Residential sales by auction : a property type or geographic consideration

The sale of residential property by auction is a preferred sale method by real estate agents, but not always preferred by some vendors and most residential property buyers. In many residential property markets, the performance and measure of residential property market activity is based on the number of properties offered for sale by auction, auction clearance rates and the number of properties sold prior to auction. However, in many specific residential property markets, sale by auction may not be the preferred or supported method of sale. This paper will review the type of residential property sale within the Sydney residential property market and track the auction sales and clearance rates for Sydney over the past 5 months and compare these results in relation to clearance rates, passed in sales, and properties sold prior to auction This will provide a breakdown of real estate agency sale practice over a large metropolitan region to determine the impact of geographic location and socio-economic factors on the auction of residential property. In addition the paper will analyse the weekly auction sales in the Sydney residential property market to determine what areas of Sydney have the greatest number of house auctions and the performance of the auctions in relation location and socio economic factors.

Examining the use of bid information in predicting the contractor’s performance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of bid information, including both price and non-price factors in predicting the bidder’s performance. Design/methodology/approach – The practice of the industry was first reviewed. Data on bid evaluation and performance records of the successful bids were then obtained from the Hong Kong Housing Department, the largest housing provider in Hong Kong. This was followed by the development of a radial basis function (RBF) neural network based performance prediction model. Findings – It is found that public clients are more conscientious and include non-price factors in their bid evaluation equations. With the input variables used the information is available at the time of the bid and the output variable is the project performance score recorded during work in progress achieved by the successful bidder. It was found that past project performance score is the most sensitive input variable in predicting future performance. Research limitations/implications – The paper shows the inadequacy of using price alone for bid award criterion. The need for a systemic performance evaluation is also highlighted, as this information is highly instrumental for subsequent bid evaluations. The caveat for this study is that the prediction model was developed based on data obtained from one single source. Originality/value – The value of the paper is in the use of an RBF neural network as the prediction tool because it can model non-linear function. This capability avoids tedious ‘‘trial and error’’ in deciding the number of hidden layers to be used in the network model. Keywords Hong Kong, Construction industry, Neural nets, Modelling, Bid offer spreads Paper type Research paper

Service bid comparisons by fuzzy ranking in open railway market timetabling

In an open railway access market, the Infrastructure Provider (IP), upon the receipts of service bids from the Train Service Providers (TSPs), assigns track access rights according to its own business objectives and the merits of the bids; and produces the train service timetable through negotiations. In practice, IP chooses to negotiate with the TSPs one by one in such a sequence that IP optimizes its objectives. The TSP bids are usually very complicated, containing a large number of parameters in different natures. It is a difficult task even for an expert to give a priority sequence for negotiations from the contents of the bids. This study proposes the application of fuzzy ranking method to compare and prioritize the TSP bids in order to produce a negotiation sequence. The results of this study allow investigations on the behaviors of the stakeholders in bid preparation and negotiation, as well as evaluation of service quality in the open railway market.

The determinants of multinational contractors' willingness to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure projects : towards deploying the eclectic paradigm of internationalisation

Against a background of already thin markets in some sectors of major public sector infrastructure in Australia and the desire of Australian federal government to leverage private finance, concerns about ensuring sufficient levels of competition are prompting federal government to seek new sources of in-bound Foreign Direct Income. The aim of this paper is to justify and develop a means to deploying the eclectic paradigm of internationalisation that forms part of an Australian federally funded research project designed to explain the determinants of multinational contractors' willingness to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure projects. Despite the dominance of the eclectic paradigm as a theory of internationalisation for over two decades, it has seen limited application in terms of multinational construction. It is expected that the research project will be the first empirical study to deploy the eclectic paradigm to inbound FDI to Australia whilst using the dominant economic theories advocated for use within the eclectic paradigm. Furthermore, the research project is anticipated to yield a number of practical benefits. These include estimates of the potential scope to attract more multinational contractors to bid for Australian public sector infrastructure, including the nature and extent to which this scope can be influenced by Australian governments responsible for the delivery of infrastructure. On the other hand, the research is also expected to indicate the extent to which indigenous and other multinational contractors domiciled in Australia are investing in special purpose technology and achieving productivity gains relative to foreign multinational contractors.

