858 resultados para California. Supreme Court.
Resumo:
This paper develops an understanding of creativity to meet the requirements of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural (1991). The inclusion of creativity in originality, in a minimal degree of creativity, and in a creative spark below the level required for originality, is first established. Conditions for creativity are simultaneously derived. Clauses negatively implying creativity are then identified and considered.
The clauses which imply creativity can be extensively correlated with conceptions of computability. The negative of creativity is then understood as an automatic mechanical or computational procedure or a so routine process which results in a highly routine product. Conversely, creativity invariantly involves a not mechanical procedure. The not mechanical is then populated by meaning, in accord with accepted distinctions, drawing on a range of discourses. Meaning is understood as a different level of analysis to the syntactic or mechanical and also as involving direct human engagement with meaning. As direct engagement with meaning, it can be connected to classic concepts of creativity, through the association of dissimilars. Creativity is finally understood as not mechanical human activity above a certain level of routinicity.
Creativity is then integrated with a minimal degree of creativity and with originality. The level of creativity required for a minimal degree is identified as intellectual. The combination of an intellectual level with a sufficient amount of creativity can be read from the exchange values connected with the product of creative activity. Humanly created bibliographic records and indexes are then possible correlates to or constituents of a minimal degree of creativity. A four stage discriminatory process for determining originality is then specified. Finally, the strength and value of the argument are considered.
Finally, the strength and value of the argument are considered.
Resumo:
In recent years, the US Supreme Court has rather controversially extended the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act to extend arbitration’s reach into, inter alia¸ consumer matters, with the consequence that consumers are often (and unbeknownst to them) denied remedies which would otherwise be available. Such denied remedies include recourse to class action proceedings, effective denial of punitive damages, access to discovery and the ability to resolve the matter in a convenient forum.
The courts extension of arbitration’s ambit is controversial. Attempts to overturn this extension have been made in Congress, but to no avail. In contrast to American law, European consumer law looks at pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate directed at consumers with extreme suspicion, and does so on the grounds of fairness. In contrast, some argue that pre-dispute agreements in consumer (and employment) matters are consumer welfare enhancing: they decrease the costs of doing business, which is then passed on to the consumer. This Article examines these latter claims from both an economic and normative perspective.
The economic analysis of these arguments shows that their assumptions do not hold. Rather than being productive of consumer surplus, the use of arbitration is likely to have the opposite effect. The industries from which the recent Supreme Court cases originated not only do not exhibit the industrial structure assumed by the proponents of expanded arbitration, but are also industries which exhibit features that facilitate consumer welfare reducing collusion.
The normative analysis addresses the fairness concerns. It is explicitly based upon John Rawls’ notion of “justice as fairness,” which can provide a lens to evaluate social institutions. This Rawlsian analysis considers the use of extended arbitration in consumer matters in the light of the earlier economic results. It suggests that the asymmetries present in the contractual allocation of rights serve as prima facie evidence that such arbitration–induced exclusions are prima facie unjust/unfair. However, as asymmetry is only a prima facie test, a generalized criticism of the arbitration exclusions (of the sort found in Congress and underlying the European regime) is overbroad.
Resumo:
The Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural (Feist, 1991) specified that compilations or databases, and other works, must have a minimal degree of creativity to be copyrightable. The significance and global diffusion of the decision is only matched by the difficulties it has posed for interpretation. The judgment does not specify what is to be understood by creativity, although it does give a full account of the negative of creativity, as ‘so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’ (Feist, 1991, p.362). The negative of creativity as highly mechanical has particularly diffused globally.
A recent interpretation has correlated ‘so mechanical’ (Feist, 1991) with an automatic mechanical procedure or computational process, using a rigorous exegesis fully to correlate the two uses of mechanical. The negative of creativity is then understood as an automatic computation and as a highly routine process. Creativity is itself is conversely understood as non-computational activity, above a certain level of routinicity (Warner, 2013).
