Registered social landlords: private enterprise (f)or public good?

Millions of homes previously owned by councils have been transferred to the ownership of registered social landlords. Many of these are run as private companies under the principles first set out in the Combined Code of Corporate Governance. This articled considers whether it is appropriate to apply both the principles of the Code and regulation from the Housing Corporation as forms of control over such companies, and whether extensive government regulation negates the requirement for a board comprising independent directors expected to make strategic decisions while overseeing the executive. Conflict is created when trying to run these companies with a unitary board structure adhering to Combined Code principles while considering the wider interests of the community. It is questioned whether it is inefficient to try to meet these two objectives simultaneously and whether this system produces the best results for the community, the lenders and the end users.

Reconstructing direct and indirect interactions in networked public goods game

W.-X.W. was supported by NNSFC under Grant No. 61573064 and Grant No. 61074116, Beijing Nova Programme, China, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities. Y.-C.L. was supported by ARO under Grant W911NF-14-1-0504.

Health as a Public Good

The purpose of the article is to present different conceptualizations of health as a public good. Author considers whether analytical tools and conceptual framework developed in the studies on the issue of public goods might be useful in order to analyze health. It was noted that health belongs to the special group of exceptional goods, since it carries the characteristics of both private and public good. It was emphasized that the distribution of public goods is a complex issue that requires an appropriate system of incentives as well as instruments in charge of its proper functioning. In the article it is argued that the widespread social anxiety and growing fear of further integration and globalization to a large extend results from the wrong management and unequal provision of global public goods.

Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

How to avoid Copenhagen : An experimental economic approach to climate negotiations

This study got its origin in the failed climate negotiations in the Copenhagen 2009 summit. By conducting a public good game, with participants from China and Sweden, my study indicates that previous studies on public good games can predict the outcome of the game to a quit large extent even though most of my statistical tests came out statistically insignificant. My study also indicates that by framing the game as climate negotiations there were no statistical significant difference on the level of contributions in comparison to the unframed versions of the game. The awareness of the issues with emissions, global warming and other environmental problems are pretty high but even so when push comes to shove gains in the short run are prioritized to gains in the long run. There are however hypothetical willingness to come to term with the environmental issues. The results of the study indicate that the outcome of the Copenhagen summit can be avoidable but would need additional experiments made on cultural differences and behavior.

Policy processes and collective action in water reforms: the cases of Nicaragua and Suriname

