Costs of raising equity capital for U.S. REITs

The direct and indirect costs of raising equity capital by U.S. REITs through IPOs average 8.43% and 3.07%, respectively while these costs through SEOs average 4.63% and 1.18%, respectively. Ownership limit and the number of adverse risk factors identified in the IPO prospectus and underwriting syndicate structure determine such costs.

Underpricing of equity offerings in Brazil

We examine the underpricing of twenty-seven IPOs and twenty-nine SEOs issued in Brazil from January 1999 to March 2006. Determinants on pre-market demand, underwriting activities and information asymmetry were discussed. Common characteristics seem to exist between all issues. 94% have been on premium market corporate level and 93% were realized via bookbuilding. Underpricing for IPOs and SEOs has been recorded at 9.6% and 3.6%, respectively. IPOs are more underpriced when (i) more informed investors receive shares, (ii)better ranked underwriters lead the offer, and (iii) there is positive revision in the final price compared to the initial price range defined before information disclosure. SEOs are more underpriced when (i) shares presents higher appreciation in pre-offer period, and (ii) the proportion of primary offers are larger, supporting adverse selection costs theory.

Informational spillovers in the pre-1914 London sovereign debt market

We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis. We interpret it as evidence that the identity of the financial intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the soundness of a debtor based on the existence of financial relationships. This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance, in this case, underwriting, helps alleviate informational and incentive problems.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Civil Liability as an Enforcement Tool of Securities Underwriter Gatekeeping Duty

This book is dedicated to the Law and Economics analysis of civil liability of securities underwriters for the damage caused by material misstatements of corporate information by securities issuers. It seeks to answer a series of important questions. Who the are underwriters and what is their main role in the securities offering? Why there is a need for legal intervention in the underwriting market? What is so special about civil liability as an enforcement tool? How is civil liability used in a real world and does it really reach its goals? Finally, is there a need for a change and, if so, by what means?

The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Cost of Going Public

This paper examines the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a legal framework intended to increase transparency and accountability of listed companies, on the cost of going public in the US. We expect SOX to increase the direct cost of going public, but decrease the underpricing because of reduced asymmetric information. Our main results corroborate these hypotheses. First, we find an increase in the cost of going public of 90 bp of gross proceeds. Second, we record a reduction in underpricing of 6 pp, which is related to a reduced offer price adjustment. This supports our hypothesis that SOX represents a mechanism to reduce asymmetric information.

The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination

This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the evidence on housing and mortgage lending discrimination, as well as the potential impacts of such discrimination on minority outcomes like homeownership and neighborhood environment. The paper begins by discussing conceptual issues surrounding empirical analyses of discrimination including explanations for why discrimination takes place, defining different forms of discrimination, and the appropriate interpretation of observed racial and ethnic differences in treatment or outcomes. Next, the paper reviews evidence on housing market discrimination starting with evidence of segregation and price differences in the housing market and followed by direct evidence of discrimination by real estate agents in paired testing studies. Finally, mortgage market discrimination and barriers in access to mortgage credit are discussed. This discussion begins with an assessment of the role credit barriers play in explaining racial and ethnic differences in homeownership and follows with discussions of analyses of underwriting and the price of credit based on administrative and private sector data sources including analyses of the subprime market. The paper concludes that housing discrimination has declined especially in the market for owner-occupied housing and does not appear to play a large role in limiting the neighborhood choices of minority households or the concentration of minorities into central cities. On the other hand, the patterns of racial centralization and lower home ownership rates of African-Americans appear to be related to each other, and lower minority homeownership rates are in part attributable to barriers in the market for mortgage credit. The paper presents considerable evidence of racial and ethnic differences in mortgage underwriting, as well as additional evidence suggesting these differences may be attributable to differential provision of coaching, assistance, and support by loan officers. At this point, innovation in loan products, the shift towards risk based pricing, and growth of the subprime market have not mitigated the role credit barriers play in explaining racial and ethnic differences in homeownership. Further, the growth of the subprime lending industry appears to have segmented the mortgage market in terms of geography leading to increased costs of relying on local/neighborhood sources of mortgage credit and affecting the integrity of many low-income minority neighborhoods through increased foreclosure rates.

A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities

Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.

Efectividad de las señales de compromiso de suscripción ante el anuncio de ampliaciones de capital en España

El objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es averiguar si el anuncio por parte del accionista significativo de ejercitar su derecho de suscripción preferente elimina o reduce la asimetría de información en las ampliaciones de capital con derecho de suscripción preferente en el Mercado de Valores español. Durante los 17 años analizados, encontramos que ni el anuncio de la ampliación de capital ni el tipo de aseguramiento acordado en cada ampliación tienen un impacto estadísticamente significativo en el Exceso de Rentabilidad Ajustada por Riesgo. Principalmente, el análisis realizado utiliza la información requerida por la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) que deben aportar los accionistas significativos en el Folleto de emisión publicado con carácter previo a la ampliación. Esta investigación desglosa las ofertas en un Grupo 1, el cual incluye aquéllas en las que los accionistas significativos anuncian su intención de ejercitar su derecho en las emisiones, y el Grupo 2, que incluye aquéllas en donde no acuden o simplemente no existía información al respecto ya que no es una información obligatoria a incluir en el Folleto. Para cada ampliación de capital y para tres periodos de tiempo distintos se obtiene el Exceso de Rentabilidad Ajustada por Riesgo (ERAR) como la diferencia entre la Tasa Interna de Retorno y el Retorno Esperado, utilizando el modelo CAPM. De este modo, se trata de aislar el efecto temporal. La principal contribución de esta tesis doctoral es el hallazgo de una rentabilidad negativa estadísticamente significativa cuando el accionista significativo anuncia su intención de no suscribir la ampliación, o no existe información suficiente sobre su intención a este respecto. Adicionalmente, el análisis que se ha llevado a cabo en este estudio muestra un refuerzo estadísticamente significativo de este efecto negativo en la rentabilidad cuando existe simultáneamente una falta de compromiso por parte del accionista significativo y la ampliación no está asegurada. ABSTRACT The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to find out whether or not consideration of significant shareholders announcement of intention to exercise subscription rights makes a difference in eliminating or reducing the effects of asymmetrical information in equity offerings with pre-emptive rights on the Spanish Stock Market. For the 17 years of equity issues covered, we find that neither equity issue announcements nor the type of underwriting arrangements has a statistically significant impact on the issues’ Excess Risk Adjusted Return. The analysis uses the information required by CNMV (Spanish equivalent to SEC) to be provided by the significant shareholders in the equity issue’s prospectus. The doctoral dissertation breaks the offerings down into Group 1, in which the significant shareholders indicated their intention to subscribe, and Group 2, for which there was not enough information provided as to their intentions. For each equity issue, Excess Risk Adjusted Return (ERAR) is obtained, for three different periods, as is the difference between nominal Internal Rate of Return and expected return, using the CAPM. By subtracting the expected return from the IRR, the effect of time or any other variable influencing the stock price during the period, aside from the equity issue, should, in principle, be removed. The main contribution of this study is the finding of a statistically significant negative impact on returns either when the significant shareholders indicate their intention not to subscribe, or when not enough information is provided about their intention. We also find a statistically significant reinforcing negative effect on returns in the case of simultaneous lack of commitment on the part of significant shareholders, and non-underwritten equity issues.

Best's insurance reports.

"Best's insurance reports ... upon American and foreign joint-stock companies, American mutual companies, inter-insurance associations, and individual underwriting organizations."

The R & R sales training course.

[v. 1] Plan and action in life underwriting.-[v. 2] The fundamentals of life underwriting.-[v. 3] Life situations and life underwriting.-[v. 4] The sales process of life underwriting.

The standard.

"A weekly insurance newspaper devoted to the intrests of sound underwriting in all its branches."

The Spectator Insurance Year Book

Title varies: 1874-1937, The Insurance Year Book

ANÁLISE DA ASSOCIAÇÃO DE OPERAÇÕES DE CAPITALIZAÇÃO DE PRIVATE EQUITY E VENTURE CAPITAL NO DESEMPENHO DE EMPRESAS COM AÇÕES NA BOVESPA

A vantagem competitiva e o desempenho organizacional são conceitos administrativos estreitamente ligados à competitividade das empresas e sua permanência no mercado a longo prazo. Para que alcancem tal objetivo, de acordo com os fundamentos da RBV, as capacidades organizacionais dessas empresas devem ser dinâmicas, o que significa estar à frente das mudanças ambientais, mantendo, criando e desenvolvendo novas capacidades. Um dos caminhos para que isso se realize é a aposta na sua capitalização, que pode ocorrer com a captação de recursos de terceiros ou recursos próprios, com maior ou menor grau de risco. A captação de recursos com capital de terceiros acontece, principalmente, via instituições financeiras e factorings. A captação por meio de capital próprio pode ocorrer por retenção de lucros ou pelo underwriting. A emissão feita via mercado primário configura a oferta pública inicial de ações ou Initial Public Offering (IPO). No Brasil, a escolha dos fundos de Private Equity e Venture Capital, segmentos do mercado financeiro que consistem fundamentalmente em aporte temporário de capital, vem crescendo consideravelmente nos últimos anos. Contudo, existem poucas pesquisas a respeito da utilização e do desempenho financeiro que esses fundos trazem para as empresas. O presente estudo procura averiguar se as empresas que estavam listadas na BOVESPA no período de 2002 a 2008 e que receberam recursos via Private Equity e Venture Capital com IPO desenvolveram desempenho financeiro superior às que receberam ou não outros tipos de financiamento no mesmo período. Foram selecionados dados secundários como: balanços patrimoniais, demonstração de resultados e valores das ações, utilizando-se da base de dados da Economática. Tomando o logaritmo do Q de Tobin como variável dependente e log_Ativo, Debt to Equity, ROA, crescimento de vendas, crescimento de investimentos, crescimento investimento Fama e CrescInv_endividamento como variáveis de controle, foram aplicados testes estatísticos, comparando a média dos índices, seguidos de análise por setor econômico, subsetor e segmento. Os resultados encontrados apontam que as empresas que receberam recursos via Private Equity e Venture Capital com IPO, tornaram-se diferentes das demais empresas que estavam listadas na BOVESPA naquele período. O presente trabalho busca, dessa forma, contribuir para o enriquecimento de conhecimento acadêmico acerca do tema.(AU)

Material artifacts:practices for doing strategy with 'stuff'

This paper addresses the dearth of research into material artifacts and how they are engaged in strategizing activities. Building on the strategy-as-practice perspective, and the notion of epistemic objects, we develop a typology of strategy practices that show how managers use material artifacts to strategize by a dual process of knowledge abstraction and substitution. Empirically, we study the practice of underwriting managers in reinsurance companies. Our findings first identify the artifacts – pictures, maps, data packs, spreadsheets and graphs – that these managers use to appraise reinsurance deals. Second, the analysis of each artifact’s situated use led to the identification of five practices for doing strategy with artifacts: physicalizing, locating, enumerating, analyzing, and selecting. Last, we developed a typology that shows how practices vary in terms of their level of abstraction from the physical properties of the risk being reinsured and unfold through a process of substituting. Our conceptual framework extends existing work in the strategy-as-practice field that calls for research into the role of material artifacts.