Études de la nature /

I-III. Études de la nature -- IV. Paul et Virginie L'Arcadie -- -V. Voeux d'un solitaire. Le café de Surate. La chaumière indienne.

Songs and verses and the true cross /

Bound in calf, gilt inside border, by Rivière & son.

Cinquante ans dans l'église romaine /

Paged continuously; v. 1: 4 p. 1., 368 p.; v. 2: 4. p. 1., 369-682 p.

Romance literature pamphlets.

A collection of miscellaneous pamphlets.

The origins of contemporary France

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contes /

"La première édition des Contes de Perrault fut publiée en 1697, sous le titre de: Histoires ou Contes du temps passé, avec des moralitez, à Paris ... Au dos: Contes de ma Mère Loye."

L'Éducation nationale.

Issues for Dec. 18, 1863- called nouv. sér.

Opere /

v.1. I. Didone abbandonata. Intermezzi. Varianti. II. Siroe. III. Catone in Utica. Varianti. IV. Ezio. V. Alessandro nell'Indie. Varianti.- v.2. VI. Semiramide. Varianti. VII. Artaserse. VIII. Adriano in Siria. Varianti. IX. Demetrio. X. Issipile.- v.3. XI. Olimpiade. XII. Demofoonte. XIII. La clemenza di Tito. XIV. Achille in Sciro. XV. Ciro riconosciuto.- v.4. XVI. Temistocle. XVII. Zenobia. XVIII. Attilio Regolo. XIX. Antigono. XX. Ipermestra. XXI. Il re pastore.

Evolutionary market agents for resource allocation in decentralised systems

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers. Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe. Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

An efficient eAuction potocol

A secure protocol for electronic, sealed-bid, single item auctions is presented. The protocol caters to both first and second price (Vickrey) auctions and provides full price flexibility. Both computational and communication cost are linear with the number of bidders and utilize only standard cryptographic primitives. The protocol strictly divides knowledge of the bidder's identity and their actual bids between, respectively, a registration authority and an auctioneer, who are assumed not to collude but may be separately corrupt. This assures strong bidder-anonymity, though only weak bid privacy. The protocol is structured in two phases, each involving only off-line communication. Registration, requiring the use of the public key infrastructure, is simultaneous with hash-sealed bid-commitment and generates a receipt to the bidder containing a pseudonym. This phase is followed by encrypted bid-submission. Both phases involve the registration authority acting as a communication conduit but the actual message size is quite small. It is argued that this structure guarantees non-repudiation by both the winner and the auctioneer. Second price correctness is enforced either by observing the absence of registration of the claimed second-price bid or, where registered but lower than the actual second price, is subject to cooperation by the second price bidder - presumably motivated through self-interest. The use of the registration authority in other contexts is also considered with a view to developing an architecture for efficient secure multiparty transactions

Egalitarian behaviour in multi unit combinatorial auctions

En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.

Pricing Algorithms For a Two-sided Internet Advertisement Market

The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher. Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. Following previous modelling efforts, we model the program as a two-sided market with advertisers on one side and publishers on the other. We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction. GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known. We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction. The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential auctions where an individual’s value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indi¤erent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the …rst object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller’s revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net e¤ect on the seller’s revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine two special cases with asymmetric players. In the …rst case, players have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline. In the second case, one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. For this example, we show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco (1997). The reason is that players with singleunit demand will generally bid less than their true valuations in the …rst period. Therefore, there are two opposing forces; the reduction in the bid of the player with multiple-demand in the last auction and less aggressive bidding in the …rst auction by the players with single-unit demand.

What price life insurance? : Not how but what to sell or buy--and why, facts and supporting figures which prove the fallacy of the self-serving propaganda of those "term-ites" who seek to undermine confidence in legal reserve (old line) life insurance /

Mode of access: Internet.

The Federal reserve system; the course of the Federal reserve banks before and during the price crisis and readjustment: address ... before the North Carolina bankers' convention at Pinehurst, April 26-28, 1922.

Mode of access: Internet.