On the efficiency of the Argentinean electricity wholesale market

This paper discusses two key aspects regarding the efficiency of the Argentinean Electricity Market. Using hourly data on prices, marginal costs, and operational status of generators, it will be argued that, unlike the former British and Californian electricity spot markets, this market is not subject to the conventional forms of exercise of market power by generators. We then use Chao's (1983) model of optimal configuation of electricity supply to evaluate the social desirability of the change in the supply pattern of the Argentinean electricity industry, which took place throughout the last ten years.

Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.

Section 46(1) and 46(1AA) of the TPA : the struggle of the small against the large

The purpose of this article is to highlight the conflict in the policy objectives of subs 46(1) and subs 46(1AA) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). The policy objective of subs 46(1) is to promote competition and efficient markets for the benefit of consumers (consumer welfare standard). It does not prohibit corporations with substantial market power using cost savings arising from efficiencies such economies of scale or scope, to undercut small business competitors The policy objective of 46(1AA), on the other hand, is to protect small business operators from price discounting by their larger competitors.. Unlike subs 46(1), it does not contain a ‘taking advantage’ element. It is argued that subs 46(1AA) may harm consumer welfare by having a chilling effect on price competition if this would harm small business competitors.

When should private property rights give way to the public interest?

Since Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 it has been recognised that corporations with substantial market power are subject to special responsibilities and restraints that corporations without market power are not. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 McHugh A-CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in their joint reasons stated (at [76]), that s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) can operate not only to prevent firms with substantial market power from doing prohibited things, but also compel them positively to do things they do not want to do. Their Honours also stated (at [126]) that the proposition that a private property owner who declines to permit competitors to use the property is immune from s 46 is “intrinsically unsound”. However, the circumstances in which a firm with substantial power must accommodate competitors, and private property rights give way to the public interest are uncertain. The purpose of this Note is to consider recent developments in two areas of the CCA where the law requires private property rights to give way to the public interest. The first part of the Note considers two recent cases which clarify the circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with substantial market power to accommodate a competitor and allow the competitor to make use of private property rights in the public interest. Secondly, on 12 February 2014 the Minister for Small Business, the Hon Bruce Billson,released the Productivity Commission’s Final Report, on the National Access Regime in Pt IIIA of the CCA (National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No 66, Canberra). Pt IIIA provides for the processes by which third parties may obtain access to infrastructure owned by others in the public interest. The Report recommends that Pt IIIA be retained but makes a number of suggestions for its reform, some of which will be briefly considered.

Competition Law in Australia [6th ed.]

Competition Law in Australia, 6th edition provides a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) dealing with the regulation of competition and markets in Australia. This book covers disparate topics, such as restrictions in horizontal and vertical agreements, horizontal mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, and access to services necessary to compete in upstream or downstream markets. However, the unifying theme of this text is that it is not possible to use a formalistic approach in applying the CCA. The decisions of the courts, and the competition authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing the CCA, underline the need to undertake a detailed substantive economic analysis of the effect of the agreement or conduct at issue on competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.

Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Essays on Economic Integration and Labour Demand

This dissertation consists of an introductory section and three essays investigating the effects of economic integration on labour demand by using theoretical models and by empirical analysis. The essays adopt an intra-industry trade approach to specify a theoretical framework of estimation for determining the effects of economic integration on employment. In all the essays the empirical aim is to explore the labour demand consequences of European integration. The first essay analyzes how labour-demand elasticities with own price have changed during the process of economic integration. As a theoretical result, intensified trade competition increases labour-demand elasticity, whereas better advantage of economies of scale decreases labour-demand elasticity by decreasing the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products. Furthermore, if integration gives rise to an increase in input-substitutability and/or outsourcing activities, labour demand will become more elastic. Using data from the manufacturing sector from 1975 to 2002, the empirical results provide support for the hypothesis that European integration has contributed to increased elasticities of total labour demand in Finland. The second essay analyzes how economic integration affects the impact of welfare poli-cies on employment. The essay considers the viability of financing the public sector, i.e. public consumption and social security expenses, by general labour taxation in an economy which has become more integrated into international product markets. The theoretical results of the second essay indicate that, as increased trade competition crowds out better economies of scale, it becomes more costly to maintain welfare systems financed by labour taxation. Using data from European countries for the years 1975 to 2004, the empirical results provide inconsistent evidence for the hypothesis that economic integration has contributed to the distortion effects of welfare policies on employment. The third essay analyzes the impact of profit sharing on employment as a way to introduce wage flexibility into the process of economic integration. The results of the essay suggest that, in theory, the effects of economic integration on the impact of profit sharing on employment clearly depend on a trade-off between intensified competition and better advantage of economies of scale. If product market competition increases, the ability of profit sharing to improve employment through economic integration increases with moderated wages. While, the economic integration associating with market power in turn decrease the possibilities of profit sharing with higher wages to improve employment. Using data from the manufacturing sector for the years 1996 to 2004, the empirical results show that profit-sharing has a positive impact on employment during the process of European integration, but can have ambiguous effects on the stability of employment in Finland.

