Valence and spatial explanations for voting in the 2013 Australian election

This paper examines the 2013 Australian federal election to test two competing models of vote choice: spatial politics and valence issues. Using data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, the analysis finds that spatial politics (measured by party identification and self-placement on the left-right spectrum) and valence issues both have significant effects on vote choice. However, spatial measures are more important than valence issues in explaining vote choice, in contrast with recent studies from Britain, Canada and the United States. Explanations for these differences are speculative, but may relate to Australia’s stable party and electoral system, including compulsory voting and the frequency of elections. The consequently high information burden faced by Australian voters may lead to a greater reliance on spatial heuristics than is found elsewhere.

Documenting the inevitable: Voting behaviour at the 2013 Australian election

This chapter uses data from the 2013 Australian Election Study (AES), conducted by Clive Bean, Ian McAllister, Juliet Pietsch and Rachel Gibson (Bean et al. 2014) to investigate political attitudes and voting behaviour in the election. The study was funded by the Australian Research Council and involved a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-completion questionnaire mailed to respondents on the day before the 7 September election. The sample was a systematic random sample of enrolled voters throughout Australia, drawn by the Australian Electoral Commission. Respondents were given the option of returning the completed questionnaire by reply-paid mail or completing the survey online. Non-respondents were sent several follow-up mailings and the final sample size was 3955, representing a response rate of 34 per cent. The data were weighted to reflect population parameters for gender, age, state and vote.

Structuring time and questioning to achieve tactical awareness in games lessons

Background: A paradigm shift in educational policy to create problem solvers and critical thinkers produced the games concept approach (GCA) in Singapore's Revised Syllabus for Physical Education (1999). A pilot study (2001) conducted on 11 primary school student teachers (STs) using this approach identified time management and questioning as two of the major challenges faced by novice teachers. Purpose: To examine the GCA from three perspectives: structure—lesson form in terms of teacher-time and pupil-time; product—how STs used those time fractions; and process—the nature of their questioning (type, timing, and target). Participants and setting: Forty-nine STs from three different PETE cohorts (two-year diploma, four-year degree, two-year post-graduate diploma) volunteered to participate in the study conducted during the penultimate week of their final practicum in public primary and secondary schools. Intervention: Based on the findings of the pilot study, PETE increased the emphasis on GCA content specific knowledge and pedagogical procedures. To further support STs learning to actualise the GCA, authentic micro-teaching experiences that were closely monitored by faculty were provided in schools nearby. Research design: This is a descriptive study of time-management and questioning strategies implemented by STs on practicum. Each lesson was segmented into a number of sub-categories of teacher-time (organisation, demonstration and closure) and pupil-time (practice time and game time). Questions were categorised as knowledge, technical, tactical or affective. Data collection: Each ST was video-taped teaching a GCA lesson towards the end of their final practicum. The STs individually determined the timing of the data collection and the lesson to be observed. Data analysis: Each lesson was segmented into a number of sub-categories of both teacher- and pupil-time. Duration recording using Noldus software (Observer 4.0) segmented the time management of different lesson components. Questioning was coded in terms of type, timing and target. Separate MANOVAs were used to measure the difference between programmes and levels (primary and secondary) in relation to time-management procedures and questioning strategies. Findings: No differences emerged between the programmes or levels in their time-management or questioning strategies. Using the GCA, STs generated more pupil time (53%) than teacher time (47%). STs at the primary level provided more technical practice, and those in secondary schools more small-sided game play. Most questions (58%) were asked during play or practice but were substantially low-order involving knowledge or recall (76%) and only 6.7% were open-ended or divergent and capable of developing tactical awareness. Conclusions: Although STs are delivering more pupil time (practice and game) than teacher-time, the lesson structure requires further fine-tuning to extend the practice task beyond technical drills. Many questions are being asked to generate knowledge about games but lack sufficient quality to enhance critical thinking and tactical awareness, as the GCA intends.