The distinction between the negative of creativity and creativity is strongly analogous to an independently developed distinction between forms of mental labour, between semantic and syntactic labour. Semantic labour is understood as human labour motivated by considerations of meaning and syntactic labour as concerned solely with patterns. Semantic labour is distinctively human while syntactic labour can be directly humanly conducted or delegated to machine, as an automatic computational process (Warner, 2005; 2010, pp.33-41).
The value of the analogy is to greatly increase the intersubjective scope of the distinction between semantic and syntactic mental labour. The global diffusion of the standard for extreme absence of copyrightability embodied in the judgment also indicates the possibility that the distinction fully captures the current transformation in the distribution of mental labour, where syntactic tasks which were previously humanly performed are now increasingly conducted by machine.
The paper has substantive and methodological relevance to the conference themes. Substantively, it is concerned with human creativity, with rationality as not reducible to computation, and has relevance to the language myth, through its indirect endorsement of a non-computable or not mechanical semantics. These themes are supported by the underlying idea of technology as a human construction. Methodologically, it is rooted in the humanities and conducts critical thinking through exegesis and empirically tested theoretical development
References
Feist. (1991). Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340.
Warner, J. (2005). Labor in information systems. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology. 39, 2005, pp.551-573.
Warner, J. (2010). Human Information Retrieval (History and Foundations of Information Science Series). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Warner, J. (2013). Creativity for Feist. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology. 64, 6, 2013, pp.1173-1192.
Resumo:
The well-known ‘culture wars’ clash in the United States between civil society actors has now gone transnational. Political science scholarship has long detailed how liberal human rights non-governmental organizations NGOs engage in extensive transnational activity in support of their ideals. More recently, US conservative groups (including faith-based NGOs) have begun to emulate these strategies, promoting their convictions by engaging in transnational advocacy. NGOs thus face off against each other politically across the globe. Less well known is the extent to which these culture wars are conducted in courts, using conflicting interpretations of human rights law. Many of the same protagonists, particularly NGOs that find themselves against each other in US courts, now find new litigation opportunities abroad in which to fight their battles. These developments, and their implications, are the focus of this article. In particular, the extent to which US faith-based NGOs have leveraged the experience gained transnationally to use international and foreign jurisprudence in interventions before the US Supreme Court is assessed.
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This paper reviews decisions from the Northern Ireland and England and Wales High Courts and Courts of Appeal as well as the UK Supreme Court relating to tort and principally to the tort of negligence in the past 12 months or so.
In structure, the paper will be presented in four parts. First, three preliminary points relating to contemporary features of the NI civil courts: personal litigants – Devine v McAteer [2012] NICA 30 (7 September 2012); pre-action protocols – Monaghan v Graham [2013] NIQB 53 (3 May 2013); and the rise of alternative dispute resolution. On the last named issue, the recent decision of PGF II SA v OMFS Company 1 Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288 (23 October 2013) on unreasonable refusal to mediate, will be discussed.
Second, the paper moves to consider the law of negligence generally and case law from the NI High Court reiterating Lord Hoffmann’s view in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46 that no duty of care arises from obvious risks of injury. In this, reference will be made to the application of the above “Hoffmann principle” in West Sussex County Council v Pierce [2013] EWCA Civ 1230 (16 October 2013), which concerned an accident sustained by a child at school. A similar set of facts was presented recently to the UK Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council [2013] UKSC 66 (23 October 2013). The decision there, on non-delegable duties of care, will have a significant impact for schools in the provision of extracurricular activities.
Third, I will review a NI case of note on the duty of care of solicitors in the context of professional negligence in the context of conflicting advice by counsel.
Fourth, I will examine a series of cases on employer liability and including issues such as the duty of care towards the volunteer worker; tort and safety at work principles generally; and, more specifically, the duty of care of the employer towards an employee who suffers psychiatric illness as a result of stress and/or harassment at work. On the issue of workplace stress, the NI courts have made extensive reference to the Hale LJ principles found in the Court of Appeal decision of Hatton v Sutherland [2002] 1 All ER 1 and applied to those who have suffered trauma in reporting on or policing “the troubles” in Northern Ireland. On the issue of statutory harassment at work, the paper will also mention the UK Supreme Courts decision in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 (20 March 2013).
