Survival Power: An Empirical Analysis of Power in a Life and Death Situation

This paper seeks to identify what antecedents of power make it more or less likely for people to survive in a life-threatening situation.In particular, we look at the Titanic disaster as the life or death situation. Maritime disasters can be interpreted as quasi-natural experiments because every person is affected by the shock. True human nature becomes apparent in such a dangerous situation. Five antecedents of power are distinguished: physical strength, economic resources, nationality, social and moral factors. This empirical analysis supports the notion that power is a key determinant in extreme situations of life or death.

Tax morale affects tax compliance : evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

Our working hypotheses is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behaviour have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioural issue. Its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demondtrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.

Spatial information infrastructure : what can it possibly mean?

Investment begins with imagining that doing something new in the present will lead to a better future. Investment can vary from incidental improvements as safe and beneficial side-effects of current activity through to a more dedicated and riskier disinvestment in current methods of operation and reinvestment in new processes and products. The role of government has an underlying continuity determined by its constitution that authorises a parliament to legislate for peace, order and good government. ‘Good government’ is usually interpreted as improving the living standards of its citizens. The requirements for social order and social cohesion suggest that improvements should be shared fairly by all citizens through all of their lives. Arguably, the need to maintain an individual’s metabolism has a social counterpart in the ‘collective metabolism’ of a sustainable and productive society.

Perceptions of fairness and allocation systems

This paper explores the conditions of acceptability of differing allocation systems under scarcity and evaluates what makes a price system more or less fair. We find that fairness in an allocation arrangement depend on the institutional settings inherent in the situation, such as information, transparency and competition and the perceived institutional quality e.g., fiscal exchange and institutional trust). Results also indicate that the solution “weak people first” is seen as the fairest approach to an excess demand situation, followed by “first come, first serve”, the price system and an auction system. On the other hand, a random procedure or an allocation through the government is not perceived to be fair. Moreover, economics students seemed to be less sceptical towards the price system than other subjects although we observe that female students are more sceptical than male students.

The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy

This paper uses a multivariate analysis to examine how countries‘ tax morale and institutional quality affect the shadow economy. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors in understanding the level of and changes in the shadow economy. Newly available data sources offer the unique opportunity to further illuminate a topic that has received increased attention. After controlling for a variety of potential factors, we find strong support that a higher tax morale and a higher institutional quality lead to a smaller shadow economy.

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).

Serious tax non compliance : motivation and guardianship

This article reviews what international evidence exists on the impact of civil and criminal sanctions upon serious tax noncompliance by individuals. This construct lacks sharp definitional boundaries but includes large tax fraud and large-scale evasion that are not dealt with as fraud. Although substantial research and theory have been developed on general tax evasion and compliance, their conclusions might not apply to large-scale intentional fraudsters. No scientifically defensible studies directly compared civil and criminal sanctions for tax fraud, although one U.S. study reported that significantly enhanced criminal sanctions have more effects than enhanced audit levels. Prosecution is public, whereas administrative penalties are confidential, and this fact encourages those caught to pay heavy penalties to avoid publicity, a criminal record, and imprisonment.

Rational avoidance of accountability

Anthony Downs public choice theory proposes that every rational person would try to meet their own desires in preference to those of others, and that such rational persons would attempt to obtain these desires in the most efficient manner possible. This paper will demonstrate that the application of this theory would mean that public servants and politicians would perform acts of corruption and maladministration in order to efficiently meet their desires. As such action is unavoidable, political parties must appear to meet the public demand for accountability systems, but must not make these systems viable lest they expose the corruption and maladministration that would threaten the government’s chance or re-election. It is therefore logical for governments to display a commitment for accountability whilst simultaneously ensuring the systems would not be able to interfere with government control or expose its flaws.

Politicians : Be killed or survive

In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. To investigate this phenomenon, rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using a large data set covering close to 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well-functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and a stronger civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

Costly technology adoption, redistribution and growth

We study a political economy model which aims to understand the diversity in the growth and technology-adoption experiences in different economies. In this model the cost of technology adoption is endogenous and varies across heterogeneous agents. Agents in the model vote on the proportion of revenues allocated towards such expenditures. In the early stages of development, the political-economy outcome of the model ensures that a sub-optimal proportion of government revenue is used to finance adoption-cost reducing expenditures. This sub-optimality is due to the presence of inequality; agents at the lower end of the distribution favor a larger amount of revenue allocated towards redistribution in the form of lump-sum transfers. Eventually all individuals make the switch to the better technology and their incomes converge. The outcomes of the model therefore explain why public choice is more likely to be conservative in nature; it represents the majority choice given conflicting preferences among agents. Consequently, the transition path towards growth and technology adoption varies across countries depending on initial levels of inequality.

