Impact of Ownership Structure on the Performance of China’s Feed Mill Sector, April 2005

In the decade of the 1990s, China’s feed sector became increasingly privatized, more feed mills opened, and the scale of operation expanded. Capacity utilization remained low and multi-ministerial supervision was still prevalent, but the feed mill sector showed a positive performance overall, posting a growth rate of 11 percent per year. Profit margin over sales was within allowable rates set by the government of China at 3 to 5 percent. Financial efficiency improved, with a 20 percent quicker turnover of working capital. Average technical efficiency was 0.805, as more efficient feed mills increasingly gained production shares. This study finds evidence that the increasing privatization explains the improved performance of the commercial feed mill sector. The drivers that shaped the feed mill sector in the 1990s have changed with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. With the new policy regime in place, the study foresees that, assuming an adequate supply of soy meal and an excess capacity in the feed mill sector, it is likely that China will allow corn imports up to the tariff rate quota (TRQ) of 7.2 mmt since the in-quota rate is very low at 1 percent. However, when the TRQ is exceeded, the import duty jumps to a prohibitive out-quota rate of 65 percent. With an import duty for meat of only 10 to 12 percent, China would have a strong incentive to import meat products directly rather than bringing in expensive corn to produce meat domestically. This would be further reinforced if structural transformation in the swine sector would narrow the cost differential between domestic and imported pork.

State of Iowa Space Utilization and Building Study, October 9, 2000

Executive Summary Purposes of this Report: • Recommend the most logical and economical options to address state governmental space needs in the Polk County metropolitan area to the year 2010. • Include building size, location, phasing, financing, method of project delivery and estimated cost. • Develop a software tool to compare costs of leasing vs. ownership of space. Methodology: Identify: 1. Current amount and location of owned and leased space, by agency; 2. Types of space and whether best located on or off of the Capitol Complex; 3. Utilization of space, noting over-crowding and under-utilization; 4. Current number of workstations for full and part time employees, Personnel Employment Organization (PEO) workers, contractors, interns, etc.; and, 5. History of staff levels to assist in the prediction of staff growth. Scope: This report focuses on 10 state-owned buildings located on the Capitol Complex and 48 leased spaces in the Polk County metropolitan area. (See Figures 1 and 2.) • Due to a separate space study under way by the Legislature, implications of area and staff for the State Capitol building are included only for the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Treasurer, Secretary of State, Auditor and the Department of Management. • Because it is largely a museum building that does not have office space available for other agencies, the area and staff of the Historical Building are not fully addressed. • Only the parking implications of the new Judicial Building are included in this study because the building space is under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch and not available for other agencies. Several state-owned buildings are not included in the scope of this report, generally because they have highly focused purposes, and their space is not available for assignment to other agencies. Several leased locations are not included for similar reasons, including leases that do not fall within the authority of the Department of General Services.

Securing Tenure for Sustainable Livelihoods: A Case of Women Land Ownership in Anglophone Cameroon

The majority of women in Third World countries depend on land for their livelihood. Security of tenure is important for them to ensure sustainable development, especially in rural areas. In most parts of Africa, land ownership is affected by traditional values, inheritance rights, and government influence. These forces have provided varying types of tenure which are detrimental to the women in rural and urban areas. Land acquisition and its development has been an emotive issue due to traditional pressures and the law as regards the process of land certification. The government and traditional administrations are highly involved in the way women own land and subsequently develop it in Anglophone Cameroon. State authority over land acquisition is important, but the process for obtaining land title is herculean especially for the rural woman. This study illustrates that land acquisition and development by women constitute a problem because of traditional pressures and the law guiding the process of land certification. There is need to exhume the barriers of government’s legal instrument (The Land Consultative Board) that regulates the ownership of land and to revisit some traditional practices as regards land ownership that impact negatively on women in a changing and globalizing world. A compromise approach is advocated for land acquisition that can transcend traditional barriers as well as render the process of land registration more realistic especially for women.

The effectiveness of non-executive directors in Chinese state-owned enterprises

Purpose – The primary aim of this paper is to examine whether boards of directors with independent members function as effective corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs), by analysing four characteristics of non-executive directors (NEDs) that impact on their effectiveness, namely their degree of independence, information, incentive, and competence. Design/methodology/approach – Being exploratory in nature, the research uses qualitative methods for data collection. It is based on an interpretivist perspective of social sciences, analysing and explaining the factors that influence the effectiveness of NEDs. Findings – The findings indicate that the NED system is weak in China as a result of the concentrated ownership structure, unique business culture, intervention of controlling shareholders and the lack of understanding of the benefits brought by NEDs. Research limitations/implications – The paper examines the salient features of and challenges to the system of NEDs of SOEs in present-day China. It provides an understanding of how the various perceptions of the board, gathered from in-depth interviews of corporate directors, leads to new interpretations of board effectiveness. The research, however, is limited owing to a relatively small sample size and the sensitive nature of the information collected. Originality/value – The study aims to fill gaps in the literature and contribute to it by assessing the “real” views and perceptions of NEDs in China in an institutional environment significantly different from that of the USA, the UK and other western economies.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The Effects of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Poland and East Germany

