Contracts for the Sale of Land: Understanding the Impecuniosity Defence

Where either the seller or buyer of landed property fails to complete a contract to sell land the non-breaching party has a right to seek specific performance of the contract. This remedy would compel the party in default to perform the contract on pain of being held in contempt of court if the court's order is not obeyed. The defaulting party would not be able to satisfy its obligations under the law by paying a sum of money as damages for breach of contract. This paper considers the impecuniosity defence to specific performance as recognised by courts in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Where the buyer demonstrates that he or she simply cannot raise the funds to buy the property specific performance will not be decreed and the court will make an award of damages for breach of contract measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the time of default. The paper considers the nature and parameters of this defence and how it differs (if at all) from the alternative defence of extreme hardship. The paper addresses the question of whether it might be better to move to a position where sellers of land in all cases no longer enjoy a presumption of specific performance but have to demonstrate that the alternative remedy of damages is clearly inadequate. If this should be so the paper goes on to consider whether abolition of the presumption in favour of specific performance for sellers should lead to abolition of the presumption of specific performance for buyers, as is the position in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415.

On the efficient evaluation of ruin probabilities for completely monotone claim size distributions

In this paper we propose a highly accurate approximation procedure for ruin probabilities in the classical collective risk model, which is based on a quadrature/rational approximation procedure proposed in [2]. For a certain class of claim size distributions (which contains the completely monotone distributions) we give a theoretical justification for the method. We also show that under weaker assumptions on the claim size distribution, the method may still perform reasonably well in some cases. This in particular provides an efficient alternative to a related method proposed in [3]. A number of numerical illustrations for the performance of this procedure is provided for both completely monotone and other types of random variables.

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. fonds 1955-1990, n.d. (non-inclusive)

In March 1931, Captain Bruce Angus was sent to Sarnia by Gordon C. Leitch, general manager of Toronto Elevators. He was sent to inspect the Sarnian to ensure it was still seaworthy. Leitch was a savvy business man, who had been active in the business community for a number of years. Leitch began his career with a partner in the lumber business. When that went under he moved into graineries and worked for the Winnipeg Wheat Pool for 12 years. After Winnipeg he moved to Toronto, which was closer to his home town of Ridgetown, Ontario. In Toronto Leitch became manager of the Toronto branch of the Canadian Wheat Pool. While managing the wheat pools in Toronto Leitch became aware of huge costs associated with shipping the grains from the praries into the Toronto area. He felt that there was no need for such costs and decided to do something to make them better and cheaper for the business. Originally the grain was loaded onto Lakers that would bring the grain from the praries to Lake Huron and Georgian Bay. It was stored there until needed by the Toronto graineries and then hauled across land by either truck or train. The land journey was the most expensive and the one which Leitch wanted to eliminate. This was a fine plan except for 2 obstacles that were quickly overcome. First of all the Welland canals were not large enough to accommodate the large carriers that were bringing in the grain. This was changing as the expansion and widening of the canals was already underway. The second issue was the lack of storage in Toronto for the grain. The grain elevators had been destroyed by fire in the late 1880s and never replaced. Leitch propsed his company built its own storage elevators along the water front to allow not only for easier access to the grain, and more timely production of products. The elevators would aslo create a reduction in shipping costs and an overall more competitoive price for the customers of the grainery. The company refused, so Leitch went elsewhere to friends and contacts within the grain industry. The elevators were built and Leitch quit his job with the Canadian Wheat Pool and became the general manager of the elevators. Although the elevators were built and ready for storage the next issue was filling them. None of the carriers wanted to do business with Leitch because the competition in Georgian Bay threatened to cancel their contracts if they did. Leitch saw no way around this, but to provide his own transportation. This is when he sent Captain Bruce Angus to scout out potential ships. The ship was purchased for $37,000 and after another $30,000 was spent to fix it up, it was ready for business. The need for transportation and the finding of a seaworthy ship, lead to the beginnings of the Northland Steamship Company. The Sarnian proved to not be enough for the business underway. Leitch decided another ship was necessary. He joined forces with James Norris the owner of the Norris Grain Company. He proposed they join forces to create a more economical means of transportating their products.

