"Minimálbér-paradoxon" versenyzői munkaerőpiacon? ("Minimum-wage paradox" in a competitive labour market? Lessons from an experimental line of thought)

A versenyzői munkaerőpiac hagyományos kereslet-kínálati modellje az egyensúlyi bérszintet meghaladó minimálbér következményeként az egyensúlyi bérszint mellettinél alacsonyabb foglalkoztatást jósol; minél magasabb a minimálbér, annál alacsonyabbat. Empirikus vizsgálatok szerint ugyanakkor a minimálbér-emelés nem feltétlenül csökkenti a foglalkoztatást - ezt nevezik minimálbér-paradoxonnak -, ami legkézenfekvőbben a munkáltatók munkaerő-piaci monopszonerejével látszik magyarázhatónak. Ezzel szemben az a gondolatkísérlet, amelyről ez a cikk beszámol, általánosabb érvényű, versenyzői munkaerőpiacot feltételező magyarázat kidolgozására irányul. / === / In the conventional textbook demand/supply model of competitive labour markets, the introduction of a minimum wage above market-clearing level must reduce employment. Empirical findings suggest, however, that this may not always be the case, a finding most readily explained by monopsonistic competition in the labour market. The experimental line of thought reported here explores an alternative root, interpreting the "minimum-wage paradox" as the outcome of a competitive labour market that displays friction.

Firing and training costs and labour market segmentation

This dissertation consists of three essays on the labour market impact of firing and training costs. The modelling framework resorts to the search and matching literature. The first chapter introduces firing costs, both liner and non-linear, in a new Keynesian model, analysing business cycle effects for different wage rigidity degrees. The second chapter adds training costs in a model of a segmented labour market, accessing the interaction between these two features and the skill composition of the labour force. Finally, the third chapter analyses empirically some of the issues raised in the second chapter.

The Living Wage: Reducing inequality in the UK?

The revival of support for a living wage has reopened a long-run debate over the extent to which active regulation of labour markets may be necessary to attain desired outcomes. Market failure is suggested to result in lower wages and remuneration for low skilled workers than might otherwise be expected from models of perfect competition. This paper examines the theoretical underpinning of living wage campaigns and demonstrates that once we move away from idealised models of perfect competition to one where employers retain power over the bargaining process, such as monopsony, it is readily understandable that low wages may be endemic in low skilled employment contracts. The paper then examines evidence, derived from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey, for the extent to which a living wage will address low pay within the labour force. We highlight the greater incidence of low pay within the private sector and then focus upon the public sector where the Living Wage demand has had most impact. We examine the extent to which addressing low pay within the public sector increases costs. We further highlight the evidence that a predominance of low pay exists among public sector young and women workers (and in particular lone parent women workers) but not, perhaps surprisingly, among workers from ethnic minority backgrounds. The paper then builds upon the results from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey with analysis of the British Household Panel Survey in order to examine the impact the introduction of a living wage, within the public sector, would have in reducing household inequality. The paper concludes that a living wage is indeed an appropriate regulatory response to market failure for low skilled workers and can act to reduce age and gender pay inequality, and reduce household income inequality among in-work households below average earnings.

Cohort effects within firms, and their implications for labour market outcomes and the business cycle

The project aims to achieve two objectives. First, we are analysing the labour market implications of the assumption that firms cannot pay similarly qualified employees differently according to when they joined the firm. For example, if the general situation for workers improves, a firm that seeks to hire new workers may feel it has to pay more to new hires. However, if the firm must pay the same wage to new hires and incumbents due to equal treatment, it would either have to raise the wage of the incumbents, or offer new workers a lower wage than the firm would do otherwise. This is very different from the standard assumption in economic analysis that firms are free to treat newly hired workers independently of existing hires. Second, we will use detailed data on individual wages to try to gauge whether (and to what extent) equity is a feature of actual labour markets. To investigate this, we are using two matched employer-employee panel datasets, one from Portugal and the other from Brazil. These unique datasets provide objective records on millions of workers and their firms over a long period of time, so that we can identify which firms employ which workers at each time. The datasets also include a large number of firm and worker variables.

Partial Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where- refl ecting institutional constraints-fi rms cannot dfferentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.

Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where re flecting institutional constraints firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.