Resumo:
The book gives an authoritative account of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural 1991, which required databases to have a minimal degree of creativity to be copyrightable. The decision left creativity undefined, although it did extensively characterize the antithesis of creativity, and the decision has defied interpretation since its publication.
The book gives a detailed exegesis of the decision and correlates the antithesis to creativity with classic conceptions of computability. Creativity is then understood as non-computable human activity, above a certain level of routinicity.
Resumo:
Where either the seller or buyer of landed property fails to complete a contract to sell land the non-breaching party has a right to seek specific performance of the contract. This remedy would compel the party in default to perform the contract on pain of being held in contempt of court if the court's order is not obeyed. The defaulting party would not be able to satisfy its obligations under the law by paying a sum of money as damages for breach of contract. This paper considers the impecuniosity defence to specific performance as recognised by courts in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Where the buyer demonstrates that he or she simply cannot raise the funds to buy the property specific performance will not be decreed and the court will make an award of damages for breach of contract measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the time of default. The paper considers the nature and parameters of this defence and how it differs (if at all) from the alternative defence of extreme hardship. The paper addresses the question of whether it might be better to move to a position where sellers of land in all cases no longer enjoy a presumption of specific performance but have to demonstrate that the alternative remedy of damages is clearly inadequate. If this should be so the paper goes on to consider whether abolition of the presumption in favour of specific performance for sellers should lead to abolition of the presumption of specific performance for buyers, as is the position in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415.
Resumo:
This speech by Georgia Supreme Court judge Joseph Lumpkin aims to ignite a spirit of improvement and bring about its influence. This improvement is not necessarily in the interest of agriculture alone, but in the interest of the state as well.
Resumo:
O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar os seguintes tópicos: a possibilidade de interpretação literal do artigo 798 do Código Civil brasileiro, a aplicação das súmulas 61 e 105 do STF, o cabimento de indenização à família do suicida, os entendimentos da neurociência sobre possibilidades que podem interferir na ideação suicida, a visão e, finalmente, posicionamentos do Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e do Supremo Tribunal Federal do Brasil e quanto ao pagamento da indenização estabelecido no contrato de seguro de vida em caso de suicídio do contratante antes dos dois anos da assinatura do contrato. Buscou-se, também, comparar a doutrina e jurisprudência do Brasil e de Portugal. Na estrutura, iniciou-se por considerações sobre a interpretação jurídica e, em seguida, foram desenvolvidos os capítulos acerca de negócio jurídico, dos contratos, dos contratos de seguro de vida e da boa fé presente e necessária. Como o foco principal eram os contratos de seguro de vida e baseando-se na doutrina e na jurisprudência, de modo geral, mesmo a legislação dos dois países diferindo em pequenos aspectos, concluiu-se que: (1) o seguro é a cobertura de evento futuro e incerto que poderá gerar o dever de indenizar por parte do segurador; (2) a boa-fé - que é presumida - constitui elemento intrínseco do seguro, e é caracterizada pela lealdade nas informações prestadas pelo segurado ao garantidor do risco pactuado; (3) o legislador procurou evitar fraudes contra as seguradoras na hipótese de contratação de seguro de vida por pessoas que já tinham a idéia de suicídio quando firmaram o instrumento contratual; (4) uma coisa é a contratação causada pela premeditação ao suicídio, que pode excluir a indenização. Outra, diferente, é a premeditação para o próprio ato suicida;(5) é possível a interpretação entre os enunciados das Súmulas 105 