Redistribution and technology adoption under uncertainty : a political economy perspective

We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framework of an endogenous growth model with costly technology adoption and uncertainty. The model is aimed at understanding the diversity in growth and inequality experiences across countries. Agents adopt either of two risky technologies, one of which is only available through financial intermediaries, who are able to alleviate some of this risk. The entry cost of financial intermediation depends on the proportion of government revenue that is allocated towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure, and agents vote on this proportion. The results show that agents at the top and bottom ends of the distribution prefer alternative means of re-distribution, thereby effectively blocking the allocation of resources towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Thus political factors have a role in delaying financial and capital deepening and economic development. Furthermore, the model provides a political-economy perspective on the Kuznets curve; uncertainty interacts with the political economy mechanism to produce transitional inequality patterns that, depending on initial conditions, can unearth the Kuznets-curve experience. Finally, the political outcomes are inefficient relative to policies aimed at maximizing the collective welfare of agents in the economy.

Are lifecycle funds appropriate as default options in participant-directed retirement plans?

The appropriateness of default investment options in participant-directed retirement plans like 401(k) has been in sharp focus given that most participants fail to nominate an investment option to direct their contributions. In United States (US), prior to the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, plan fiduciaries often selected a money market fund as the default option. Whilst this ‘low risk and low return’ investment option was considered to be a ‘safe’ choice by many fiduciaries who were fearful of litigation risk, it was heavily criticized for resulting in inadequate wealth at retirement, particularly when retirees were living much longer and facing inflation risk (see, for example, Viceira, 2008; Skinner, 2009)...

A intervenção judicial no âmbito das políticas públicas orientadas à concretização dos direitos fundamentais

O presente estudo se propõe a desvelar o espaço legítimo de controle de políticas públicas destinadas à concretização de direitos fundamentais pelo Poder Judiciário. Para tanto, inicialmente é apresentada uma teoria das políticas públicas, que compreende a busca de um conceito para a categoria e a apresentação de suas características e elementos mais relevantes. O estudo não prescinde da análise da teoria dos direitos fundamentais, em especial das questões atinentes à eficácia dos direitos ditos prestacionais, e também da chamada análise institucional, um campo de estudos recentemente reavivado nos Estados Unidos. Na segunda parte do trabalho, de natureza marcadamente propositiva, as políticas públicas são divididas segundo a sua natureza, e em seguida sugeridos diferentes níveis de controle jurídico. Para as políticas ligadas ao mínimo existencial, sustenta-se o controle por meio dos princípios da proibição da proteção insuficiente e vedação do retrocesso. Para as demais políticas públicas, o controle é analisado sob o prisma dos princípios da isonomia, eficiência e transparência. Após o estudo de questões incidentais, o trabalho segue para as modalidades de controle de políticas públicas, distinguindo-se entre o controle forte, em que a discricionariedade dos órgãos políticos é reduzida a zero, e o controle fraco, onde o Poder Judiciário apenas comprime o espaço de liberdade decisória.

Bases teóricas do Orçamento Participativo: um estudo na Prefeitura da cidade de Belém/PA

O objetivo central desta pesquisa consiste em verificar a existência de semelhanças entre o planejamento estratégico situacional e o orçamento participativo implementado em Belém durante o período de 1997 a 2000; assim como verificar a existência de semelhanças entre a teoria da escolha pública e o orçamento participativo em Belém no mesmo período. Para alcançar tal objetivo, serão abordadas resumidamente, a teoria da escolha pública e o planejamento estratégico situacional, como base teórica para desenvolver o estudo. Supõe-se que essas teorias fundamentam o orçamento participativo, instrumento mais conhecido de participação popular no processo da gestão pública. Para alcançar esse fim, utilizou-se o método de estudo de caso, por ser o mais indicado para esse tipo de pesquisa. Os resultados sugerem que o orçamento participativo, do modo como foi implementado na Capital do Estado do Pará, no período de 1997 a 2000 possui características da teoria e do método aqui levantados. No que diz respeito à teoria da escolha pública, características em comum com o orçamento participativo foram observadas, como reconhecer que os agentes políticos são motivados por interesses pessoais, além de admitir que a escolha política, no processo político, é resultado das preferências dos agentes envolvidos nas escolhas que permitem passar de preferências diversas de cada indivíduo para uma única escolha coletiva. Quanto ao planejamento estratégico situacional, também foram observados conceitos e características em comum com o orçamento participativo. Ambos reconhecem a existência de vários atores dentro do processo de planejamento, que passa a ser discutido diretamente com a população, inserindo todos os setores do município no processo de gestão. Através de reivindicações, que são entendidas como problemas, o planejamento passa a ser dividido com a população, e esta passa a ser atuante no planejamento do espaço em que vive. Outra característica em comum é a subjetividade, que diz respeito ao entendimento que cada ator tem de seu próprio problema, e do problema de outros atores. Pôde-se observar que a participação popular na gestão pública é instrumento de elevada importância para impulsionar o desenvolvimento social, sendo também incentivada nas formas previstas em Lei. No entanto, tal incentivo acarreta fatores diversos que por vezes fogem ao controle dos gestores, além de significar uma divisão de poderes.