Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Modelling of the sodium complex of a calixarene tetraester in the 1,3-alternate conformation

This paper describes the use of molecular mechanics to model the geometry of the sodium complex of a calix[4] arene tetraester, in the 1,3-alternate conformation 1. Partial charges were assigned to the calixarene on the basis of semi-empirical (AM1, PM3, MNDO, INDO, CNDO and ZINDO) calculations and the binding of the sodium ion to the calixarene was modelled using molecular mechanics. Agreement between the optimised and X-ray structures of the complex was very good. The effect of placing the cation in different starting positions on the energy-minimised geometry of the complex is described.

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.