do STF e 61 da Corte Superior na vigência do Código Civil de 2002; e (6) as regras relativas aos contratos de seguro devem ser interpretadas sempre com base nos princípios da boa fé e da lealdade contratual. Essa premissa é extremamente importante para a hipótese de indenização securitária decorrente de suicídio, pois dela extraise que a presunção de boa fé deverá também prevalecer sobre a exegese literal do art. 798 do Código Civil 2002. O período de 02 anos contido na norma não deve ser examinado isoladamente, mas em conformidade com as demais circunstâncias que envolveram sua elaboração, pois seu objetivo certamente não foi substituir a prova da premeditação do suicídio pelo mero transcurso de um lapso temporal. Há de se distinguir a premeditação que diz respeito ao ato do suicídio daquela que se refere ao ato de contratar o seguro com afinalidade única de favorecer o beneficiário que receberá o capital segurado. Somente a última hipótese permite a exclusão da cobertura contratada, pois configura a má-fé contratual. Em Portugal, salvo em raras exceções, apenas o critério temporal tem sido considerado. Continuando com o objetivo deste estudo, pretendeu-se refletir sobre as pesquisas neurocientíficas acerca do suicídio e, nelas, constam aspectos efetivamente que merecem ser considerados pela ciência jurídica. Suicídio é tema complexo e digno de reflexões por parte de profissionais de várias áreas de atuação. Suas causas ainda são motivo de curiosidade e de investigação. A idéia de uma associação entre disfunção serotoninérgica e suicídio é antiga e bastante consistente, surgindo ainda nos anos 1970 com as primeiras pesquisas. Defende-se que a boa fé necessária nos contratos de seguro, especialmente nos de seguro de vida, prevalece mesmo nos casos em que o contratante se esquece ou deixa de informar algum detalhe que, mais tarde, possa vir a comprometer o recebimento do prêmio por seus beneficiários. Há fortes evidências de que determinantes neurobiológicos, independentes das doenças psiquiátricas, implicam em comportamento suicida, estudados especialmente nos últimos 20 anos. Assim, noções básicas sobre a neurobiologia do suicídio podem finalmente produzir ferramentas clínicas para tratar comportamento suicida e evitar mortes, além de poder nortear seguradoras na análise de propostas de seguros de vida. Textos legais não têm sido elaborados com fundamento na sedimentação existente nos repositórios da psicopatologia forense, psiquiatria, psicanálise e sociologia sobre o suicídio, disponíveis há décadas e de forma reiteradamente confirmados. Na mesma linha, os textos deixaram de lado incontáveis pesquisas sobre o tema, notadamente a respeito de sua etiologia, causas primárias, efeitos, e correlação com outras ciências, como neurociência, psiquiatria e psicanálise. Não buscaram informações sobre o comportamento singular do suicida, nem reconheceram o estado sui generis de desequilíbrio mental em que o ato final foi praticado. Sabe-se que os transtornos psiquiátricos são fundamentais para o entendimento do comportamento suicida, mas também já está comprovada a realidade de problemas comuns, como distúrbios do sono, e sono insuficiente é um problema da sociedade moderna. Dentre os neurotransmissores, a serotonina é considerada como a maior candidata a um vínculo etiológico entre distúrbios do sono e suicídio, pois suas alterações promovem estados de vigília e de início do sono. Como somente 14% de pessoas que tentaram suicídio tiveram pensamentos suicidaprévios à tentativa de suicídio de forma potencialmente impulsiva ou reativa, a insônia foi o fator importante visualizado antes de tentativas de suicídio graves e letais em relação a planosespecíficos de suicídio. Nas pesquisas neurocientíficas revisadas, constatou-se que: (1) a frequência de pesadelos está diretamente associada a maior risco de suicídios na população em geral; (2) sono de má qualidade está associado a suicídios na maturidade e velhice na população em geral; (3) sono curto (menos de cinco horas) está associado a maiores probabilidades de ideação suicida e tentativa de suicídio; (4) pesadelos frequentes são preditores de tentativas de suicídio; e (5) a presença de qualquer problema de sono está associada com maior risco de suicídio na população em geral. A associação entre redução da resposta de hormônio de crescimento