Las reformas de agua en países en desarrollo suelen llevarse a cabo junto con cambios institucionales más profundos o, incluso, acompañadas de cambios constitucionales o de régimen político. Por lo tanto, los marcos institucionales adaptados a países gobernados sujetos al estado de derecho pueden no ser apropiados para contextos gobernados fundamentalmente, al menos en sus inicios, por instituciones informales o poco maduras. Esta tesis toma las reformas de agua como punto de partida y pretende contribuir a la literatura mediante una serie de análisis empíricos tanto del ámbito general como del plano individual o sujeto personal de la política del agua. En el ámbito general, el foco se pone en los factores que explican el fallo de la acción colectiva en dos contextos diferentes: 1) en la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua y 2) en el mantenimiento y revitalización de las instituciones de riego en Surinam. En el plano del individuo, la investigación se centra en las decisiones de los usuarios de los recursos y analiza el papel crítico de las variables sociales para la gestión de los recursos comunes. Para ello, el método de investigación utilizado es mixto, combinando el análisis de entrevistas, encuestas y experimentos. En el ámbito general, los resultados muestran que las principales barreras para la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua podrían tener su reflejo en el lenguaje de la Ley y, por tanto, en la forma en la que se definen y configuran las instituciones incluidas en dicha Ley. Así, la investigación demuestra que la implementación de políticas no puede ser estudiada o entendida sin tener en cuenta tanto el diseño de la propia política como el marco socio-ecológico en el que se enmarca. El contexto específico de Nicaragua remarca la importancia de considerar tanto las instituciones formales como informales en los procesos de transición política. A pesar de que las reformas de agua requieren plazos largos para su implementación, el hecho de que exista una diferencia entre las reglas tal cual se definen formalmente y las reglas que operan en la realidad merece una mayor consideración en el diseño de políticas basadas fundamentalmente en instituciones formales. En el ámbito de la conducta individual, el análisis de la acción colectiva ofrece una serie de observaciones empíricas interesantes. En el caso de Nicaragua, los resultados indican que la intensidad de las relaciones sociales, el tipo de agentes dispuestos a proporcionar apoyo social y el nivel de confianza en la comunidad son factores que explican de manera significativa la participación en la comunidad. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la gestión colectiva de riego se produzca, en la mayoría de casos, en torno a lazos familiares sugiere que las variables de capital social críticas se definen en gran medida en la esfera familiar, siendo difícil que se extiendan fuera de estos nexos. El análisis experimental de los resultados de un juego de uso de recurso común y contribución al bien público muestra que las preferencias pro-sociales de los individuos y la heterogeneidad del grupo en términos de composición por sexo son factores que explican significativamente los resultados y las decisiones de apropiación a lo largo del juego. En términos del diseño de las políticas, es fundamental tener en cuenta las dinámicas de participación y uso de los recursos comunes de manera que los niveles de cooperación puedan mantenerse en el largo plazo, lo cual, como se observa en el caso de Surinam, no es siempre posible. Finalmente, el caso de Surinam es un ejemplo ilustrativo de los procesos de acción colectiva en economías en transición. El análisis del fallo de la acción colectiva en Surinam muestra que los procesos políticos vinculados al período colonial y de independencia explican en gran medida la falta de claridad en las reglas operacionales y colectivas que gobiernan la gestión de los sistemas de riego y drenaje. Los resultados empíricos sugieren que a pesar de que la acción colectiva para la provisión de los servicios de riego y drenaje estaba bien establecida bajo el régimen colonial, la auto-organización no prosperó en un contexto dependiente del apoyo externo y regido fundamentalmente por reglas diseñadas al nivel competencial del gobierno central. El sistema socio-ecológico que se desarrolló durante la transición post-colonial favoreció, así, la emergencia de comportamientos oportunistas, y posteriormente la inoperancia de los Water Boards (WBs) creados en la época colonial. En este sentido, cualquier intento por revitalizar los WBs y fomentar el desarrollo de la auto-organización de los usuarios necesitará abordar los problemas relacionados con los patrones demográficos, incluyendo la distribución de la tierra, el diseño de instituciones y la falta de confianza en el gobierno, además de las inversiones típicas en infraestructura y sistemas de información hidrológicos. El liderazgo del gobierno, aportando empuje de arriba-abajo, es, además, otro elemento imprescindible en Surinam. ABSTRACT Water reforms in developing countries take place along deeper institutional and even constitutional. Therefore, institutional frameworks that might result in positive outcomes in countries governed by the rule of law might not fit in contexts governed mainly by informal or immature institutions. This thesis takes water reforms as the starting point and aims to contribute to the literature by presenting several conceptual and empirical analyses at both general and individual levels. At the general national level, the focus is on the factors explaining failure of collective action in two different settings: 1) in the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law and 2) in sustaining and revitalizing irrigation institutions in Suriname. At the individual level, the research focuses on the actions of resource users and analyzes the critical role of social variables for common pool resources management. For this purpose, the research presented in this thesis makes use of a mixed-method approach, combining interviews, surveys and experimental methods. Overall, the results show that major barriers for the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law have its reflection on the language of the Law and, therefore, on the way institutions are defined and configured. In this sense, our study shows that implementation cannot fruitfully be studied and understood without taking into account both the policy design and the social-ecological context in which it is framed. The specific setting of Nicaragua highlights the relevance of considering both formal and informal institutions when promoting policy transitions. Despite the unquestionable fact that water reforms implementation needs long periods of time, there is still a gap between the rules on paper and the rules on the ground that deserves further attention when proposing policy changes on the basis of formal institutions. At the level of the individual agent, the analysis of collective action provides a number of interesting empirical insights. In the case of Nicaragua, I found that the intensity of social networks, the type of agents willing to provide social support and the level of trust in the community are all significant factors in explaining collective action at community level. However, the fact that most collective irrigation relies on family ties suggests that critical social capital variables might be defined within the family sphere and making it difficult to go beyond it. Experimental research combining a common pool resource and a public good game in Nicaragua shows that individuals’ pro-social traits and group heterogeneity in terms of sex composition are significant variables in explaining efficiency outcomes and effort decisions along the game. Thus, with regard to policy design, it is fundamental to consider carefully the dynamics of agents' participation and use of common pool resources, for sustaining cooperation in the long term, which, as seen in the case and Surinam, is not always possible. The case of Suriname provides a rich setting for the analysis of collective action in transition economies. The analysis of decay of collective irrigation in Suriname shows that the lack of clear operational and collective choice rules appear to be rooted in deeper political processes that date back to the colonial period. The empirical findings suggest that despite collective action for the provision of irrigation and drainage services was well established during the colonial period, self-organization did not flourish in a context governed by colonial state-crafted rules and mostly dependent on external support. The social-ecological system developed during the post-colonial transition process favored the emergence of opportunistic behavior. In this respect, any attempt to revitalize WBs and support self-organization will need to tackle the problems derived from demographic patterns, including land allocation, institutions design and government distrust, in addition to the typical investments in both physical infrastructure and hydrological information systems. The leadership role of the government, acting as a top-down trigger, is another essential element in Suriname.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize egame involving positive contributions.

