Ancient History pamphlets

A collection of miscellaneous pamphlets.

Activities of the Mississippi Democratic Committee : hearings ... Eighty-second Congress, first session pursuant to S. Res. 51 ... April 9-11, 16, May 2, 5, 10, 1951.

Includes index--pp.609-621.

Watergate reorganization and reform act of 1975 : hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, first session.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.

The beast.

Mode of access: Internet.

Decisions of the United States Merit Systems Protection Board

Decisions in actions brought before the U. S. Civil Service Commission, as well as in cases initiated before the U. S. Merit Systems Protection Board under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978

«Corruption» and social and economic criminal law: criminology, criminal policy, political science and law&economics - a new idea about criminal liability of legal entities

Abstract: If we think there is a significant number of legal offshore in the globalized world, then there is not even a global consensus about what «corruption» is. The «illegal corruption» in a country may be legal in another. Moreover, the great global corruption is above the law or above democratic States. And not all democratic States are «Rule of Law». Therefore, the solution is global earlier in time and space law, democratic, free and true law. While the human being does not reach a consensus of what «corruption» really is, the discussion will not go further than a caricature. One of the other problems about «corruption» is that it is very difficult to establish the imputation of crimes, including «corruption» (v.g. Portugal) on some «companies», corporations. We have a juridical problem in the composition of the art. 11. of the Portuguese Penal Code.

The political economy of corruption in Brazil

This article is the first part of a research on corruption in Brazil and it is theoretical. Despite this, it provides an economic interpretation of corruption using Brazil as a case study. The main objective of this research is to apply some microeconomic tools to understand the "big corruption". However, I am going to show that corruption is not simply a kind of crime. Rather, it is an ordinary economic activity that arises in some institutional environments. Firstly, some corruption cases in Brazil will be described. This article is aimed at showing that democracy itself does not ensure control over corruption. Secondly, I am going to do a very brief survey of institutional changes and controls over corruption in some Western Societies in which I am going to argue that corruption, its control and its illegality depend on institutional evolution by streamlining the constitutional and institutional framework. Thirdly, I am going to explain how some economic models could be adopted for a better understanding of corruption. Finally, I will present a multiple-self model applied to the public agent (politician and bureaucrat) constrained by institutions and pay-off systems.

Accountability and corruption : a study into political institutions as referees between principals and agents

Representativ demokrati innebär att medborgare istället för att själv göra beslut i frågor som angår dem, ofta delegerar dylikt beslutsfattande till representanter. Det här betyder att viktiga beslut görs av personer som medborgarna i allmänhet inte känner speciellt väl, och i vars ageranden medborgarna endast har lite insyn. Vanliga medborgare och deras representanter har därtill ofta mycket olika intressen, d.v.s. har olika syn på vad som är viktigt. Representanterna har följaktligen både möjligheter och incitament att missbruka den makt som anförtrotts dem, bl.a. genom korrupt verksamhet. Denna avhandling analyserar mekanismer genom vilka korruption bland representanter kan förebyggas, och (då korrupta handlingar redan ägt rum) upptäckas. Avhandlingen granskar mekanismer som a) ger medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare mer information om representanternas målsättningar och ageranden, b) som tvingar representanterna att rättfärdiga sina ageranden gentemot medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare, och c) som gör det möjligt för medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare att straffa representanter som agerat korrupt. Avhandlingen hävdar att tillämpandet av dylika mekanismer minskar lockelsen för och möjligheterna att engagera sig i korrupta handlingar. Avhandlingen studerar de mekanismer för ansvarsutkrävande som skapas genom politiskt institutionsbyggande. Bl.a. analyseras i vilken grad olika valsystem och typer av maktfördelning gör det möjligt att hålla representanter till svars, och därmed förhindra och upptäcka korruption. Sambandet mellan institutionsbyggande, möjligheter till ansvarsutkrävande och förekomst av korruption studeras på såväl makro- som mikronivå. Studien på makronivå inkluderar ett flertal länder och analyserar sambandet med hjälp av statistisk analys. Studien på mikronivå däremot består av två fallstudier (Österrike och Botswana) och utgör en djupdykning i dessa länders politiska institutioner, möjligheter till ansvarsutkrävande inom ramen för institutionerna, och följder i form av korruption.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Corruption and the Electoral Support of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Is there space for senior civil servants hybrid management models across political- administrative systems?

