Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity

Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations.

Escolha social e valores irredutíveis: uma aproximação da economia política e a ideologia

No presente paper, nós provamos que qualquer função da escolha social satisfaz o princípio da independência das alternativas irrelevantes (IIA) de Arrow se o comportamento individual é menu-dependente. Portanto, o 'Teorema da Possibilidade Geral' de Arrow não é válido quando as preferências individuais são determinadas por valores irredutíveis. Nesse contexto, qualquer instrumento de agregação que satisfaça os princípios não-ditatoriais e paretianos de unanimidade (maioria simples, por exemplo) também faz IIA. Esse poderia ser um resultado importante para a teoria da escolha social, enquanto um comportamento individual determinado por valores irredutíveis (interesse próprio, ideologia, Ética e normas sociais, por exemplo) podendo validar democracia representativa. A importância relativa de tais valores e da possibilidade de reversão da preferência determina a dinâmica da escolha social, de acordo com os princípios democráticos.

Levantamento sobre as concepções e práticas de educação ambiental nos cursos de educação de jovens e adultos do centro expandindo da cidade de São Paulo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Modelli e linguaggi per grafi multi-livello

I grafi sono molto utilizzati per la rappresentazione di dati, sopratutto in quelle aree dove l’informazione sull’interconnettività e la topologia dei dati è importante tanto quanto i dati stessi, se non addirittura di più. Ogni area di applicazione ha delle proprie necessità, sia in termini del modello che rappresenta i dati, sia in termini del linguaggio capace di fornire la necessaria espressività per poter fare interrogazione e trasformazione dei dati. È sempre più frequente che si richieda di analizzare dati provenienti da diversi sistemi, oppure che si richieda di analizzare caratteristiche dello stesso sistema osservandolo a granularità differenti, in tempi differenti oppure considerando relazioni differenti. Il nostro scopo è stato quindi quello di creare un modello, che riesca a rappresentare in maniera semplice ed efficace i dati, in tutte queste situazioni. Entrando più nei dettagli, il modello permette non solo di analizzare la singola rete, ma di analizzare più reti, relazionandole tra loro. Il nostro scopo si è anche esteso nel definire un’algebra, che, tramite ai suoi operatori, permette di compiere delle interrogazioni su questo modello. La definizione del modello e degli operatori sono stati maggiormente guidati dal caso di studio dei social network, non tralasciando comunque di rimanere generali per fare altri tipi di analisi. In seguito abbiamo approfondito lo studio degli operatori, individuando delle proprietà utili per fare delle ottimizzazioni, ragionando sui dettagli implementativi, e fornendo degli algoritmi di alto livello. Per rendere più concreta la definizione del modello e degli operatori, in modo da non lasciare spazio ad ambiguità, è stata fatta anche un’implementazione, e in questo elaborato ne forniremo la descrizione.

A multi-regional view on aging societies accounting for the existence of non-tradable goods

This thesis assesses the question, whether accounting for non-tradable goods sectors in a calibrated Auerbach-Kotlikoff multi-regional overlapping-generations-model significantly affects this model’s results when simulating the economic impact of demographic change. Non-tradable goods constitute a major part of up to 80 percent of GDP of modern economies. At the same time, multi-regional overlapping-generations-models presented by literature on demographic change so far ignored their existence and counterfactually assumed perfect tradability between model regions. Moreover, this thesis introduces the assumption of an increasing preference share for non-tradable goods of old generations. This fact-based as-sumption is also not part of models in relevant literature. rnThese obvious simplifications of common models vis-à-vis reality notwithstanding, this thesis concludes that differences in results between a model featuring non-tradable goods and a common model with perfect tradability are very small. In other words, the common simplifi-cation of ignoring non-tradable goods is unlikely to lead to significant distortions in model results. rnIn order to ensure that differences in results between the ‘new’ model, featuring both non-tradable and tradable goods, and the common model solely reflect deviations due to the more realistic structure of the ‘new’ model, both models are calibrated to match exactly the same benchmark data and thus do not show deviations in their respective baseline steady states.rnA variation analysis performed in this thesis suggests that differences between the common model and a model with non-tradable goods can theoretically be large, but only if the bench-mark tradable goods sector is assumed to be unrealistically small.rnFinally, this thesis analyzes potential real exchange rate effects of demographic change, which could occur due to regional price differences of non-tradable goods. However, results show that shifts in real exchange rate based on these price differences are negligible.rn