Dominating search: Google before the law

For many, particularly in the Anglophone world and Western Europe, it may be obvious that Google has a monopoly over online search and advertising and that this is an undesirable state of affairs, due to Google's ability to mediate information flows online. The baffling question may be why governments and regulators are doing little to nothing about this situation, given the increasingly pivotal importance of the internet and free flowing communications in our lives. However, the law concerning monopolies, namely antitrust or competition law, works in what may be seen as a less intuitive way by the general public. Monopolies themselves are not illegal. Conduct that is unlawful, i.e. abuses of that market power, is defined by a complex set of rules and revolves principally around economic harm suffered due to anticompetitive behavior. However the effect of information monopolies over search, such as Google’s, is more than just economic, yet competition law does not address this. Furthermore, Google’s collection and analysis of user data and its portfolio of related services make it difficult for others to compete. Such a situation may also explain why Google’s established search rivals, Bing and Yahoo, have not managed to provide services that are as effective or popular as Google’s own (on this issue see also the texts by Dirk Lewandowski and Astrid Mager in this reader). Users, however, are not entirely powerless. Google's business model rests, at least partially, on them – especially the data collected about them. If they stop using Google, then Google is nothing.

A modell of socially optimal hydro reservoir usage - yelding socially optimal outcomes in nordic electricity markets

An extensive electricity transmission network facilitates electricity trading between Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Currently most of the area's power generation is traded at NordPool, where the trading volumes have steadily increased since the early 1990's, when the exchange was founded. The Nordic electricity is expected to follow the current trend and further integrate with the other European electricity markets. Hydro power is the source for roughly a half of the supply in the Nordic electricity market and most of the hydro is generated in Norway. The dominating role of hydro power distinguishes the Nordic electricity market from most of the other market places. Production of hydro power varies mainly due to hydro reservoirs and demand for electricity. Hydro reservoirs are affected by water inflows that differ each year. The hydro reservoirs explain remarkably the behaviour of the Nordic electricity markets. Therefore among others, Kauppi and Liski (2008) have developed a model that analyzes the behaviour of the markets using hydro reservoirs as explanatory factors. Their model includes, for example, welfare loss due to socially suboptimal hydro reservoir usage, socially optimal electricity price, hydro reservoir storage and thermal reservoir storage; that are referred as outcomes. However, the model does not explain the real market condition but rather an ideal situation. In the model the market is controlled by one agent, i.e. one agent controls all the power generation reserves; it is referred to as a socially optimal strategy. Article by Kauppi and Liski (2008) includes an assumption where an individual agent has a certain fraction of market power, e.g. 20 % or 30 %. In order to maintain the focus of this thesis, this part of their paper is omitted. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly we expand the results from the socially optimal strategy for years 2006-08, as the earlier study finishes in 2005. The second objective is to improve on the methods from the previous study. This thesis results several outcomes (SPOT-price and welfare loss, etc.) due to socially optimal actions. Welfare loss is interesting as it describes the inefficiency of the market. SPOT-price is an important output for the market participants as it often has an effect on end users' electricity bills. Another function is to modify and try to improve the model by means of using more accurate input data, e.g. by considering pollution trade rights effect on input data. After modifications to the model, new welfare losses are calculated and compared with the same results before the modifications. The hydro reservoir has the higher explanatory significance in the model followed by thermal power. In Nordic markets, thermal power reserves are mostly nuclear power and other thermal sources (coal, natural gas, oil, peat). It can be argued that hydro and thermal reservoirs determine electricity supply. Roughly speaking, the model takes into account electricity demand and supply, and several parameters related to them (water inflow, oil price, etc.), yielding finally the socially optimal outcomes. The author of this thesis is not aware of any similar model being tested before. There have been some other studies that are close to the Kauppi and Liski (2008) model, but those have a somewhat different focus. For example, a specific feature in the model is the focus on long-run capacity usage that differs from the previous studies on short-run market power. The closest study to the model is from California's wholesale electricity markets that, however, uses different methodology. Work is constructed as follows.