e comportamento suicida nos pacientes com depressão só é encontrada quando há simultaneamente uma alteração serotoninérgica. Geneticamente analisados, determinantes neurobiológicos são independentes de transtorno psiquiátrico com o qual estão associados, pois muitos suicídios ocorrem de maneira inesperada. Além disso, quando se considera a depressão como único fator, percebe-se que muitas pessoas depressivas nunca se tornam suicidas e muitos suicídios são cometidos por pessoas consideradas normais.Quanto à colesterolemia, na maior categoria de concentração de colesterol total no soro, o risco relativo ajustado de suicídio violento é mais do que o dobro em comparação com a categoria mais baixa. Nas avaliações eletroencefalográficas em adolescentes suicidas pode-se dizer existir uma hipótese de ativação reduzida esquerda posterior, que não está relacionada à depressão, mas ao comportamento agressivo ou suicida. Essas abordagens da Neurociência servem, portanto, para indicar que um contratante de seguro de vida, mesmo saudável, pode estar vivenciando problemas da vida contemporânea e, mesmo sem jamais ter tido qualquer pensamento ou ideação suicida, vir a cometer esse ato extremo por alterações independentes de sua vontade. Entende-se que, neste foco, a ciência jurídica deve refletir para fazer inserir de maneira obrigatória nos pré-requisitos da apólice, informações sobre exames molecu-lares e sobre algum eventual distúrbio do sono, já que existem achados evidenciados sobre alguns fenômenos não antes considerados. Como abordado neste estudo, já existe uma seguradora portuguesa que solicitam exames moleculares, mas nenhuma no Brasil. Assim, isto indica já ser um início de mudança.
Resumo:
Consabido que para uma sociedade organizada se desenvolver política e juridicamente, indispensável se faz a existência de um documento formal, dotado de observância obrigatória, capaz de definir as competências públicas e delimitar os poderes do Estado, resguardando os direitos fundamentais de eventuais abusos dos entes políticos. Este documento é a Constituição, que, em todos os momentos da história, sempre se fez presente nos Estados, mas, inicialmente, não de forma escrita, o que fez com que surgisse, então, o constitucionalismo, movimento que defendia a necessidade de elaboração de constituições escritas, munidas de normatividade e supremacia em relação às demais espécies normativas, que visassem organizar a separação dos poderes estatais e declarar os direitos e as liberdades individuais. Porém, de nada adiantaria a edição de uma Lei Maior sem que houvesse mecanismos de defesa, no intuito de afastar qualquer ameaça à segurança jurídica e à estabilidade social, por conta de alguma lei ou ato normativo contrário aos preceitos estabelecidos na Constituição. O controle de constitucionalidade, pilar do Estado de Direito, consiste em verificar a compatibilidade entre uma lei ou qualquer ato normativo infraconstitucional e a Lei Excelsa e, em havendo contraste, a lei ou o ato viciado deverá ser expurgado do ordenamento jurídico, para que a unidade constitucional seja restabelecida. No Brasil, o controle de constitucionalidade foi instituído sob forte influência do modelo norte-americano e obteve diversos tratamentos ao longo das constituições brasileiras, porém, o sistema de fiscalização de constitucionalidade teve seu ápice com o advento da atual Constituição Federal, promulgada em 05.10.88, com a criação de instrumentos processuais inovadores destinados à verificação da constitucionalidade das leis e atos normativos. Além disso, a Carta da República de 1988, ao contrário das anteriores, fortaleceu a figura do Poder Judiciário no contexto político, conferindo, assim, maior autonomia aos magistrados na solução de casos de grande repercussão nacional, redundando em um protagonismo judicial atual. Nesse contexto, o Supremo Tribunal Federal, órgão de cúpula do Judiciário nacional e guardião da Constituição, tem se destacado no cenário nacional, em especial na defesa dos direitos e garantias fundamentais insculpidos na Lei Fundamental, fazendo-se necessária, desta forma, uma análise na jurisprudência da Corte, no sentido de verificar se, de fato, tem havido evolução no controle de constitucionalidade no Brasil ao longo dos últimos anos e, em caso afirmativo, em que circunstâncias isso tem se dado.
