Energy compensation following consumption of sugar-reduced products: a randomized controlled trial

PURPOSE: Consumption of sugar-reformulated products (commercially available foods and beverages that have been reduced in sugar content through reformulation) is a potential strategy for lowering sugar intake at a population level. The impact of sugar-reformulated products on body weight, energy balance (EB) dynamics and cardiovascular disease risk indicators has yet to be established. The REFORMulated foods (REFORM) study examined the impact of an 8-week sugar-reformulated product exchange on body weight, EB dynamics, blood pressure, arterial stiffness, glycemia and lipemia. METHODS: A randomized, controlled, double-blind, crossover dietary intervention study was performed with fifty healthy normal to overweight men and women (age 32.0 ± 9.8 year, BMI 23.5 ± 3.0 kg/m2) who were randomly assigned to consume either regular sugar or sugar-reduced foods and beverages for 8 weeks, separated by 4-week washout period. Body weight, energy intake (EI), energy expenditure and vascular markers were assessed at baseline and after both interventions. RESULTS: We found that carbohydrate (P < 0.001), total sugars (P < 0.001) and non-milk extrinsic sugars (P < 0.001) (% EI) were lower, whereas fat (P = 0.001) and protein (P = 0.038) intakes (% EI) were higher on the sugar-reduced than the regular diet. No effects on body weight, blood pressure, arterial stiffness, fasting glycemia or lipemia were observed. CONCLUSIONS: Consumption of sugar-reduced products, as part of a blinded dietary exchange for an 8-week period, resulted in a significant reduction in sugar intake. Body weight did not change significantly, which we propose was due to energy compensation.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.

An Analysis of the Association Between Firm Risk, Executive Share Options and Accounting Performance: Some Australian Evidence

This paper examines whether the financial performance of the firm is associated with the risk-taking propensity of executives, which is inferred from the structure of their share option portfolio. The objective of this paper is to determine if executives have greater risk bearing preferences when they have more share options than shares in their firm. In turn, executives' risk-taking preferences suggest that these decision-makers adopt value-increasing strategies. The results of this study support this notion. The results of the study of 182 Australian firms demonstrate that the negative relationship between firm risk and firm performance is weaker when executives hold a higher proportion of share options than shares in their investment in the firm. These results hold implications for executives' compensation contracts. That is, executives who share in their firms' risk via share options are more likely to undertake risky activities with high-expected performance outcome.

An investigation on the risk perceptions of Australian property fund Managers

Recent empirical and analytical studies have demonstrated that downside risk appears as an intuitively appealing risk measure in which it is more consistent with investors’ behaviour. Conversely, qualitative studies into the behaviour of investors, particularly real estate investors, have been relatively limited. This study seeks to address this shortfall and aims to examine the perceptions of property fund managers towards risk. A survey was conducted to investigate the risk perceptions of property fund managers and determine whether they only require compensation for bearing with higher downside risk. The acceptance level of downside risk is also examined. The findings reveal that downside risk is more consistent with how investors individually perceive risk. However, there is also a gap between theoretical assertions and practice in which downside risk is not commonly used in the practice. The results give an insight into the knowledge base of property investors towards risk, particularly downside risk.

Behaviours of property investors: an investigation on the risk perceptions of Australian property fund managers

Recent finance and real estate empirical and analytical studies have demonstrated that downside risk appears as an intuitively appealing risk measure in which it is more consistent with investors' behaviours. Conversely, qualitative studies into the behaviours of investors, particularly real estate investors, have been relatively limited. This study seeks to address this shortfall and aims to examine the behaviours of property fund managers towards downside risk. A survey was conducted in order to investigate the risk perceptions of property fund managers and determine whether they only require compensation for bearing with higher downside risk. The acceptance level of downside risk in the property funds industry in Australia is also examined. The findings reveal that downside risk is more consistent with how investors individually perceive risk. However, there is also a gap between theoretical assertions and practice in which downside risk is not commonly used in the practice. The results give an insight into the knowledge base of property investors towards downside risk.

Listed property trusts and downside systematic risk sensitivity

Purpose: This paper aims to identify and examine the determinants of downside systematic risk in Australian listed property trusts (LPTs).

Design/methodology/approach: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and lower partial moment-CAPM (LPM-CAPM) are employed to compute both systematic risk and downside systematic risk. The methodology of Patel and Olsen and Chaudhry et al. is adopted to examine the determinants of systematic risk and downside systematic risk.

Findings: The results confirm that systematic risk and downside systematic risk can be individually identified. There is little evidence to support the existence of linkages between systematic risk in Australian LPTs and financial/management structure determinants. On the other hand, downside systematic risk is directly related to the leverage/management structure of a LPT. The results are also robust after controlling for the LPTs' investment characteristics and varying target rates of return.

Practical implications: Investors and real estate analysts should conscious with the higher returns from high leverage and internally managed LPTs. Although there is no evidence that these higher returns are related to higher systematic risk, there could be the compensation for higher downside systematic risk.

