On being balanced in an unbalanced world

This paper examines the case of a procurement auction for a single project, in which the breakdown of the winning bid into its component items determines the value of payments subsequently made to bidder as the work progresses. Unbalanced bidding, or bid skewing, involves the uneven distribution of mark-up among the component items in such a way as to attempt to derive increased benefit to the unbalancer but without involving any change in the total bid. One form of unbalanced bidding for example, termed Front Loading (FL), is thought to be widespread in practice. This involves overpricing the work items that occur early in the project and underpricing the work items that occur later in the project in order to enhance the bidder's cash flow. Naturally, auctioners attempt to protect themselves from the effects of unbalancing—typically reserving the right to reject a bid that has been detected as unbalanced. As a result, models have been developed to both unbalance bids and detect unbalanced bids but virtually nothing is known of their use, success or otherwise. This is of particular concern for the detection methods as, without testing, there is no way of knowing the extent to which unbalanced bids are remaining undetected or balanced bids are being falsely detected as unbalanced. This paper reports on a simulation study aimed at demonstrating the likely effects of unbalanced bid detection models in a deterministic environment involving FL unbalancing in a Texas DOT detection setting, in which bids are deemed to be unbalanced if an item exceeds a maximum (or fails to reach a minimum) ‘cut-off’ value determined by the Texas method. A proportion of bids are automatically and maximally unbalanced over a long series of simulated contract projects and the profits and detection rates of both the balancers and unbalancers are compared. The results show that, as expected, the balanced bids are often incorrectly detected as unbalanced, with the rate of (mis)detection increasing with the proportion of FL bidders in the auction. It is also shown that, while the profit for balanced bidders remains the same irrespective of the number of FL bidders involved, the FL bidder's profit increases with the greater proportion of FL bidders present in the auction. Sensitivity tests show the results to be generally robust, with (mis)detection rates increasing further when there are fewer bidders in the auction and when more data are averaged to determine the baseline value, but being smaller or larger with increased cut-off values and increased cost and estimate variability depending on the number of FL bidders involved. The FL bidder's expected benefit from unbalancing, on the other hand, increases, when there are fewer bidders in the auction. It also increases when the cut-off rate and discount rate is increased, when there is less variability in the costs and their estimates, and when less data are used in setting the baseline values.

Hot and cold IPO markets : the case of the stock exchange of Mauritius

The aim of this study is to assess the characteristics of the hot and cold IPO markets on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM). The results show that the hot issues exhibit, on average, a greater degree of underpricing than the cold issues, although the hot issue phenomenon is not a significant driving force in explaining this short-run underpricing. The results are consistent with the predictions of the changing risk composition hypothesis in suggesting that firms going public during hot markets are on average relatively more risky. The findings also support the time adverse selection hypothesis in that the firms’ quality dispersion is statistically different between hot and cold markets. Finally, the study concludes that firms which go public during hot markets do not underperform those going public in cold markets over the longer term.

Financial characteristics of Australian initial public offerings from 1994 to 1999

A variety of financial characteristics of Australian initial public offerings (IPOs) for the period 1994-1999 are explored. A number of previous Australian studies have investigated the initial day underpricing and longer term underperformance of IPOs and this study updates those papers. This paper partitions the IPO data into no liability/limited liability; share option/no share option; underwriter option/no underwriter option and dividend reinvestment/no dividend reinvestment characteristics to better understand the types of IPOs that list on the Australian Stock Exchange. The data supports the findings of previous studies in that IPOs are underpriced at the time of listing and underperform the market in the first year following their listing.

The importance of audit committees in initial public offerings

This paper follows Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988), and Beatty (1989), who find lower underpricing in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) when prestigious auditors are used to attest to the IPO's financial statements. Australian IPOs are not obliged to nominate audit firms in the prospectus, but often identify that they will have audit committees so as to assist in more appropriate corporate governance. This paper analyzes if IPOs identifying the existence of audit committees in the prospectus have a lower underpricing return. While our findings are consistent with previous studies concluding that both the size of the new issue and the use of an underwriter are important ingredients in the level of underpricing return, the inclusion of an audit committee in the prospectuses has actually increased underpricing returns. The capital market may view the audit committee identification with some skepticism.

The importance of intangible assets in initial public offerings

This paper follows Beatty and Ritter (1986), who argue that lower uncertainty about the value of an initial public offering (IPO) reduces the 'need' for the underpricing of an IPo. Australian IPOs often identify the existence of intangible assets such as goodwill, licenses, brand names, trademarks, patents and capitalized research and development costs in the prospectus. This paper analyses if IPOs identifying the existence of such intangible assets in the prospectus might reduce uncertainty about their valuation and hence allow a lower underpricing return. While the reporting of intangible assets such as goodwill and license costs in the prospectus are not significant ingredients in the level of underpricing, the identification and valuation of intangible assets such as brand names, trademarks, patents and capitalized research and development costs is significant in reducing the level of underpricing return. Our findings are also consistent with previous studies concluding that both the size of the new issue and the use of an underwriter are important in the level of underpricing return.

The pricing of property trust IPOs in Australia

Following Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) this paper adds to the international literature investigating the underpricing of REIT initial public offerings (IPOs), with a study into Australian property trusts. This study finds that initial day returns can in part be explained by forecast profit distributions (or dividends) and the market sentiment towards property trusts from the date of the prospectus to the date of listing. There is some support for the “winners curse” explanation of underpricing with evidence that large investor or institutional involvement at the outset of the IPO also has some explanatory power.

