The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

Finite-Sample Simulation-Based Inference in VAR Models with Applications to Order Selection and Causality Testing

Statistical tests in vector autoregressive (VAR) models are typically based on large-sample approximations, involving the use of asymptotic distributions or bootstrap techniques. After documenting that such methods can be very misleading even with fairly large samples, especially when the number of lags or the number of equations is not small, we propose a general simulation-based technique that allows one to control completely the level of tests in parametric VAR models. In particular, we show that maximized Monte Carlo tests [Dufour (2002)] can provide provably exact tests for such models, whether they are stationary or integrated. Applications to order selection and causality testing are considered as special cases. The technique developed is applied to quarterly and monthly VAR models of the U.S. economy, comprising income, money, interest rates and prices, over the period 1965-1996.

The effects of corporate social performance on the cost of corporate debt and credit ratings

This study investigates the differential impact that various dimensions of corporate social performance have on the pricing of corporate debt as well as the assessment of the credit quality of specific bond issues. The empirical analysis, based on an extensive longitudinal data set, suggests that overall, good performance is rewarded and corporate social transgressions are penalized through lower and higher corporate bond yield spreads, respectively. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on either the bond rating assigned to a specific debt issue or the probability of it being considered to be an asset of speculative grade.

MONEY AND EDUCATION: HOW ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION CORRESPONDS TO ACADEMIC SUCCESS

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Money and Education: How Economic Distribution Corresponds to Academic Success

Urban sprawl is a significant issue in the United States, one effect of which is the departure of the wealth from cities. This study examined the distribution of wealth in Erie County, New York, focused around Buffalo. The question is then raised, why do those with the money leave the city, and to where do they go? While this study does not attempt to explain all of the reasons, it does examine two significant issues: quality of public school education, and proximity to main highways with easy access to the city. Using ArcGIS, I was able to place the public high schools and their relative ranking over a distribution of per capita income. The results of this analysis show that the wealthiest areas are located within the best school districts. Moreover, the areas where the wealth accumulates are directly connected by major highways.

Welfare costs of inflation: the case for interest-bearing money and empirical estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next. we extend this approach to ao economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Fmally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

A model is presented in which banks accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. Alt though theories about the coexistence of money and credit are inherently difficult, the model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are well monitored, and can credibly allow fiat-money withdraws to whom needs its, thus qualifying to become safe brokers of idle capital. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

Divisia indexes, money and welfare

We suggest the use of a particular Divisia index for measuring welfare losses due to interest rate wedges and in‡ation. Compared to the existing options in the literature: i) when the demands for the monetary assets are known, closed-form solutions for the welfare measures can be obtained at a relatively lower algebraic cost; ii) less demanding integrability conditions allow for the recovery of welfare measures from a larger class of demand systems and; iii) when the demand speci…cations are not known, using an index number entitles the researcher to rank di¤erent vectors of opportunity costs directly from market observations. We use two examples to illustrate the method.

Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies

Pooled procurement has an important role in reducing acquisition prices of goods. A pool of buyers, which aggregates demand for its members, increases bargaining power and allows suppliers to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production. Such aggregation demand e ect lowers prices paid for buyers. However, when a buyer with a good reputation for paying suppliers in a timely manner is joined in the pool by a buyer with bad reputation may have its price paid increased due to the credit risk e ect on prices. This will happen because prices paid in a pooled procurement should refect the (higher) average buyers' credit risk. Using a data set on Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, we nd evidence supporting both e ects. We show that the prices paid by public bodies in Brazil are lower when they buy through pooled procurement than individually. On the other hand, federal agencies (i.e. good buyers) pay higher prices for products when they are joined by state agencies (i.e. bad buyers) in a pool. Such evidence suggests that pooled procurement should be carefully designed to avoid that prices paid increase for its members.

WeIfare costs of inflation the case for interest-bearing money and empiricaI Estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next, we extend this approach to an economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Finally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

A coordination approach to the essentiality of money

The essentiality of money is commonly justi ed on e¢ ciency grounds. In this paper, we propose an alternative view on the essentiality of money. We consider an economy with llimited monitoring where agents have to coordinate on the use of two alternative technologies of exchange, money and credit. We show that although credit strictly dominates money from an e¢ ciency perspective, money is essential for coordination reasons. If agents are patient, the region of parameters where they coordinate in the use of money strictly contains the region of parameters where they coordinate in the use of credit

Show me the money and I will bring you the head: evaluation of the effects of self-interest and anger on whistleblowing

Though many of those who decided to report wrongdoings in their organizations were able to tell their stories (e.g. Bamford, 2014, Armenakis 2004), it is fair to say that there is still much left to uncover. The paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, it provides preliminary evidence that the wrongdoing linked with individual financial loss leads to higher whistleblowing rate. Secondly, it shows how the experience of anger is related to the higher likelihood to report the wrongdoer but only if the wrongful act is perceived as a cause of one’s financial loss. Finally, the paper establishes first steps for the future development of an experimental procedure that would enable to predict, and measure whistleblowing behavior in the lab environment.