L'obligation de non-concurrence dans les sociétés de professionnels : vers une théorie de liberté de choix contractuelle

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"

Le transfert de documents conformes et la résolution du contrat pour leur non-conformité selon la convention de Vienne sur la vente internationale de marchandises

La présente étude examine une des difficultés que soulève l'exécution des contrats de vente mettant en relation des parties situées dans des pays différents. Ces contrats connaissent des problèmes bien particuliers. En effet, en donnant lieu à l'expédition des marchandises vendues, ces contrats obligent aussi le vendeur à transférer à l'acheteur les documents conformes représentatifs de celles-ci. La non-conformité des documents se distingue de la non-conformité des marchandises et constitue une source principale des litiges visant la résolution des contrats dans ce secteur commercial. La diversité des solutions susceptibles de s'y appliquer est devenue une réalité depuis que les droits internes doivent coexister avec les règles de la Convention de Vienne sur la vente internationale de marchandises. En principe, aucune difficulté ne se pose lorsqu'un droit interne est désigné comme étant le droit compétent: il suffirait d'appliquer les solutions de ce droit. Ainsi, par exemple, l'acheteur peut résoudre le contrat si les documents ne sont pas conformes aux stipulations contractuelles sur la base du concept de fundamental breach (en cas de vente non documentaire) ou sur la base de la stricte conformité (en cas de vente documentaire) que retiennent les droits anglo-américain; en revanche dans les systèmes de droit civil (où la distinction entre vente documentaire et vente non documentaire n'existe pas), pareille résolution du contrat basée sur le défaut de conformité des documents n'est possible qu'en présence d'un préjudice important ou d'un défaut majeur. Plusieurs justifications fondamentales sous-tendent la raison d'être des solutions retenues par les droits nationaux: quête de sécurité juridique et recherche de solution conforme aux besoins des opérateurs du commerce international. Néanmoins, il appert que de telles justifications sont également présentes dans la Convention de Vienne. De plus, cette Convention oblige le vendeur à transférer à l'acheteur les documents conformes de la vente. Cependant, elle le fait de manière indirecte sans pour autant préciser quels types de documents doivent faire l'objet du transfert. L'opportunité d'un tel transfert dépendra donc, sous réserves des dispositions impératives, de l'accord des parties et des usages commerciaux qui ont préséance sur les règles unifiées. Ce qui en fait parfois une question d'interprétation du contrat ou une question de comblement des lacunes de ce droit uniforme de la vente internationale. En ce sens, ce dernier droit diffère des droits nationaux qui sont plus clairs à cet égard. Quant aux conditions de la résolution du contrat pour non-conformité des documents, quel que soit le système national considéré, la solution qu'il consacre contraste avec celle prévue par la Convention de Vienne qui n'admet une telle sanction qu'en présence d'une contravention essentielle. Cette dualité entre droits nationaux et droit matériel uniforme nous met en face d'un constat bien évident: l'avènement de la Convention de Vienne sur la vente internationale de marchandises et la règle de la contravention essentielle qu'elle consacre, perturbent le paysage juridique jusqu'ici en vigueur dans chacun des États signataires. Ce qui justifie tout l'intérêt du sujet: la contravention essentielle par opposition à la règle de la stricte conformité et celle basée sur l'importance du préjudice prévues par les droits internes sont-elles des règles exclusives l'une de l'autre? La réponse est loin d'être certaine en dépit des convergences possibles dans le dénouement du contentieux de la résolution, même si par ailleurs il faut admettre qu'il s'agit de régimes juridiques bien différents. Tout en subordonnant la résolution du contrat à l'existence d'une contravention essentielle, lorsque la Convention de Vienne s'applique (DEUXIÈME PARTIE), la présente étude propose une interprétation de celle-ci en examinant son contenu ainsi que les différentes sources qui interfèrent dans sa mise en œuvre afin de démontrer que ce droit uniforme, malgré ses limites, régit les aspects documentaires de la vente internationale (PREMIÈRE PARTIE).

