Ballistic missile defence: An Australian perspective

The University of Queensland's School of Political Science and International Studies organised a round table in Canberra on 27 June 2001 that brought together a select group of government policy-makers and academic specialists to discuss the issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD). The round table provided useful insights into Australian thinking on the issue. This report seeks to summarise the essence of those discussions in order to contribute to the broader national debate.(1)

China and Southeast Asia

In the new millennium, no issue in international relations will be more important than how to accommodate the rising power of China. Many analysts, especially in the United States, see China as a significant threat to American interests in Asia. Washington has treaty commitments in both Northeast and Southeast Asia and retains a substantial military presence in the region. Beijing claims it does not seek to replace the United States reigning global hegemony, but seeks to promote a multi-polar world in which six states (the US, China, the EU, Russia, Japan, and India) would have pre-eminent status.

ANZUS - Alive and well after fifty years

Marking its fiftieth anniversary in late 2001, the ANZUS alliance remains Australia's primary security relationship and one of the United States' most important defence arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. It is argued here that ANZUS has defied many common suppositions advanced by international relations theorists on how alliances work. It thus represents an important refutation of arguments that they are short-term instruments of mere policy expediency and are largely interest-dependent. Cultural and normative factors are powerful, if often underrated, determinants for ANZUS's perpetuation. ANZUS may thus constitute an important test case for expanding our understanding of alliance politics beyond the usual preconditions and prerogatives normally associated with such a relationship.

'The utility of human security': Which humans? What security? A reply to Thomas & Tow

Thomas & Tow's evaluation of the utility of human security is an important contribution to an ongoing debate about what security is and for whom security should be provided. In particular, the authors' engagement with the human security agenda is important given the centrality of this approach to recent attempts to rethink security. This article argues, however, that Thomas & Tow's approach to the human security agenda is problematic for two central reasons. First, their attempt to narrow security to make this approach amenable to state policymakers risks reifying the sources of insecurity for individuals everywhere. Second, the conception of human security they put forward appears largely inconsistent with the normative concerns inherent in the human security agenda.