Voting Paths

We consider a variant of the popular matching problem here. The input instance is a bipartite graph $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$, where vertices in $\mathcal{A}$ are called applicants and vertices in $\mathcal{P}$ are called posts. Each applicant ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching $M$ is popular if there is no other matching $M'$ such that the number of applicants who prefer their partners in $M'$ to $M$ exceeds the number of applicants who prefer their partners in $M$ to $M'$. However, the “more popular than” relation is not transitive; hence this relation is not a partial order, and thus there need not be a maximal element here. Indeed, there are simple instances that do not admit popular matchings. The questions of whether an input instance $G$ admits a popular matching and how to compute one if it exists were studied earlier by Abraham et al. Here we study reachability questions among matchings in $G$, assuming that $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$ admits a popular matching. A matching $M_k$ is reachable from $M_0$ if there is a sequence of matchings $\langle M_0,M_1,\dots,M_k\rangle$ such that each matching is more popular than its predecessor. Such a sequence is called a length-$k$ voting path from $M_0$ to $M_k$. We show an interesting property of reachability among matchings in $G$: there is always a voting path of length at most 2 from any matching to some popular matching. Given a bipartite graph $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$ with $n$ vertices and $m$ edges and any matching $M_0$ in $G$, we give an $O(m\sqrt{n})$ algorithm to compute a shortest-length voting path from $M_0$ to a popular matching; when preference lists are strictly ordered, we have an $O(m+n)$ algorithm. This problem has applications in dynamic matching markets, where applicants and posts can enter and leave the market, and applicants can also change their preferences arbitrarily. After any change, the current matching may no longer be popular, in which case we are required to update it. However, our model demands that we switch from one matching to another only if there is consensus among the applicants to agree to the switch. Hence we need to update via a voting path that ends in a popular matching. Thus our algorithm has applications here.

Instructional aid for tactical wargame model

A tactical gaming model for wargame play between two teams A and B through a control unit C has been developed, which can be handled using IBM personal computers (XT and AT models) having a local area network facility. This simulation model involves communication between the teams involved, logging and validation of the actions of the teams by the control unit. The validation procedure uses statistical and also monte carlo techniques. This model has been developed to evaluate the planning strategies of the teams involved. This application software using about 120 files has been developed in BASIC, DBASE and the associated network software. Experience gained in the instruction courses using this model will also be discussed.

A participatory approach to tactical forest planning.

The paper examines the needs, premises and criteria for effective public participation in tactical forest planning. A method for participatory forest planning utilizing the techniques of preference analysis, professional expertise and heuristic optimization is introduced. The techniques do not cover the whole process of participatory planning, but are applied as a tool constituting the numerical core for decision support. The complexity of multi-resource management is addressed by hierarchical decision analysis which assesses the public values, preferences and decision criteria toward the planning situation. An optimal management plan is sought using heuristic optimization. The plan can further be improved through mutual negotiations, if necessary. The use of the approach is demonstrated with an illustrative example, it's merits and challenges for participatory forest planning and decision making are discussed and a model for applying it in general forest planning context is depicted. By using the approach, valuable information can be obtained about public preferences and the effects of taking them into consideration on the choice of the combination of standwise treatment proposals for a forest area. Participatory forest planning calculations, carried out by the approach presented in the paper, can be utilized in conflict management and in developing compromises between competing interests.

Nonlinear and linear autopilot performance comparison of tactical flight vehicle

n this paper, three-axis autopilot of a tactical flight vehicle has been designed for surface to air application. Both nonlinear and linear design synthesis and analysis have been carried out pertaining to present flight vehicle. Lateral autopilot performance has been compared by tracking lateral acceleration components along yaw and pitch plane at higher angles of attack in presence of side force and aerodynamic nonlinearity. The nonlinear lateral autopilot design is based on dynamic inversion and time scale separation principle. The linear lateral autopilot design is based on three-loop topology. Roll autopilot robustness performance has been enhanced against unmodeled roll disturbances by backstepping technique. Complete performance comparison results of both nonlinear and linear controller based on six degrees of freedom simulation along with stability and robustness studies with respect to plant parameter variation have been discussed in the paper.

Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting

In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided, for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the POSSIBLE WINNER problem, with number of candidates as the parameter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge 10]. In this paper, we settle this open question for many common voting rules. We show that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule does not admit a polynomial kernel with the number of candidates as the parameter. We show however that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem which is an important special case of the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule, when the number of manipulators is polynomial in the number of candidates. A significant conclusion of our work is that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem is harder than the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem since the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does not admit a polynomial kernel. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.

Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.

I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.