Originality/value: This study provides invaluable insights into the management of real estate risk in Australian LPTs with implications for REITs in other countries. Unlike previous studies of systematic risk in REITs or LPTs, this is the first study to assess downside systematic risk and explore the determinants of downside systematic risk in LPTs.

Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing

Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.

Tail risk in the hedge fund industry

The dissertation goal is to quantify the tail risk premium embedded into hedge funds' returns. Tail risk is the probability of extreme large losses. Although it is a rare event, asset pricing theory suggests that investors demand compensation for holding assets sensitive to extreme market downturns. By de nition, such events have a small likelihood to be represented in the sample, what poses a challenge to estimate the e ects of tail risk by means of traditional approaches such as VaR. The results show that it is not su cient to account for the tail risk stemming from equities markets. Active portfolio management employed by hedge funds demand a speci c measure to estimate and control tail risk. Our proposed factor lls that void inasmuch it presents explanatory power both over the time series as well as the cross-section of funds' returns.

Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis

The question of whether the design of the corporate executive pay package reflects an attempt to reduce agency costs between shareholders an managers is adressed. The components of senior executive pay are found to vary systematically across firms in a manner that cannot easily be explained by tax effects, and which would indicate that individual elements of pay are aimed at controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems. Managerial decisions and the structure of managerial pay therefore appear to be interrelated.

The Taxation of Bonuses and its Effect on Executive Compensation - Evidence from the UK Experience

This paper explores the reaction of compensation components awarded to executive directors of UK financial institutions following the adoption of the bonus tax in December 2009. Excessive bonuses are blamed for encouraging risk taking and are regarded as one of the pull factors of the financial crisis. The British government attempted to reduce bonuses and accordingly corporate risk-taking by means of a special tax on cashbased bonuses. Using a comprehensive dataset on executive compensation we show that the introduction of the bonus tax decreased the net cash bonuses awarded to directors by about 43%, accompanied however by a simultaneous increase in other compensation components leaving both variable as well as total compensation unaffected. Hence, the incidence of the bonus tax was borne by the firms which compensated their managers for the decrease in cash-based compensation by awarding them different forms of pay. Consistent with this finding our data also suggests that firms reduced dividend pay-outs as a consequence of the bonus tax.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

A conceptual model of compensation/decompensation in lumbar segmental instability

Lumbar spinal instability (LSI) is a common spinal disorder and can be associated with substantial disability. The concept of defining clinically relevant classifications of disease or 'target condition' is used in diagnostic research. Applying this concept to LSI we hypothesize that a set of clinical and radiological criteria can be developed to identify patients with this target condition who are at high risk of 'irreversible' decompensated LSI for whom surgery becomes the treatment of choice. In LSI, structural deterioration of the lumbar disc initiates a degenerative cascade of segmental instability. Over time, radiographic signs become visible: traction spurs, facet joint degeneration, misalignment, stenosis, olisthesis and de novo scoliosis. Ligaments, joint capsules, local and distant musculature are the functional elements of the lumbar motion segment. Influenced by non-functional factors, these functional elements allow a compensation of degeneration of the motion segment. Compensation may happen on each step of the degenerative cascade but cannot reverse it. However, compensation of LSI may lead to an alleviation or resolution of clinical symptoms. In return, the target condition of decompensation of LSI may cause the new occurrence of symptoms and pain. Functional compensation and decompensation are subject to numerous factors that can change which makes estimation of an individual's long-term prognosis difficult. Compensation and decompensation may influence radiographic signs of degeneration, e.g. the degree of misalignment and segmental angulation caused by LSI is influenced by the tonus of the local musculature. This conceptual model of compensation/decompensation may help solve the debate on functional and psychosocial factors that influence low back pain and to establish a new definition of non-specific low back pain. Individual differences of identical structural disorders could be explained by compensated or decompensated LSI leading to changes in clinical symptoms and pain. Future spine surgery will have to carefully define and measure functional aspects of LSI, e.g. to identify a point of no return where multidisciplinary interventions do not allow a re-compensation and surgery becomes the treatment of choice.

Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Conventional tort law does not allow victims of exposure to a toxic substance to seek compensation until they develop actual symptoms of illness. This may effectively bar recovery because at the time the illness arises, injurers may be judgment proof. One possible response is to allow a tort for risk that allows victims to seek expected damages at the time of exposure. However, critics charge that this could create a 'race to file' wherein victims rush to file suit to ensure that they will get a share of the injurer's limited assets. We show that such a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file at exposure if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. If bankruptcy is not inevitable, it is possible that a tort for risk will trigger bankruptcy, although a no-bankruptcy equilibrium always exists and Paretodominates the bankruptcy equilibrium. We examine the consequences of the various tort-for-risk equilibria on the compensation of exposure victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.

Private Property, Public Use, and Just Compensation: The Economics of Eminent Domain

The eminent domain clause of the U.S. Constitution concerns the limits of the government's right to take private property for public use. The economic literature on this issue has examined (1) the proper scope of this power as embodied by the 'public use' requirement, (2) the appropriate definition, and implications, of 'just compensation,' and (3) the impact of eminent domain on land use incentives of owners whose land is subject to a taking risk. This essay reviews this literature and draws implications for our understanding of eminent domain law.