807 resultados para American Wind Energy Association
Resumo:
Goatmilk with and without stabilizing salt was subjected to in-container and UHTsterilization. Heatstability was assessed by measuring the amount of sediment in the milk. Without stabilizing salts, goatmilk usually produced less sediment when subjected to in-containersterilization compared with UHT processing. Addition of stabilizing salts up to 12.8 mM resulted in a progressive increase in sediment for in-containersterilization. In contrast, adding stabilizing salts at 6.4 mM initially reduced sediment formation in UHT-treated milk but addition of stabilizing salts at 12.8 mM increased sediment formation. Adding stabilizing salts to goatmilk increased pH, decreased ionic calcium, and increased ethanol stability. Adding up to 2 mM calcium chloride increased sediment formation more after UHT treatment than after in-containersterilization. These results suggest that no single mechanism or set of reactions causes milk to produce sediment during heating and that the favored pathway is different for UHT and in-containersterilization processes. Poor heatstability could be induced both by increasing ionic calcium and by decreasing it. Ethanol stability is not a good indicator of heatstability for in-containersterilization, but it may be for UHTsterilization, if milk does not enter the region of poor heatstability found at low concentrations of ionic calcium.
Resumo:
There is currently an increased interest of Government and Industry in the UK, as well as at the European Community level and International Agencies (i.e. Department of Energy, American International Energy Agency), to improve the performance and uptake of Ground Coupled Heat Pumps (GCHP), in order to meet the 2020 renewable energy target. A sound knowledge base is required to help inform the Government Agencies and advisory bodies; detailed site studies providing reliable data for model verification have an important role to play in this. In this study we summarise the effect of heat extraction by a horizontal ground heat exchanger (installed at 1 m depth) on the soil physical environment (between 0 and 1 m depth) for a site in the south of the UK. Our results show that the slinky influences the surrounding soil by significantly decreasing soil temperatures. Furthermore, soil moisture contents were lower for the GCHP soil profile, most likely due to temperature-gradient related soil moisture migration effects and a decreased hydraulic conductivity, the latter as a result of increased viscosity (caused by the lower temperatures for the GCHP soil profile). The effects also caused considerable differences in soil thermal properties. This is the first detailed mechanistic study conducted in the UK with the aim to understand the interactions between the soil, horizontal heat exchangers and the aboveground environment. An increased understanding of these interactions will help to achieve an optimum and sustainable use of the soil heat resources in the future. The results of this study will help to calibrate and verify a simulation model that will provide UK-wide recommendations to improve future GCHP uptake and performance, while safeguarding the soil physical resources.
Resumo:
Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.