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

Behavioural evidence for social preferences

A central topic in economics is the existence of social preferences. Behavioural economics in general has approached the issue from several angles. Controlled experimental settings, surveys, and field experiments are able to show that in a number of economic environments, people usually care about immaterial things such as fairness or equity of allocations. Findings from experimental economics specifically have lead to large increase in theories addressing social preferences. Most (pro)social phenomena are well understood in the experimental settings but very difficult to observe 'in the wild'. One criticism in this regard is that many findings are bound by the artificial environment of the computer lab or survey method used. A further criticism is that the traditional methods also fail to directly attribute the observed behaviour to the mental constructs that are expected to stand behind them. This thesis will first examine the usefulness of sports data to test social preference models in a field environment, thus overcoming limitations of the lab with regards to applicability to other - non-artificial - environments. The second major contribution of this research establishes a new neuroscientific tool - the measurement of the heart rate variability - to observe participants' emotional reactions in a traditional experimental setup.

Tax concessions for charities : competitive neutrality, the tax base and "public goods" choice

It is argued that concerns arise about the integrity and fairness of the taxation regime where charitable organizations, which avail themselves of the tax exemption status while undertaking commercial activities, compete directly with the for-profit sector. The appropriateness of the tax concessions granted to charitable organizations is considered in respect of income derived from commercial activities. It is principally argued that the traditional line of reasoning for imposing limitations on tax concessions focuses on an incorrect underlying inquiry. Traditionally, it is argued that limitations should be imposed because of unfair competition, lack of competitive neutrality, or an arbitrary decision relating to a lack of deserving. However, it is argued that a more appropriate question from which to base any limitations is one which considers the value attached to the integrity of the taxation regime as a whole, and the tax base specifically compared to the public good of charities. When the correct underlying question is asked, sound taxation policy ensues, as a less arbitrary approach may be adopted to limit the scope of tax concessions available to charitable organizations.

The limits to public service : rural communities, professional families, and work mobility

Australia faces an ongoing challenge recruiting professionals to staff essential human services in rural and remote communities. This paper identifies the private limits to the implicit service contract between professions and such client populations. These become evident in how private solutions to competing priorities within professional families inform their selective mobility and thus create the public problem for such communities. The paper reports on a survey of doctors, nurses, teachers and police with responsibility for school-aged children in Queensland that plumbed the strength of neoliberal values in their educational strategy and their commitment to the public good in career decisions. The quantitative analysis suggested that neoliberal values are not necessarily opposed to a commitment to the public good. However, the qualitative analysis of responses to hypothetical career opportunities in rural and remote communities drew out the multiple intertwined spatial and temporal limits to such public service, highlighting the priority given to educational strategy in these families’ deliberations. This private/public nexus poses a policy problem on multiple institutional fronts.

Evolutionary game design : automated game design comes of age

The "Humies" awards are an annual competition held in conjunction with the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO), in which cash prizes totalling $10,000 are awarded to the most human-competitive results produced by any form of evolutionary computation published in the previous year. This article describes the gold medal-winning entry from the 2012 "Humies" competition, based on the LUDI system for playing, evaluating and creating new board games. LUDI was able to demonstrate human-competitive results in evolving novel board games that have gone on to be commercially published, one of which, Yavalath, has been ranked in the top 2.5% of abstract board games ever invented. Further evidence of human-competitiveness was demonstrated in the evolved games implicitly capturing several principles of good game design, outperforming human designers in at least one case, and going on to inspire a new sub-genre of games.

The private problem with public service: Rural teachers in educational markets

Staffing rural and remote schools is an important policy issue for the public good. This paper examines the private issues it also poses for teachers with families working in these communities, as they seek to reconcile careers with educational choices for children. The paper first considers historical responses to staffing rural and remote schools in Australia, and the emergence of neoliberal policy encouraging marketisation of the education sector. We report on interviews about considerations motivating household mobility with 11 teachers across regional, rural and remote communities in Queensland. Like other middle-class parents, these teachers prioritised their children’s educational opportunities over career opportunities. The analysis demonstrates how teachers in rural and remote communities constitute a special group of educational consumers with insider knowledge and unique dilemmas around school choice. Their heightened anxieties around school choice under neoliberal policy are shown to contribute to the public issue of staffing rural and remote schools.

Rediscovering law students as citizens: Critical thinking and the public value of legal education

In a series of publications over the last decade, Australian National University Professor Margaret Thornton has documented a disturbing change in the nature of legal education. This body of work culminates in a recently published book based on interviews with 145 legal academics in Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada. In it, Thornton describes a feeling of widespread unease among legal academics that society, government, university administrators and students themselves are moving away from viewing legal education as a public good which benefits both students and society. Instead, legal education is increasingly being viewed as a purely private good, for consumption by the student in the quest for individual career enhancement.