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Concerning improvements to the State Capitol Grounds including placement of the Allison memorial and Soldiers and Sailor's momuments; removal of heating plant and relieving the state of coal, ashes, gas and smoke; provision of office space to the Adjutant General; an eventual executive mansion; provision of office buildings; and for a Supreme Court building where together with its library auxiliaries will have perpetual growth and constant accessbility; and propose restoration of natural scenic value of the capitol site.
Resumo:
Abstract . Rights jiirisprudence in Canada dates back as far as Confederation in 1867. Between this date and 1982, the organizing principle of Confederation - federalism - has kept this jurisprudence solely within the supremacy of Parliament, subject to its confines and division of powers. After 1982, however, a new constitutional organizing principle was introduced, when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced the patriation initiative, touted as the "people's package". Individual rights and freedoms were now guaranteed by the Constitution. Citizens of Canada now had a direct link to the Constitution via the Charter and there were now two significantly different organizing principles within the constitutional order widch created an unstable coexistence. This instability has led to a clash between judicially enforced Charter rights and federalism. The Charter has since had both a nationalizing and centralizing effect on Canadian federalism. This thesis explores the relationship between rights and federalism in Canada fix)m Confederation to present day by comparing the jurisprudence of pre and post Charter Canada. An analysis of Supreme Court's (and its predecessor's, the JCPC) decisions shows the profound effect the Charter has had on Canadian federalism. The result has been an undermining of federalism in Canada, with Parliamentary Supremacy replaced by Constitutional supremacy, and ultimately. Judicial Supremacy. Moreover, rights discourse has largely replaced federalism discourse. Canadians have become very attached to their Charter, and are unwilling to allow any changes to the constitution that may affect their rights as political elites discovered the hard way after the collapse of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords. If federalism is to remain a relevant and viable organizing principle in the Constitution, then governments, especially at the provincial level, must find new and iimovative ways to assert their importance within the federation.
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There has been considerable debate over whether corporal punishment against children should be prohibited in Canada. Various organizations, most notably the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, have argued that the Canadian Government should ban the use of corporal punishment by repealing the specific section of the Canadian Criminal Code that provides parents with a legal defence to use corporal punishment against their children; this provision is outlined in Section 43 of the Criminal Code. Recently, the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law challenged the constitutionality of Section 43 before the Supreme Court of Canada. The organization claimed Section 43 is unconstitutional. It violates children's Charter rights, such as the right to security of a person (Section 7), the right to be protected from cruel and unusual treatment (Section 12), and denies children the same protection adults receive under the law. Both the Canadian government and the Supreme Court of Canada reject the Foundation's arguments. Examining the federal government and the judicial system's rationale for refusing to remove Section 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code discloses how the parent-child relationship is perceived. This thesis examines how the parent-child relationship is perceived by the Canadian government and the issues that arise from such a view. This examination is essential for the comprehension of why Canada's corporal punishment law was enacted and remains in effect today.
Resumo:
Since the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Canadians courts have become bolder in the law-making entreprise, and have recently resorted to unwritten constitutional principles in an unprecedented fashion. In 1997, in Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court of Canada found constitutional justification for the independence of provincially appointed judges in the underlying, unwritten principles of the Canadian Constitution. In 1998, in Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Court went even further in articulating those principles, and held that they have a substantive content which imposes significant limitations on government action. The author considers what the courts' recourse to unwritten principles means for the administrative process. More specifically, he looks at two important areas of uncertainty relating to those principles: their ambiguous normative force and their interrelatedness. He goes on to question the legitimacy of judicial review based on unwritten constitutional principles, and to critize the courts'recourse to such principles in decisions applying the principle of judicial independence to the issue of the remuneration of judges.
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Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.