A model of dynamic liquidity contracts

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when both parties are credit constrained. Borrowers repeatedly have projects to undertake and need external financing. Lenders can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers can renege any period. I show that equilibrium contracts feature interesting dynamics: the economy exhibits efficient investment cycles; absence of perfect enforcement and shortage of capital skew the cycles toward states of liquidity drought; credit is rationed if either the lender has too little capital or if the borrower has too little collateral. This paper's technical contribution is its demonstration of the existence and characterization of financial contracts that are solutions to a non-convex dynamic programming problem.

The standardization of contracts for construction

Contracts are put to a wide variety of uses. Those who draft construction contracts in the UK rarely consider all of the potential uses and therefore may produce documents that are less than ideal. The various uses are considered in their theoretical background before turning to the practical difficulties often encountered in trying to fulfil such diverse aims. The question of standardisation is examined within this context. Existing standard forms of contract in the UK are found to do little to overcome these difficulties, and this encourages either a significant level of amendment to the standards or experienced clients to draft their own forms. The solution is an approach to contract drafting which is designed to offer a compromise; better standard forms, based on the lessons learned from the drafting of non-standard forms and a pooling of experience, including that of lawyers, in the drafting process. Although this paper is based upon the experience of the UK, these conclusions are relevant for contract-drafting practice in general.

Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences

This paper shows the robust non-existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a sophisticated and naive representative agent. Even when underlying preferences are monotone and convex, at given prices, we show by example that the induced preference of the sophisticated representative agent over choices in first-period markets is both non-convex and satiated. Even allowing for negative prices, the market-clearing allocation is not contained in the convex hull of demand. Finally, with a naive representative agent, we show that perfect foresight is incompatible with market clearing and individual optimization at given prices.

Transfers, contracts and regulation: a new institutional economics perspective on the changing provision of social housing in Britain

Social housing policy in the UK mirrors wider processes Associated with shifts in broad welfare regimes. Social housing has moved from dominance by state housing provision to the funding of new investment through voluntary sector housing associations to what is now a greater focus on the regulation and private financing of these not-for-profit bodies. If these trends run their course, we are likely to see a range of not-for-profit bodies providing non-market housing in a highly regulated quasi-market. This paper examines these issues through the lens of new institutional economics, which it is believed can provide important insights into the fundamental contractual and regulatory relationships that are coming to dominate social housing from the perspective of the key actors in the sector (not-for-profit housing organisations, their tenants, private lenders and the regulatory state). The paper draws on evidence recently collected from a study evaluating more than 100 stock transfer organisations that inherited ex-public housing in Scotland, including 12 detailed case studies. The paper concludes that social housing stakeholders need to be aware of the risks (and their management) faced across the sector and that the state needs to have clear objectives for social housing and coherent policy instruments to achieve those ends.

Tests of non-linearity using LIFFE futures transactions price data

This paper presents and implements a number of tests for non-linear dependence and a test for chaos using transactions prices on three LIFFE futures contracts: the Short Sterling interest rate contract, the Long Gilt government bond contract, and the FTSE 100 stock index futures contract. While previous studies of high frequency futures market data use only those transactions which involve a price change, we use all of the transaction prices on these contracts whether they involve a price change or not. Our results indicate irrefutable evidence of non-linearity in two of the three contracts, although we find no evidence of a chaotic process in any of the series. We are also able to provide some indications of the effect of the duration of the trading day on the degree of non-linearity of the underlying contract. The trading day for the Long Gilt contract was extended in August 1994, and prior to this date there is no evidence of any structure in the return series. However, after the extension of the trading day we do find evidence of a non-linear return structure.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.