La influencia del crimen organizado transnacional en el proceso de formulación de políticas públicas. Estudio de caso: Argentina 2001-2013

Este estudio de caso analiza la influencia del Crimen Organizado Transnacional en la formulación de Políticas Públicas de seguridad en Argentina entre 2001 y 2013. En contraste con otros estudios, se considera que la relación de estos dos fenómenos debe recoger aspectos fundamentales de un enfoque de seguridad integral y multidimensional. En el caso de Argentina, durante 2001 el Crimen Organizado Transnacional ocupó el primer lugar en la agenda pública, lo cual derivó en una serie de acciones públicas llevadas a cabo por los distintos gobiernos. Sin embargo, los casos de Santa Fe en 2012 y Córdoba en 2013 demostraron la debilidad institucional en la formulación de Políticas Públicas de este país. Por lo tanto, este trabajo pretende demostrar con los casos anteriormente mencionados que debilidades estatales como la corrupción estatal y la indiferencia ciudadana son obstáculos para la formulación de políticas públicas.

Análisis del abordaje realizado por Colombia al crimen transnacional de la trata de personas como amenaza a la seguridad en el periodo 2004-2014: una mirada desde la securitización

El objetivo de esta monografía es analizar el abordaje a la trata de personas en Colombia durante el período 2004-2014 desde la teoría de la securitización, para determinar su posición en la agenda de seguridad del país. La hipótesis que se propone es que a través de algunos postulados de esta teoría es posible establecer que la trata de personas es un crimen transnacional que no ha sido percibido como amenaza para la seguridad del país, lo cual ha incidido en que no se hayan tomado medidas eficaces para contenerlo. A través de una investigación descriptiva que analiza las políticas de seguridad, y un ejercicio comparativo del abordaje gubernamental dado al secuestro durante este periodo, se intentará establecer una relación explicativa entre los postulados teóricos escogidos y el fenómeno analizado. Se espera también profundizar en el concepto de securitización y sus implicaciones para los estados y la población.

Disrupting the market for illegal rhino horn and ivory

This paper considers methods for regulating the trafficking of rhino horn and ivory, seen through the lens of compliance theories. It stresses the importance of the distinction between normative and instrumental motivations. It argues for a balanced set of strategies that include normative levers designed to change the behaviour of poachers, traffickers and consumers of these products. In particular it considers the options needed to achieve demand reduction in consumer countries, and those needed to provide incentives to local communities in producer countries to disengage from poaching.

Trabalho com redução à condição análoga à de escravos e ofensa à dignidade da pessoa humana: tráfico de mulheres para fins de exploração sexual comercial, no Brasil (2002-2008)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

As dimensões internacionais das políticas brasileiras de combate ao tráfico de drogas na década de 1990

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

As maras e pandillas no Triângulo Norte da América Central e a atuação dos Estados Unidos em seu combate

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

EU enlargement to the Balkans: will the leopard change its spots? EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

As the leadership of the European Union hands over the baton to a new management this autumn, will the winds of change blow also through the cobwebs of the EU’s enlargement agenda? Jean-Claude Juncker – the incoming President of the European Commission – has already promised to put the gearbox of further EU widening in neutral for the next five years of his mandate, and has designated the Austrian Johannes Hahn as Commissioner for the re-baptised portfolio of now European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, instructing him to focus on the Union’s political and economic ties with Southern and Eastern Europe, and in particular with the Balkans. Such an approach in the field of enlargement – once crowned the jewel of EU foreign policy – has all the appeal of a damp rag but does not necessarily depart from the festina lente strategy of the recent past. Inside the Union, political appetite and public support for expansion have been fizzling since Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and were then severely curbed in the context of the on-going crisis by growing fears of importing organised crime and migrants from the Balkans. Juncker’s logic of consolidation sounds depressingly similar to what it supposedly replaces and incidentally, it also fits neatly with the unambitious and inward-looking mantra favoured at present in discussions at all levels on the future of European integration, more generally. With the 28-member block determined to catch its breath in the immediate time period, and given that even the forerunner countries in the Balkans – that is, Montenegro and Serbia – will realistically need more than five years to complete their accession talks, what priorities should guide Commissioner Hahn, soon to be Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations – when they get down to business on 1 November?