The main goal of this project was to propose appropriate methods of analysing the effects of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, methods which were then tested on a limited sample of 16 Polish and 8 German enterprises privatised in 1992. A considerable amount of information was collected relating to the six-year period 1989-1994 relating to most aspects of the companies' activities. The effects of privatisation were taken to be those changes within the enterprises which were the result of privatisation, in such areas as production, the productivity of labour and fixed assets, investments and innovations, employment and wages, economic incentives (especially for top managers), financing (internal and external sources), bad debts and economic effects (financial analysis). A second important goal was to identify the main factors which represent methodological obstacles in surveys of the effects of privatisation during a period of fundamental transformation of the entire economic system. The list of enterprises for the research was compiled in such a way as to allow for the differentiation of ownership structures of privatised firms and to permit (at least to a certain extent) the empirical verification of some hypotheses regarding the privatisation process. The enterprises selected were divided into the following three groups representing (as far as possible) various types of ownership structures or types of control: (1) enterprises control by strategic investors (domestic or foreign), (2) enterprises controlled by employees (employee-owned companies), (3) enterprises controlled by managers. Formal methods such as econometric models with varying parameters were used to separate pure privatisation effects from other factors which influence various aspects of an enterprise's working, including policies on the productivity of labour and capital, average wages, the remuneration of top managers, etc. While the group admits that their findings and conclusions cannot be treated as representative of all privatised enterprises in Poland and Germany, they found considerable convergence with their findings and those of other surveys conducted on a wider scale. The main hypotheses that were confirmed included that privatisation (especially in companies controlled by large investors and managers) leads to a significant increase in the effectiveness of these production process, growing pay differentials between different employee groups (e.g. between executives and rank-and-file employees) and between different jobs and positions within particular professional groups. They also confirmed the growing importance in incentives to top executives of incentives linked with the company's economic effects (particularly profit-related incentives), long-term incentives and the capital market.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.

Firearm legislation and firearm mortality in the USA: a cross-sectional, state-level study.

BACKGROUND In an effort to reduce firearm mortality rates in the USA, US states have enacted a range of firearm laws to either strengthen or deregulate the existing main federal gun control law, the Brady Law. We set out to determine the independent association of different firearm laws with overall firearm mortality, homicide firearm mortality, and suicide firearm mortality across all US states. We also projected the potential reduction of firearm mortality if the three most strongly associated firearm laws were enacted at the federal level. METHODS We constructed a cross-sectional, state-level dataset from Nov 1, 2014, to May 15, 2015, using counts of firearm-related deaths in each US state for the years 2008-10 (stratified by intent [homicide and suicide]) from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, data about 25 firearm state laws implemented in 2009, and state-specific characteristics such as firearm ownership for 2013, firearm export rates, and non-firearm homicide rates for 2009, and unemployment rates for 2010. Our primary outcome measure was overall firearm-related mortality per 100 000 people in the USA in 2010. We used Poisson regression with robust variances to derive incidence rate ratios (IRRs) and 95% CIs. FINDINGS 31 672 firearm-related deaths occurred in 2010 in the USA (10·1 per 100 000 people; mean state-specific count 631·5 [SD 629·1]). Of 25 firearm laws, nine were associated with reduced firearm mortality, nine were associated with increased firearm mortality, and seven had an inconclusive association. After adjustment for relevant covariates, the three state laws most strongly associated with reduced overall firearm mortality were universal background checks for firearm purchase (multivariable IRR 0·39 [95% CI 0·23-0·67]; p=0·001), ammunition background checks (0·18 [0·09-0·36]; p<0·0001), and identification requirement for firearms (0·16 [0·09-0·29]; p<0·0001). Projected federal-level implementation of universal background checks for firearm purchase could reduce national firearm mortality from 10·35 to 4·46 deaths per 100 000 people, background checks for ammunition purchase could reduce it to 1·99 per 100 000, and firearm identification to 1·81 per 100 000. INTERPRETATION Very few of the existing state-specific firearm laws are associated with reduced firearm mortality, and this evidence underscores the importance of focusing on relevant and effective firearms legislation. Implementation of universal background checks for the purchase of firearms or ammunition, and firearm identification nationally could substantially reduce firearm mortality in the USA. FUNDING None.

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Caste, land, and migration : a preliminary analysis of a village survey in an underdeveloped state in India

This paper explores migration from Bihar, one of the most underdeveloped states in India, by paying particular attention to social class (caste) and landholdings. After describing details of individual migrants, we present our preliminary findings on the determinants of migration, based on our field survey of 200 households in four villages in 2011. In terms of social class, Muslims are more likely to migrate, but Scheduled Castes do not show a high propensity to migrate as is stated in some of the existing literature where the underclass is said to be more mobile. In terms of landholdings, the probability that someone will migrate is high among the landless and smaller landholders but it decreases as the size of the landholding increases. However, as the size of the landholding increases still further, a reverse effect of landholding on decisions regarding migration moves in, with the decline in probability becoming less and less. This result confirms a non-linear relationship between landholdings and the decision to migrate. Some further research questions are raised in the paper.

The European Semester in Belgium: A state of play. European Policy Brief No. 32, October 2014

After four rounds of the European Semester process of EU economic coordination, Belgium has done relatively little to comply with EU recommendations. This brief substantiates and confirms this claim after clarifying the meaning of these recommendations. While the challenges underlined by the European Commission still lie ahead, Belgium’s ownership of the recommendations for reforms has been low. Not only do coordination processes remain bureaucratic and technocratic, but many of the recommendations’ concerns – external competitiveness, social security reforms, market reforms – are not traditionally defended by the political left in Belgium. The controversy surrounding the recommendations for national structural reforms owes much to their supply-side orientation, which contrasts with the inability of the EU to pursue demand-side policies. But despite this disequilibrium, the recommendations highlight relevant issues that ought to be addressed, and indicate where scope for national debate exists.

Treaty provisions relating to the rights of inheritance, acquisitions, and ownership of property in force between the United States and other countries /

Mode of access: Internet.

Public land ownership in California

Mode of access: Internet.

The government ownership of railways /

Cover title.