The forward- and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

We build a pricing kernel using only US domestic assets data and check whether it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape consumption based models. By interpreting our stochastic discount factor as the projection of a pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets. We address predictability issues associated with the forward premium puzzle by: i) using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations, and; ii) by pricing Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)'s foreign currency portfolios. Our results indicate that the relevant state variables that explain foreign-currency market asset prices are also the driving forces behind U.S. domestic assets behavior.

The forward- and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

Using information on US domestic financial data only, we build a stochastic discount factor—SDF— and check whether it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape consumption based models. By interpreting our SDF as the projection of a pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets prices. We address predictability issues associated with the forward premium puzzle by: i) using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations, and; ii) by pricing Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)’s foreign currency portfolios. Our results indicate that the relevant state variables that explain foreign-currency market asset prices are also the driving forces behind U.S. domestic assets behavior.

Fator estocástico de desconto: as cotas de variância, métricas de distância e suas extensões

The concept of stochastic discount factor pervades the Modern Theory of Asset Pricing. Initially, such object allows unattached pricing models to be discussed under the same terms. However, Hansen and Jagannathan have shown there is worthy information to be brought forth from such powerful concept which undelies asset pricing models. From security market data sets, one is able to explore the behavior of such random variable, determining a useful variance bound. Furthermore, through that instrument, they explore one pitfall on modern asset pricing: model misspecification. Those major contributions, alongside with some of its extensions, are thoroughly investigated in this exposition.

The forward- and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

Using information on US domestic financial data only, we build a stochastic discount factor—SDF— and check whether it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape consumption based models. By interpreting our SDF as the projection of a pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets prices. We address predictability issues associated with the forward premium puzzle by: i) using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations, and; ii) by comparing this out-of-sample results with the one obtained performing an in-sample exercise, where the return-based SDF captures sources of risk of a representative set of developed and emerging economies government bonds. Our results indicate that the relevant state variables that explain foreign-currency market asset prices are also the driving forces behind U.S. domestic assets behavior.

The forward and the equity-premium puzzles: a straightforward test of whether they are two symptoms of the same illness

We build a stochastic discount factor—SDF— using information on US domestic financial data only, and provide evidence that it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape SDF’s generated by consumption based models. By interpreting our SDF as the projection of the pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets prices. In our tests, we address predictability, a defining feature of the Forward Premium Puzzle—FPP— by using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations both in the equity and the foreign markets.

A note on the forward and the equity-premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

We build a stochastic discount factor—SDF— using information on US domestic financial data only, and provide evidence that it accounts for foreign markets stylized facts that escape SDF’s generated by consumption based models. By interpreting our SDF as the projection of the pricing kernel from a fully specified model in the space of returns, our results indicate that a model that accounts for the behavior of domestic assets goes a long way toward accounting for the behavior of foreign assets prices. In our tests, we address predictability, a defining feature of the Forward Premium Puzzle—FPP— by using instruments that are known to forecast excess returns in the moments restrictions associated with Euler equations both in the equity and the foreign markets.

Auctions with options for re-auction

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

Impondo mais restrições ao modelo de apreçamento vetorial com séries temporais

Este Trabalho se Dedica ao exercício empírico de gerar mais restrições ao modelo de apreçamento de ativos com séries temporais desenvolvido por Hansen e Singleton JPE 1983. As restrições vão, desde um simples aumento qualitativo nos ativos estudados até uma extensão teórica proposta a partir de um estimador consistente do fator estocástico de desconto. As estimativas encontradas para a aversão relativa ao risco do agente representativo estão dentro do esperado, na maioria dos casos, já que atingem valores já encontrados na literatura além do fato destes valores serem economicamente plausíveis. A extensão teórica proposta não atingiu resultados esperados, parecendo melhorar a estimação do sistema marginalmente.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