On being balanced in an unbalanced world

This paper examines the case of a procurement auction for a single project, in which the breakdown of the winning bid into its component items determines the value of payments subsequently made to bidder as the work progresses. Unbalanced bidding, or bid skewing, involves the uneven distribution of mark-up among the component items in such a way as to attempt to derive increased benefit to the unbalancer but without involving any change in the total bid. One form of unbalanced bidding for example, termed Front Loading (FL), is thought to be widespread in practice. This involves overpricing the work items that occur early in the project and underpricing the work items that occur later in the project in order to enhance the bidder's cash flow. Naturally, auctioners attempt to protect themselves from the effects of unbalancing—typically reserving the right to reject a bid that has been detected as unbalanced. As a result, models have been developed to both unbalance bids and detect unbalanced bids but virtually nothing is known of their use, success or otherwise. This is of particular concern for the detection methods as, without testing, there is no way of knowing the extent to which unbalanced bids are remaining undetected or balanced bids are being falsely detected as unbalanced. This paper reports on a simulation study aimed at demonstrating the likely effects of unbalanced bid detection models in a deterministic environment involving FL unbalancing in a Texas DOT detection setting, in which bids are deemed to be unbalanced if an item exceeds a maximum (or fails to reach a minimum) ‘cut-off’ value determined by the Texas method. A proportion of bids are automatically and maximally unbalanced over a long series of simulated contract projects and the profits and detection rates of both the balancers and unbalancers are compared. The results show that, as expected, the balanced bids are often incorrectly detected as unbalanced, with the rate of (mis)detection increasing with the proportion of FL bidders in the auction. It is also shown that, while the profit for balanced bidders remains the same irrespective of the number of FL bidders involved, the FL bidder's profit increases with the greater proportion of FL bidders present in the auction. Sensitivity tests show the results to be generally robust, with (mis)detection rates increasing further when there are fewer bidders in the auction and when more data are averaged to determine the baseline value, but being smaller or larger with increased cut-off values and increased cost and estimate variability depending on the number of FL bidders involved. The FL bidder's expected benefit from unbalancing, on the other hand, increases, when there are fewer bidders in the auction. It also increases when the cut-off rate and discount rate is increased, when there is less variability in the costs and their estimates, and when less data are used in setting the baseline values.

Misleading and deceptive conduct at an auction

An unusual factual situation recently arose for consideration by Lindsay J of the Federal Circuit Court. In Carter v Delgrove Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] FCCA 783, an application was brought by the owners of a residential property in Western Australia, the Carters, for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (“ACL”) and for damages for breach of contract arising from an auction of their house. Delgrove Holdings Pty Ltd was a trustee of a family trust with Mr Ilahi being a director and shareholder of the company as well as a beneficiary under the family trust. It was established that Delgrove Holdings Pty Ltd engaged in the business of property acquisition for the purposes of generating rental income...

The determinants of multinational contractors' willingness to bid for Australian public sector major infrastructure projects : deploying the eclectic paradigm of internationalisation

Based on Dunning's dominant international business theory and the unique characteristics of construction, a novel framework is developed and tested to explain multinational contracting into Australia. Beyond contributions to theory, Australian governments now have clear evidence upon which to develop more effective procurement reform towards increasing the attractiveness of public sector major infrastructure projects and competition in this sector.

To bid or not to bid: A framework for contractor decision making

This thesis is a framework to formalise contractors process for bidding decision making through categorising the factors effecting the decision to bid into five categories. It opens the door to introduce a strategic planning system for pre-contract and business development activities which cost the contractors up to 5% of the project cost which is considered as high risk investment and would have impact on submitted bid price and the project delivery quality.

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent thirty years little progress has been made - due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. This paper resumes the debate by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to assure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of twelve construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders’ bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder’s probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Non-competitive bids have recently become a major concern in both Public and Private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This work contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Who is the South African retail giant behind the David Jones bid?

Yesterday morning came the news South African retailer Woolworths had offered $4 a share to acquire David Jones, a proposal that has the approval of the department store’s board. This offer, worth an estimated A$2.15 billion, represents a 25% premium over the current share price value. An earlier offer, from rival Myer, was rejected earlier this year. But who is Woolworths? Not to be confused with Australia’s largest supermarket, Woolworths SA is one of South Africa’s largest retailers.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.