Risk Attitude And Wage Growth: Replication And Reconstruction

We replicate Shaw (1996) who found that individual wage growth is higher for individuals with greater preference for risk taking. Expanding her dataset with more American observations and data for Germany, Spain and Italy, we find mixed support for the earlier results. We present and estimate a new model and find that in particular the wage level is sensitive to attitudes towards risk taking. Comments given at the Labour Economics Conference in honour of Niels Westergaard (Nyborg, August 2008) and EALE 2008 (Amsterdam) and at seminars in Maastricht,Reus and Essen (RWI) are gratefully acknowledged. The authors also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (grant number SEJ2007-66318) and from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. JEL code: J24; J30. Key words: wage growth, risk, post-school investment.

Heterogeneity across immigrants in the Spanish labour

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the diferences that immigrants have in the Spanish labour market. Immigrants in Spain come from a diversity of continents (Africa, South America, Eastern Europe, Asia, etc.), and there are substantial diferences in characteristics not only among continents but also among countries in each continent. Using a quantile regression method of decomposition we estimate these diferences that are reflected in the labour market and in particular are mirrored in the wage, so some immigrants are more discriminated or segregated that others because they have less advantage. For example Argentineans and Peruvians have the same origin and culture but we can find diferences in the wage that they receive in the Spanish labor market, or for example Moroccans have a advantage with respect to the Rest of Africans, due to the geographical proximity to Spain. So when we study the pay gap and the gender pay gap we need to take into consideration the origin of immigrants. We also want to study how the integration of immigrants evolved across years, whether the wage gap that we find in the first episode of work between immigrants and natives disappears or continues to be present in the Spain labour market.

The Effect of occupational sex-composition on earnings: job-specialisation, sex-role attitudes and the division of domestic-labour in Spain

Important theoretical controversies remain unresolved in the literatire on occupational sex-segregation and the gender wage-gap. A useful way of summarising these controversies is viewing them as a debate between - cultural -socialisation. The paper discusses these theories in detail and carries out a preliminary test of the relative explanatory performance of some of their most consequential predictions. This is done by drawing on the Spanish sample of the second wave of the European Social Survey, ESS. The empirical analysis of ESS data illustrates the notable analytical pay-offs that can stem from using rich individual-level indicators, but also exemplifies the statistical llimitations generated by small sample size and high rates of non-response. Empirical results should, therefore, be taken as preliminary. They seem to suggest that the effect of occupational sex-segregation on wages could be explicable by workers' sex-role attitutes, their relative input in domestic production and the job-specific human capital requirements of their jobs. Of these three factors, job-specialisation seeems clearly the most important one.

Wage inequality and unemployment with overeducation

A skill-biased change in technology can account at once for the changes observed in a number of important variables of the US labour market between 1970 and 1990. These include the increasing inequality in wages, both between and within education groups, and the increase in unemployment at all levels of education. In contrast, in previous literature this type of technology shock cannot account for all of these changes. The paper uses a matching model with a segmented labour market, an imperfect correlation between individual ability and education, and a fixed cost of setting up a job. The endogenous increase in overeducation is key to understand the response of unemployment to the technology shock.

The wage effect of an indexation clause: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

An endogenous switching model of ex-ante wage changes under indexed and non-indexed settlements is estimated for the Spanish manufacturing sector using collective bargaining firm data for the 1984-1991 period. The likelihood of indexing the settlement is higher for nationwide unions than for other union groups within the works council and increases with the expected level of inflation. For wage change equations, a common structure for indexed and non-indexed settlements is strongly rejected, showing a source of nominal rigidity. For indexed contracts, the expected ex-ante total inflation coverage is nearly complete. It is also shown that workers pay a significant ex-ante wage change premium (differential) to obtain a cost of living allowance clause. However, the realised contingent compensation exceeds such a premium for all industries. Finally, important spillover effects in wage setting and the decision to index the settlement have been detected.

Wage determination in the Spanish industry

In this paper we estimate wage equations for the Spanish industryusing time series data on 85 industrial sectors, which allows us todistinguish between aggregate and sector specific effects in wagedetermination. Industry wages respond mainly to economy wide labourmarket conditions and to a much lesser extent to sector specificproductivity gains. The size of the insider effect has not remainedstable through the sample period. The estimated equations show a strongtransitory effect of unemployment on wages, which is in accordancewith the non--stationarity of the Spanish unemployment rate. Thishysteresis effect seems well accounted for by the sharp rise in theproportion of long term unemployment.