The costs of raising equity capital by Australian property trust initial public offerings

This paper reports some of the direct costs of raising equity capital by property trust initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from 1994 to 2004. It also documents the amount of underpricing by these IPOs. The results indicate the average fees paid to underwriters and/or stockbrokers in managing and marketing the issue was around 3.3% of the public equity capital raised. The average fees paid to legal firms, accounting firms and valuers for their professional involvement and expert reports were 0.4%, 0.2% and 0.1% respectively, totaling 0.7% of the equity raised. Other fees such as printing, listing fees, postage, distribution and advertising cost around 2.1%. The total average direct costs amounted to around 6.1% of the proceeds raised. The average underpricing by these property trust IPOs was 2.6%. This paper also investigates the hypotheses that the percentage direct capital raising costs are influenced by the size of the IPO and whether the IPO is underwritten. This study confirms that larger property trust equity capital raisings have lower percentage total direct cost;, however, it does not find that underwriting significantly influences the percentage of total direct costs for these property trust IPOs.

The characteristics of property trust IPOs in Australia

This paper follows Ling and Ryngaert (1997) and Brounen and Eichholtz (2001) who investigate the underpricing of REIT initial public offerings (lPOs) in the United States and Europe respectively. This study adds to the international literature by investigating Australian property trusts. It reports a variety of descriptive statistics on 37 Australian property trust IPOs from 1994 to 1999. What it also contributes is the finding that some IPOs have extremely low volumes of shares traded on the first day so the simple use of a closing price at the end of the first day to determine underpricing returns (without reference to the volume of trading) may not always be the optimum method of calculating these returns.

The costs of raising equity capital for closed-end fund IPOs

This article reports on some of the direct costs of raising equity capital by closed-end fund licensed investment company (LIC) initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from 1995 to 2005. The amount of underpricing by these IPOs is also identified. The average total direct costs amounted to a relatively low 3.4% of the capital raised, while fees paid to underwriters and/or stockbrokers was around 2.3%, to legal firms around 0.25% and to accounting firms around 0.07%. The average underpricing by these LIC IPOs was 1.3%. This article also confirms that the percentage total direct capital raising costs are inversely related to the size of the IPO and underwritten closed-end fund IPOs tend to have higher percentage total capital raising costs than those not underwritten.

The pricing and underwriting costs of Japanese REIT IPOs

This study investigates 40 Japanese REIT IPOs during 2001 to 2006 and finds evidence that higher final offer prices are reflected in higher underpricing levels by such IPOs. There is also some evidence that the engagement of one of the big three Japanese underwriting firms suggests less money is left on the table. Economies of scale in underwriting fees for Japanese REIT IPOs are also found. Specifically, the percentage underwriting fees decrease with higher amounts of equity capital sought but the percentage fee decreases at a diminishing rate.

The pricing of infrastructure initial public offerings : evidence from Australia

This paper explores first-day returns on infrastructure entity initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from 1996 to 2007. While a good deal has been written on the first-day returns of industrial and mining company IPOs and Real Estate Investment Trust IPOs, first-day returns of infrastructure entity IPOs have yet to be reported in the literature. The study uses ordinary least squares regression analysis to identify factors that might influence the percentage first-day returns theoretically available to investing subscribers and factors that might influence the aggregate amount of money left to subscribers by issuers. The study finds that first-day returns, on average, are not significantly different from zero. There is evidence, however, that suggests higher dividend yields and higher percentage direct costs of capital raising influence these first-day returns. The study also finds that infrastructure entity IPOs that seek to raise more equity capital leave less money on the table for subscribing investors.

A duration analysis of the time from prospectus to listing for A-REIT IPOs

Dimovski (2010) finds that the time from prospectus registration to listing is significantly positively related to the amount of underpricing amongst 45 Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2002 to 2008. This makes the understanding of the time from prospectus registration to listing for A-REITs an important matter. This study analyses 82 A-REIT IPOs from 1994 to 2008 using a Cox proportional hazard model to analyse the duration from prospectus date to listing date. The study finds that A-REIT IPOs issued after 2000 listed more quickly, as did those A-REITs that were underwritten and also those that sought to raise larger amounts of equity capital. Those that proposed higher debt to assets ratios in their prospectuses listed more slowly. When the data is partitioned into 1994 to 1999 and 2002 to 2008 groupings, earlier A-REIT IPOs listed more quickly if they were larger while in the more recent group, those that had higher debt to asset ratios took longer to fill their subscriptions.

Initial public offerings of energy companies

This study analyses 158 energy company initial public offerings (IPOs) in Australia from January 1994 to December 2010, including the period of the global financial crisis (GFC). The study finds that energy company IPOs had an average 22.0 % underpricing and that those IPOs that sought to raise more equity capital and engaged underwriters had lower underpricing. There is also evidence that suggests energy company IPOs that offered options to their underwriters had higher underpricing returns, effectively cancelling the lower underpricing effect of the underwriting itself. The energy IPOs that raised equity capital after the 2007/8 global financial crisis do not appear to have offered on average, significantly different underpricing returns to their investors compared to those energy IPOs that raised capital prior to this GFC period. The findings of this study offer insights for issuers who seek to lower underpricing, for underwriters involved in the capital raising and for investors who are looking to invest in Australian energy company IPOs.