Histoire physique, politique et naturelle de l'ile de Cuba

[t.9] (1838-1842)

Redistributive taxation with endogenous sentiments

We present a model in which an individual's sentiments towards others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agents' sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns of utility interdependence. To demonstrate the effects of such endogeneity, we consider an example of a production economy with redistributive taxation. There are two types of stationary equilibria: one in which all agents conform to the societal norm, into two or three groups. The main conclusion is that the tax structure, in that it affects behavior which in turn affects sentiments, plays a crucial role in determining which type of equilibrium occurs and its characteristics as well as the extent of altruism and social cohesion in society.

Taxation of banks: a theoretical framework

The goal of this paper is to develop a model of financial intermediation analyze the impact of various forms of taxation. The model considers in a unified framework various functions of banks: monitoring, transaction services and asset transformation. Particular attention is devoted to conditions for separability between deposits and loans. The analysis focuses on: (i) competition between banks and alternative financial arrangements (investment funds and organized security markets), (ii) regulation, and (iii) bank's monopoly power and risk taking behavior.

Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

Petrol consumption and redistributive effects of its taxation in Spain

The objective of this paper is to estimate a petrol consumption function for Spain and to evaluate the redistributive effects of petrol taxation. We use micro data from the Spanish Household Budget Survey of 1990/91 and model petrol consumption taking into account the effect that income changes may have on car ownership levels, as well as the differences that exist between expenditure and consumption. Our results show the importance that household structure, place of residence and income have on petrol consumption. We are able to compute income elasticities of petrol expenditure, both conditional and unconditional on the level of car ownership. Non-conditional elasticities, while always very close to unit values, are lower for higher income households and for those living in rural areas or small cities. When car ownership levels are taken into account, conditional elasticities are obtained that are around one half the value of the non- conditional ones, being fairly stable across income categories and city sizes. As regards the redistributive effects of petrol taxation, we observe that for the lowest income deciles the share of petrol expenditure increases with income, and thus the tax can be regarded as progressive. However, after a certain income level the tax proves to be regressive.

The Total fiscal cost of indirect taxation: an approximation using Catalonia's recent input-output table

In this note we quantify to what extent indirect taxation influences and distorts prices. To do so we use the networked accounting structure of the most recent input-output table of Catalonia, an autonomous region of Spain, to model price formation. The role of indirect taxation is considered both from a classical value perspective and a more neoclassical flavoured one. We show that they would yield equivalent results under some basic premises. The neoclassical perspective, however, offers a bit more flexibility to distinguish among different tax figures and hence provide a clearer disaggregate picture of how an indirect tax ends up affecting, and by how much, the cost structure.

Cinéastes indépendants, politique fédérale du cinéma et co-production du 'Nouveau cinéma suisse', 1963-1970. Contribution à une sociologie de l'innovation artistique

Ce travail s'intéresse aux modalités d'émergence et d'institutionnalisation d'un nouveau régime de création artistique, plus connu sous le nom de «Nouveau cinéma suisse ».Dans les années 1960-1970, l'arrivée du Nouveau cinéma suisse a bouleversé les manières de faire du cinéma en Suisse et a attiré l'attention sur le septième art helvétique. Comment une innovation artistique parvient-elle à s'imposer ? Comment un consensus autour d'une nouvelle forme artistique et de son mode de production émerge et se stabilise-t-il ? Quel rôle jouent les acteurs et les institutions dans ce processus ? Enfin, quelles sont les relations entre cette situation en devenir et les oeuvres créées dans ces conditions ? Au delà dé ces interrogations, c'est un questionnement théorique, épistémologique qui a motivé cette recherche. A l'image de la sociologie elle-même, l'analyse sociologique de l'art a été traversée, ces dernières années, pas de nombreux débats. Trop souvent, la réflexion s'appuie - ou trébuche -sur des dichotomies convenues :analyse interne /externe de l'art, déterminisme /indétermination des acteurs, reflet /autonomie des oeuvres. Quels sont les outils et les approches que propose la discipline pour analyser un tel objet, quels enseignements peut-on titrer de leur mise à l'épreuve sur un cas concret ? Quel est le défi lancé par le Nouveau cinéma suisse à la sociologie de l'art ?Mais commençons par le début car le point initial de cette longue entreprise était en réalité tout autre.