A study of stock market fluctuations and their relation to business conditions

Most research on stock prices is based on the present value model or the more general consumption-based model. When applied to real economic data, both of them are found unable to account for both the stock price level and its volatility. Three essays here attempt to both build a more realistic model, and to check whether there is still room for bubbles in explaining fluctuations in stock prices. In the second chapter, several innovations are simultaneously incorporated into the traditional present value model in order to produce more accurate model-based fundamental prices. These innovations comprise replacing with broad dividends the more narrow traditional dividends that are more commonly used, a nonlinear artificial neural network (ANN) forecasting procedure for these broad dividends instead of the more common linear forecasting models for narrow traditional dividends, and a stochastic discount rate in place of the constant discount rate. Empirical results show that the model described above predicts fundamental prices better, compared with alternative models using linear forecasting process, narrow dividends, or a constant discount factor. Nonetheless, actual prices are still largely detached from fundamental prices. The bubblelike deviations are found to coincide with business cycles. The third chapter examines possible cointegration of stock prices with fundamentals and non-fundamentals. The output gap is introduced to form the nonfundamental part of stock prices. I use a trivariate Vector Autoregression (TVAR) model and a single equation model to run cointegration tests between these three variables. Neither of the cointegration tests shows strong evidence of explosive behavior in the DJIA and S&P 500 data. Then, I applied a sup augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check for the existence of periodically collapsing bubbles in stock prices. Such bubbles are found in S&P data during the late 1990s. Employing econometric tests from the third chapter, I continue in the fourth chapter to examine whether bubbles exist in stock prices of conventional economic sectors on the New York Stock Exchange. The ‘old economy’ as a whole is not found to have bubbles. But, periodically collapsing bubbles are found in Material and Telecommunication Services sectors, and the Real Estate industry group.

Essays in Macro Finance

I study the link between capital markets and sources of macroeconomic risk. In chapter 1 I show that expected inflation risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns even after controlling for cash flow growth and volatility risks. Motivated by this evidence I study a long run risk model with a built-in inflation non-neutrality channel that allows me to decompose the real stochastic discount factor into news about current and expected cash flow growth, news about expected inflation and news about volatility. The model can successfully price a broad menu of assets and provides a setting for analyzing cross sectional variation in expected inflation risk premium. For industries like retail and durable goods inflation risk can account for nearly a third of the overall risk premium while the energy industry and a broad commodity index act like inflation hedges. Nominal bonds are exposed to expected inflation risk and have inflation premiums that increase with bond maturity. The price of expected inflation risk was very high during the 70's and 80's, but has come down a lot since being very close to zero over the past decade. On average, the expected inflation price of risk is negative, consistent with the view that periods of high inflation represent a "bad" state of the world and are associated with low economic growth and poor stock market performance. In chapter 2 I look at the way capital markets react to predetermined macroeconomic announcements. I document significantly higher excess returns on the US stock market on macro release dates as compared to days when no macroeconomic news hit the market. Almost the entire equity premium since 1997 is being realized on days when macroeconomic news are released. At high frequency, there is a pattern of returns increasing in the hours prior to the pre-determined announcement time, peaking around the time of the announcement and dropping thereafter.

Optimal release strategies for biological control agents: an application of stochastic dynamic programming to population management

1. Establishing biological control agents in the field is a major step in any classical biocontrol programme, yet there are few general guidelines to help the practitioner decide what factors might enhance the establishment of such agents. 2. A stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) approach, linked to a metapopulation model, was used to find optimal release strategies (number and size of releases), given constraints on time and the number of biocontrol agents available. By modelling within a decision-making framework we derived rules of thumb that will enable biocontrol workers to choose between management options, depending on the current state of the system. 3. When there are few well-established sites, making a few large releases is the optimal strategy. For other states of the system, the optimal strategy ranges from a few large releases, through a mixed strategy (a variety of release sizes), to many small releases, as the probability of establishment of smaller inocula increases. 4. Given that the probability of establishment is rarely a known entity, we also strongly recommend a mixed strategy in the early stages of a release programme, to accelerate learning and improve the chances of finding the optimal approach.

A multifactor approach to the social discount rate

This work focuses on the appraisal of public and environmental projects and, more specifically, on the calculation of the social discount rate (SDR) for this kind of very long-term investment projects. As a rule, we can state that the instantaneous discount rate must be equal to the hazard rate of the public good or to the mortality rate of the population that the project is intended to. The hazard can be due to technical failures of the system, but, in this paper, we are going to consider different independent variables that can cause the hazard. That is, we are going to consider a multivariate hazard rate. In our empirical application, the Spanish forest surface will be the system and the forest fire will be the fail that can be caused by several factors. The aim of this work is to integrate the different variables that produce the fail in the calculation of the SDR from a multivariate hazard rate approach.