The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

Criminals and terrorists in partnership:unholy alliance

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists in a strategic alliance between two non-state actors, able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the degree of dangerousness that both organised crime and terrorism currently represent in the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this edited volume aims at contributing to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Valued tradition? Armed policing in the UK

The traditional social “contract” in the UK mainland between the public and the police involves the ideal of an unarmed police service. In recent years while the public have accepted the more visible role of specialist armed officers on security duties in airports and strategic positions, the majority of officers remain unarmed. Following 7/7 in London and the Derrick Bird case in Cumbria there have been media calls for more police officers to be armed on a routine basis .This would fundamentally change the social contract and the relationship with the British public. The principle of policing by consent and the idea of the citizen in uniform are the fundamental tenets of British policing .Historically the only forces in the UK which are routinely armed are the Police Service of Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. In contrast all major police forces in Europe, as well as the US, Canada and Australia routinely carry firearms, the exceptions apart from Britain, are the Irish Republic, and New Zealand. In Norway officers carry arms in their cars but not on their person. Every time unarmed police officers are killed, as with the tragic case of Nicola Hughes and Fiona Bone killed in the line of duty in Manchester in 2013, the question of arming the British Police is raised.So does the current balance protect the public and safeguard officers or does it fail to satisfy either. Is the current balance between unarmed and armed police in the UK suitable for the 21st Century? There appears to be competing agendas for the Police to contend with. These have been illustrated by recent controversy in Scotland about a standing authority which allowed a small number of officers to carry guns while on routine patrol .Politicians and community leaders attacked the nationwide roll-out of officers with a standing authority to carry guns on routine patrols since the formation of Scotland’s single police force. The Forces armed police monitoring group recommended keeping the standing authority in place after it was given intelligence on serious organised crime groups in 2014.The Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) in its review of the authority (2014) said the operational need for the authority is justified by national intelligence and threat levels.

New challenges for the EU internal security strategy

In recent years, the EU and its member states have experienced a number of changes, as well as challenges, in the areas of politics, economics, security and law. As these areas are interconnected, changes and challenges to any of them have implications for the others, as well as implications for the populations and institutions of the EU or those coming into contact with its international power and influence. This edited collection focuses primarily on security and law, particularly the EU’s internal security strategy. The EU’s Internal Security Strategy, adopted by the Spanish presidency early in 2010, followed the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, building on previous developments within the EU in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) policy. The focus of the EU Internal Security Strategy is to prevent and combat “serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, in strengthening the management of our external borders and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters”. The Internal Security strategy intersects and overlaps with the European Union’s Counter-terrorism strategy, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, and the EU’s Security Strategy. The role of and interaction between these strategies, their supplementing documents, and their implications for crime, victims, the law, political relations, democracy and human rights, form the backdrop against which the chapters in this collection are written. Building on original research by its contributors, this collection comprises work by authors from a wide variety of academic and professional areas and perspectives, as well as different countries, on a variety of areas and issues related to or raised by the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, from intelligence-led policing to human trafficking and port security. This book examines, from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives including law, geography, politics and practice, both this further refinement of existing internal provisions on cross-border crime, and the increasing external relations of the EU in the AFSJ.

A formação das Forças e Serviços de Segurança na União Europeia rumo a uma política europeia de segurança comum

A criminalidade organizada opera cada vez mais em colaboração alargada, elevada mobilidade e grande diversificação nas suas formas de atuar. Após os recentes atentados terroristas em Paris e em Bruxelas as preocupações relacionadas com as ameaças à segurança da União Europeia (UE) estão cada vez mais na agenda política. O objetivo geral desta investigação foi analisar a importância que a formação comum das polícias da UE e o seu papel na Academia Europeia de Polícia (CEPOL) têm para a Guarda Nacional Republicada (GNR), compreendendo a importância desta formação na implementação da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD). Esta investigação procurou uma recolha de informação adequada, possibilitando a compreensão do fenómeno em estudo, adotando uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, concretizada a partir de uma pesquisa documental e um inquérito por entrevista semiestruturada, cujos dados foram objeto de análise de conteúdo. Como resultado principal destacou-se o diagnóstico que fundamenta eventuais mudanças ou orientações que a GNR possa vir a prosseguir no âmbito da sua posição na CEPOL. Concluiu-se que a prossecução da segurança na UE exige uma adequada articulação entre a segurança interna e a segurança externa, bem como da importância das agências da UE em geral, e em particular, da CEPOL cuja missão de formação comum é essencial. Abstract: Organised crime is increasingly operating in extended collaboration, high mobility and great diversity in their ways of acting. After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels the concerns about threats to security of the European Union (EU) are increasingly on the political agenda. The general objective of this research was to analyse the importance of common training in the context of the EU's police forces and its role in the European Police College (CEPOL) have in the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), understanding the importance of this training in the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This research looked for a collection of adequate information, adopting a qualitative research strategy, enabled the understanding of the phenomenon under study, adopting a qualitative research strategy, implemented from desk research and a survey by semistructured interviews, whose data were subject to content analysis. The main result highlighted the diagnosis set that underlies any changes or guidelines that GNR is likely to continue in its position on CEPOL. It was concluded that further security in the EU requires proper coordination between internal security and external security, and the importance of EU agencies in general, and in particular CEPOL whose common training mission is essential.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.