Public choice of species for the 'Ark': Phylogenetic similarity and preferred wildlife species for survival

Humans play a role in deciding the fate of species in the current extinction wave. Because of the previous Similarity Principle, physical attractiveness and likeability, it has been argued that public choice favours the survival of species that satisfy these criteria at the expense of other species. This paper empirically tests this argument by considering a hypothetical ‘Ark’ situation. Surveys of 204 members of the Australian public inquired whether they are in favour of the survival of each of 24 native mammal, bird and reptile species (prior to and after information provision about each species). The species were ranked by percentage of ‘yes’ votes received. Species composition by taxon in various fractions of the ranking was determined. If the previous Similarity Principle holds, mammals should rank highly and dominate the top fractions of animals saved in the hierarchical list. We find that although mammals would be over-represented in the ‘Ark’, birds and reptiles are unlikely to be excluded when social choice is based on numbers ‘voting’ for the survival of each species. Support for the previous Similarity Principle is apparent particularly after information provision. Public policy implications of this are noted and recommendations are given.

Solving the mystery of Guanxi-a sociological explanation of social exchange and social networking in Guanxi practice

Guanxi, loosely defined as "inter-personal relations" or "personal connections," is one of the key socio-cultural concepts in understanding Chinese society. This thesis presented a theoretical examination of the Chinese socio-cultural concept of guanxi. By using a broad survey of the available literature, this thesis established the following points: Social structures shape and define the development of guanxi practice in Chinese society. Guanxi relationships are based on the social exchange of gifts and favors in dyadic or multi-stranded social networks. While following the general rules of reciprocity found in social exchange, guanxi exchange is also governed by the internalized social norms such as mianzi (face) and renqing (humanized obligation underpinned by human sentiment). Guanxi relationships are also network-oriented, featuring ties based on familiarity and mutual trust, and characterized by an interplay between expressiveness and instrumentalism.

The political economy of corruption in Brazil

This article is the first part of a research on corruption in Brazil and it is theoretical. Despite this, it provides an economic interpretation of corruption using Brazil as a case study. The main objective of this research is to apply some microeconomic tools to understand the "big corruption". However, I am going to show that corruption is not simply a kind of crime. Rather, it is an ordinary economic activity that arises in some institutional environments. Firstly, some corruption cases in Brazil will be described. This article is aimed at showing that democracy itself does not ensure control over corruption. Secondly, I am going to do a very brief survey of institutional changes and controls over corruption in some Western Societies in which I am going to argue that corruption, its control and its illegality depend on institutional evolution by streamlining the constitutional and institutional framework. Thirdly, I am going to explain how some economic models could be adopted for a better understanding of corruption. Finally, I will present a multiple-self model applied to the public agent (politician and bureaucrat) constrained by institutions and pay-off systems.

Long-stay patients in a psychiatric hospital in Southern Brazil

OBJECTIVE: To describe the demographic profile, social functioning, and quality of life of a population of long-stay care patients in a psychiatric hospital. METHODS: A study was carried out in Porto Alegre, Southern Brazil, in 2002. A total of 584 (96%) long-stay patients were assessed by means of the following instruments: the World Health Organization Quality of Life, the Social Behavior Schedule, the Independent Living Skills Survey, the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale and another instrument for assessing disability (Questionnaire for Assessing Physical Disability). RESULTS: The average hospital stay was 26 years (SD: 15.8) and 46.6% of inpatients had no physical disability. Patients had their social functioning skills and autonomy largely impaired. Few of them (27.7%) answered the instrument for assessing quality of life, and showed significant impairments in all domains. The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale evidenced a low prevalence of positive symptoms in this population. CONCLUSIONS: The institutionalized population studied presented significantly impaired social functioning, autonomy, and quality of life. These aspects need to be taken into consideration while planning for their deinstitutionalization.

Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

Fairness under uncertainty with indivisibilities

I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the