New challenges for the EU internal security strategy

In recent years, the EU and its member states have experienced a number of changes, as well as challenges, in the areas of politics, economics, security and law. As these areas are interconnected, changes and challenges to any of them have implications for the others, as well as implications for the populations and institutions of the EU or those coming into contact with its international power and influence. This edited collection focuses primarily on security and law, particularly the EU’s internal security strategy. The EU’s Internal Security Strategy, adopted by the Spanish presidency early in 2010, followed the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, building on previous developments within the EU in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) policy. The focus of the EU Internal Security Strategy is to prevent and combat “serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, in strengthening the management of our external borders and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters”. The Internal Security strategy intersects and overlaps with the European Union’s Counter-terrorism strategy, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, and the EU’s Security Strategy. The role of and interaction between these strategies, their supplementing documents, and their implications for crime, victims, the law, political relations, democracy and human rights, form the backdrop against which the chapters in this collection are written. Building on original research by its contributors, this collection comprises work by authors from a wide variety of academic and professional areas and perspectives, as well as different countries, on a variety of areas and issues related to or raised by the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, from intelligence-led policing to human trafficking and port security. This book examines, from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives including law, geography, politics and practice, both this further refinement of existing internal provisions on cross-border crime, and the increasing external relations of the EU in the AFSJ.

A formação das Forças e Serviços de Segurança na União Europeia rumo a uma política europeia de segurança comum

A criminalidade organizada opera cada vez mais em colaboração alargada, elevada mobilidade e grande diversificação nas suas formas de atuar. Após os recentes atentados terroristas em Paris e em Bruxelas as preocupações relacionadas com as ameaças à segurança da União Europeia (UE) estão cada vez mais na agenda política. O objetivo geral desta investigação foi analisar a importância que a formação comum das polícias da UE e o seu papel na Academia Europeia de Polícia (CEPOL) têm para a Guarda Nacional Republicada (GNR), compreendendo a importância desta formação na implementação da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD). Esta investigação procurou uma recolha de informação adequada, possibilitando a compreensão do fenómeno em estudo, adotando uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, concretizada a partir de uma pesquisa documental e um inquérito por entrevista semiestruturada, cujos dados foram objeto de análise de conteúdo. Como resultado principal destacou-se o diagnóstico que fundamenta eventuais mudanças ou orientações que a GNR possa vir a prosseguir no âmbito da sua posição na CEPOL. Concluiu-se que a prossecução da segurança na UE exige uma adequada articulação entre a segurança interna e a segurança externa, bem como da importância das agências da UE em geral, e em particular, da CEPOL cuja missão de formação comum é essencial. Abstract: Organised crime is increasingly operating in extended collaboration, high mobility and great diversity in their ways of acting. After the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels the concerns about threats to security of the European Union (EU) are increasingly on the political agenda. The general objective of this research was to analyse the importance of common training in the context of the EU's police forces and its role in the European Police College (CEPOL) have in the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), understanding the importance of this training in the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This research looked for a collection of adequate information, adopting a qualitative research strategy, enabled the understanding of the phenomenon under study, adopting a qualitative research strategy, implemented from desk research and a survey by semistructured interviews, whose data were subject to content analysis. The main result highlighted the diagnosis set that underlies any changes or guidelines that GNR is likely to continue in its position on CEPOL. It was concluded that further security in the EU requires proper coordination between internal security and external security, and the importance of EU agencies in general, and in particular CEPOL whose common training mission is essential.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.

EU governance of the internet:analyzing Europol’s role in the development of a EU cyber crime and cyber security policies

In recent years, the European Union has come to view cyber security, and in particular, cyber crime as one of the most relevant challenges to the completion of its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given European societies’ increased reliance on borderless and decentralized information technologies, this sector of activity has been identified as an easy target for actors such as organised criminals, hacktivists or terrorist networks. Such analysis has been accompanied by EU calls to step up the fight against unlawful online activities, namely through increased cooperation among law enforcement authorities (both national and extra- communitarian), the approximation of legislations, and public- private partnerships. Although EU initiatives in this field have, so far, been characterized by a lack of interconnection and an integrated strategy, there has been, since the mid- 2000s, an attempt to develop a more cohesive and coordinated policy. An important part of this policy is connected to the activities of Europol, which have come to assume a central role in the coordination of intelligence gathering and analysis of cyber crime. The European Cybercrime Center (EC3), which will become operational within Europol in January 2013, is regarded, in particular, as a focal point of the EU’s fight against this phenomenon. Bearing this background in mind, the present article wishes to understand the role of Europol in the development of a European policy to counter the illegal use of the internet. The article proposes to reach this objective by analyzing, through the theoretical lenses of experimental governance, the evolution of this agency’s activities in the area of cyber crime and cyber security, its positioning as an expert in the field, and the consequences for the way this policy is currently developing and is expected to develop in the near future.

Organized Crime and Terrorism: From the Cells Towards Political Communication, A Case Study

During the first half of 2006 the city of Sao Paulo suffered three series of violent attacks against the security forces, civilians, and the government. The violent campaign also included a massive rebellion in prisons and culminated in the kidnapping of a journalist and the broadcast of a manifesto from the criminal organization PCC threatening the police and the government. Right after, the main device used to contain organized crime in the prisons was declared unconstitutional. This episode represents a prototypical example of the use of media-focused terrorism by organized crime for projection into the political communication arena.

Methadone maintenance and drug-related crime

Using data from an evaluation of methadone maintenance treatment, this study investigated factors associated with continued involvement irt crime during treatment, and in particular whether there appeared to be differences in effectiveness of treatment between different methadone clinics. The methodology was an observational study, in which 304 patients attending three low-intervention, private methadone clinics in Sydney were interviewed on three occasions over a twelve month period. Outcome measures were self-reported criminal activity and police department records of convictions. By self-report, crime dropped, promptly and substantially on entry to treatment, to a level of acquisitive crime about one-eighth that reported during the last addiction period. Analysis of official records indicated that rates of acquisitive convictions were significantly lower in the in-treatment period compared to prior to entry to treatment, corroborating the changes suggested by self-report. Persisting involvement in crime in treatment was predicted by two factors: the cost of persisting use of illicit drugs, particularly cannabis, and ASPD symptom count. Treatment factors also were independently predictive of continued involvement in crime. By both self-report and official records, and adjusting for subject factors, treatment at one clinic teas associated with greater involvement in crime. This clinic operated in a chaotic and poorly organized way. it is concluded that crime during methadone treatment is substantially lower than during street addiction, although the extent of reduction depends on the quality of treatment being delivered.

Property crime and income generation by heroin users

This paper provides a detailed analysis of patterns of income generation among 202 active heroin users in South West Sydney. We explore both sources of income and the relative contribution of different types of income generating activities, including drug sales and related activities, property crime, prostitution, legitimate income and avoided expenditures. Despite claims that heroin use leads inevitably to property crime, drug market activities accounted for a greater proportion of drug user income in this sample. Results indicate that law enforcement crackdowns that reduce opportunities for generating income from the drug market may increase property crime by heroin users.