Comunicação apresentada na 17.ª conferência anual da NISPACee, realizada de 14 a 16 de Maio de 2009.

How are top officials hybrid management models present across political-administrative systems?

Comunicação apresentada na 4th Annual ICPA - International Conference on Public Administration "Building bridges to the future: leadership and collaboration in public administration", na Universidade de Minnesota nos Estados Unidos, de 24 a 26 de setembro de 2008

Market value of corruption

This paper studies the impact of the Brazilian anticorruption legislation, PL 6826/2010, on stock returns. I show that, around the law approval date, the greater the link between the corporate and political worlds, the worse is the companies’ performance. Companies awarded with public contracts in 2012 suffer more with the new legislation approval. Firms with above median contract values have 2.9% lower returns than its peers. The negative effect is more pronounced for bigger and more complex entities, associated with higher levels of Corporate Responsibility and Governance and not subject to the US FCPA.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

L'effectivité des Conventions anti-corruption internationales : vers une Cour pénale internationale en criminalité économique pour punir le vol d'Etat

This doctoral thesis proposes an International Criminal Court Specialized in Economic Crime (ICC/EC) as a solution to the main obstacles to the effectiveness of international anti-corruption conventions studied. In fact, the dispute settlement systems of the international anti-corruption Conventions do not provide sufficient guarantees of effectiveness, and offenses and crimes of corruption are not under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) derived from the Rome Statute of 2000. In a first part, this work analyzes seven international anti-corruption Conventions adopted between 1996 and 2003, respectively, by the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CoE), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). In a second part, this study highlights a deficit of rationalization and optimization of offenses included in the conventions: an incomplete criminalization of legal persons for corruption, an equally insufficient criminalization for corruption of political leaders benefiting both from criminal and civil immunities, as well as the limited outcome of international asset recovery de-rived from corruption. Finally, given the previous analysis made, this thesis concludes with a pro-posal for an independent ICC/EC specific to economic crimes in order to overcome the major obstacles highlighted and which strongly affect the effectiveness of the international anti-corruption conventions. - Cet ouvrage de thèse doctorale propose, comme solution principale aux obstacles à l'effectivité des Conventions anti-corruption internationales étudiées, une Cour Pénale Internationale Spécialisée en Criminalité Economique (CPI/CE). En effet, les systèmes de règlement des différends des Conven¬tions anti-corruption internationales n'offrent pas suffisamment de gage d'effectivité et les délits et crimes de corruption transnationale ne sont pas de la compétence de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) issue du statut de Rome de 2000. Dans un premier temps, le présent ouvrage analyse sept Conventions anti-corruption internationales adoptées entre 1996 et 2003, respectivement, par l'Organisation des Etats Américains (OEA), l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques (OCDE), l'Union européenne (UE), le Conseil de l'Europe (CoE), l'Union Africaine (UA) et l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU). Dans un deuxième temps, l'ouvrage met en lumière un déficit de rationalisation et d'optimisation des incriminations que contiennent les Conventions, dont notamment : une incrimination lacunaire des personnes morales pour corruption, une incrimination tout aussi insuffisante pour corruption des dirigeants politiques au bénéfice d'immunités pénale et civile et une restitu¬tion internationale des avoirs issus de la corruption à portée limitée. Finalement, c'est au vu de l'analyse effectuée que le présent ouvrage conclut avec la proposition d'une CPI/CE indépendante et spécifique aux crimes économiques afin de pallier au mieux les obstacles majeurs mis en exergue et qui nuisent fortement à l'effectivité des Conventions anti-corruption internationales.