability of Afghanistan to engage in basic sovereign state activities as maintaining a national budget, conducting elections, providing for its own national security, and deterring criminality. The Afghan state is nothing more than a shell of a government, and indicative of the failings that external state-building has with establishing democracy.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 640 - "Simmel and Freudian Philosophy", "Authoritarianism and the Family Today" und "The Chances of Democracy in Germany" (p. IX 18.1-3-IX 19a)

"Simmel and Freudian Philosophy" (GS 5, S. 396-405); 1. Nachruf, verlesen beim Memorial Meeting for Ernst Simmel; datiert: 13.12.1947; veröffentlicht in: International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 29. Jahrgang, 1948, S. 110-113; 2. Abschrift aus Werken und Briefen Siegmund Freuds; Typoskript, 9 Blatt; 3. Freeman, Burriel: 1 Brief mit Unterschirft an Max Horkheimer, Chicago, 10.06.1949; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer, Los Angeles, 15.06.1949, 2 Blatt; "Authoritarianism and the Family Today" (GS 5, S. 377-395); 1. Aufsatz, datiert 1947, veröffentlicht in: Ruth Nanda Anshen (editor), "The Family: Its Function and Distiny", New York 1949. a) Typsokript, 20 Blatt b) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 20 Blatt c) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 20 Blatt d)-f) deutsche Fassung mit dem Titel "Autorität und Familie", übersetzt vom Institut für Sozialforschung, 1960; veröffentlicht in : "Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. Festschrift für Theodor Litt", Düsseldorft, 1960 d) Typoskript, 20 Blatt e) Typoskript, 20 Blatt f) Korrekturfahnen aus der Litt- Festschrift, mit dem Titel "Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart"; 6 Blatt; 2. Schönbach, Peter: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Max Horkheier, ohne Ort, 23.06.1960; 1 Blatt; 3. Schönbach, Peter: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Friedrich Pollock, ohne Ort, 22.06.1960; 1 Blatt; "The Chances of Democracy in Germany" (GS 12, S. 184-194); 1947 [?] a) Typoskript, 10 Blatt b) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 11 Blatt c) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen ,11 Blatt;

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 694 - "German Economy, Politics and Culture, 1900-1933", "The Collapse of German Democracy and the Expansion of National Socialism" (p. IX 168e - IX 169a)

"German Economy, Politics and Culture, 1900-1933. A Research Project of the International Institute of Social Research" (1940):; 1. Umriß des Forschungsprojekts: e)-g) Fassung vom 25.5.1940: e) Typoskript, 63 Blatt, f) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 61 Blatt, g) Typoskript, 61 Blatt, h)-k) "Introduction": h) Typoskript, 21 Blatt, i) Typoskript, 15 Blatt, k) D.V. Glass: Entwurf, Manuskript, 17 Blatt; 2. Kostenschätzung zum Forschungsprojekt. 1 Blatt; "The Collapse of German Democracy and the Expansion of National Socialism" (1940):; 1. Darstellung des Forschungsprojekts (15.9.1940), a) als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 70 Blatt;

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 695 - "The Collapse of German Democracy and the Expansion of National Socialism", "Cultural Aspects of National Socialism" u.a. (p. IX 169.1a - IX 170.1-4)

"The Collapse of German Democracy and the Expansion of National Socialism" (1940):; 1. Darstellung des Forschungsprojekts (15.9.1940), b. Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 78 Blatt; 2. "Research work on recent trends in the history of ideas (parts of the Research project on the Collapse of German Democracy would be included)". Als Memorandum zur Eröffnung zur Eröffnung einer Zweigstelle des Instituts in Los Angeles (12.12.1940): a) Typoskript, 2 Blatt, b) Teilstück, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt, c) Teilstück, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt, d) Teilstück, Typoskript, 1 Blatt, e) Teilstück, Typoskript, 1 Blatt, f) Entwurf, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen und Manuskript, 3 Blatt; 3. University of California, Los Angeles: 2 Briefe (Abschrift) von Max Horkheimer, o.O., 1940, 2 Briefe (Abschrift) an Max Horkheimer, 1940, 2 Blatt; A.R.L. Gurland: "Survey of Structural Changes in the German Economy, 1933 to 1939. Technological Bases and Organizational Forms of the National Socialist Economic System". Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen unter anderem von Theodor W. Adorno, 48 Blatt (formal nicht identisch mit "Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism", Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Bd. IX, 1941, S. 226ff.); "Cultural Aspects of National Socialism. A Research Project" (1941):; 1. Institute of Social Research: Mitteilung über das Forschungsprojekt und das 'Supplementary Statement', Typoskript, englisch, 4 Blatt; 2. Supplementary Statement to the Research Project, a) Typoskript, 14.4.1941, 63 Blatt, b) Typoskript, 12.4.1941, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 35 Blatt; 3. "Cultural Aspects of National Socialism. A Research Project" (24.2.1941), a) als Typoskript vervielfältigt, 54 Blatt, b) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 34 Blatt, c) Fassung Januar 1941, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 40 Blatt; 4. Inhaltsverzeichnisse, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 3 Blatt;

Democracy in the healthcare workplace: A critical perspective

A review of existing literature revealed at least two distinct theoretical perspectives or schools of thought which are troubled by problems of the lack of participation in the workplace: Jurgen Habermas' ideal of communicative rationality (1984; 1987); and the field of workplace democracy. Whereas Habermas' ideal of communicative rationality establishes communication as necessary to attain a democratic workplace, the ideal of workplace democracy focuses on a participatory ideal in which conditions of open participation must be fulfilled in order to attain a democratic workplace. This study compared the strengths and weaknesses of the conditions proposed by Habermas with the strengths and weaknesses of the conditions selected to represent the workplace democracy ideal. Two incidents were selected for analysis which occurred within a period of one year within one large healthcare organization. The author was present as a participant-observer to assess these incidents. Each of the conditions for the ideal of communicative rationality and for the workplace democracy ideal was systematically applied to both incidents selected for analysis. The results of the analysis suggested that application of Habermas' theory provided more insight into potential distortions in communication than did the conditions selected to represent workplace democracy. Although the conditions of both models were frequently complementary and even overlapping at times, application of each theory to the same incident produced distinctly different results. ^