Southwest statistical summary /

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News.

Description based on: Mar. 1988; title from caption.

News.

Description based on: June 1985; title from caption.

BLS handbook of methods.

S/N 029-001-02729-0

Pass-through of International food prices to domestic ination during and after the great recession: evidence from a set of Latin American economies

We examined how international food price shocks have impacted local ination processes in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru in the past decade -- Using impulse-response analysis coming from cointegrated VARs, we wind that international food ination shocks take from one to six quarters to pass through to domestic head-line ination, depending on the country -- In addition, by calculating the elasticity of local prices to an international food price shock, we found that this pass-through is not complete -- We also take a closer look at how this type of shock affects local food and core prices separately, and asses the possibility second round effects over core ination stemming from the shock -- We wind that a transmission to headline prices does occur, and that part of the transmission is associated with rising core prices both directly and through possible second round effects, which implies a role for monetary policy when such a shock takes place -- This is especially relevant given that international food prices have recently been on an upward trend after falling considerably during the Great Recession

Stock index reaction to large price changes:evidence frommajor Asian stock indexes

We examine the short-term price behavior of ten Asian stock market indexes following large price changes or “shocks”. Under the standard OLS regression, there is stronger support for return continuations particularly following positive and negative price shocks of less than 10% in absolute size. The results under the GJR-GARCH method provide stronger support for market efficiency, especially for large price shocks. For example, for the Hong Kong stock index, negative shocks of less than -5% but more than -10% generate a significant one day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of-0.754% under the OLS method, but an insignificant CAR of 0.022% under the GJR-GARCH. We find no support for the uncertainty information hypothesis. Furthermore, the CARs following the period after the Asian financial crisis adjust more quickly to price shocks.

Regulatory price performance, excess cost indexes and profitability:how effective is price cap regulation in the water industry?

In this study we apply an index number approach to allow for cross sectional comparisons of relative profitability, productivity and price performance of the regulated Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales during the years 1991-2008. In order to better analyse the impact of regulation on WaSC performance, we decompose actual economic profits into spatial multilateral Fisher productivity (TFP) index, the inverse of which is demonstrated to be a regulatory excess cost index that measures the deviation of a firm’s actual costs from benchmark costs, and a newly developed regulatory total price performance (TPP) index, which measures the excess of regulated revenues relative to benchmark costs. Increases (decreases) in regulatory price performance are indicative of the loosening (tightening) of price cap regulation. Moreover, we also show that the relationship between actual economic profitability, regulatory excess costs and regulatory price performance indices can be used to categorize regulatory price caps as “weak”, “powerful” or “catch-up promoting”. The results indicated that throughout the entire 1991-2008 period, price caps were never “powerful”, in the sense that they required less productive firms to immediately and fully catch-up to the most productive firm to regain economic profitability. More specifically, during the years 1991-2000 price caps were “weak” as prices were high enough for the firms to achieve economic profits despite their low productivity levels. However, after 2001 prices became “catch up promoting” as they required less productive companies to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to eliminate economic losses. Finally, we emphasize that as our results also clearly demonstrated a much closer alignment between allowed revenues and benchmark costs after 2001, Ofwat’s approach during this period was not only appropriate, but should also be continued in the 2009 price review.