Imperfect Competition

Para quien es de utilidad: •Alumnos de Tª Microeconómica IV, curso 3º LE. •Alumnos de las asignaturas de Tª de Juegos y Organización Industrial del Máster en Economía: Instrumentos del Análisis Económico. Estas notas sobre competencia imperfecta están dedicadas al estudio de estructuras de mercado caracterizadas por la existencia de poder de mercado. Se estudia en primer lugar el monopolio, dedicando una atención especial a los diferentes tipos de discriminación de precios. A continuación se presenta la Tª de juegos no cooperativos y se muestra su utilidad para analizar diferentes fenómenos económicos caracterizados por la interdependencia estratégica. Finalmente, se estudian diferentes modelos de competencia oligopolística y la estabilidad de los acuerdos colusivos.

A indústria do conhecimento, o médico e a indústria farmacêutica: uma coprodução de técnicos e técnicas de poder

Este estudo abordou o contexto de uma engrenagem macropolítica, na qual o poder dominante (representado pela indústria farmacêutica) se articula à indústria do conhecimento, condicionando construção e divulgação de conhecimento biomédico à mesma lógica da produção e distribuição capitalista de mercadorias. A indústria farmacêutica tem investido em projetos de pesquisas clínicas, com o objetivo de legitimar, cientificamente, seus produtos. A investigação deste papel financiador de ensaios clínicos baseou-se nos depoimentos de quatro médicos, professores de Medicina, coparticipantes de projetos da indústria farmacêutica. Os resultados evidenciaram que os protocolos das pesquisas são elaborados pela própria indústria, sem participação do médico colaborador; o acesso à íntegra dos dados coletados é de exclusividade dos coordenadores centrais da pesquisa; e, os resultados dos ensaios, apresentados através de resumos, são previamente submetidos a critérios de seleção de dados. Com o objetivo de articular saber médico a expectativas de mercado, o poder dominante se exerce através de técnicas de poder (estratégias de marketing), atribuindo aos médicos o papel de técnicos de poder, a serviço de seus interesses. Essa relativização de valores clama por uma crítica revisão ética.

From the transformation to the bancarization of the spanishsaving banks: an analysis of the results pursued

This research arises due to the current restructuring process in which is immersed the Spanish banking sector. The above mentioned process is carried out to try to reduce the doubts on the viability of the bank companies to average and long term and to be able to return again the confidence in the sector. Though the economic and financial crisis has concerned the whole banking sector, the subsector of the Spanish savings banks is the one that has experienced a major number of integrations (articulated by means of mergers, absorptions and across Institutional Protection Schemes -IPSs-), and the one that has met submitted to the bancarization process. Considering what has been said, the present paper analyses Spanish saving banks to try to discern whether thanks to that process the objectives pursued by the bank rearrangement have been fulfilled. To do this, the evolution of some important financial variables will be studied over a long period of time (1999-2012). The results suggest that not all the savings banks have seen improved their ratios of efficiency, solvency, financial gap and social work, which indicates that there is still much to be done in order to rectify the problems affecting the studied sector.

La justification du droit d'auteur dans l'environnement numérique

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (L.L.M.) option Technologies de l'information"

Le contrat de distribution exclusive et le principe de la concurrence au Canada

Les contrats de distribution exclusive sont couramment utilisés dans la mise en marché des produits. Des doutes et des critiques ont été, pourtant, soulevés relativement à leur validité au regard du droit de la concurrence. Ces ententes et les pratiques qui en découlent paraissent, à première vue, anticoncurrentielles. Le propos de ce mémoire est d’examiner dans quelle mesure les contrats de distribution exclusive peuvent, en fait, stimuler la concurrence et de montrer, en conséquence, qu’ils devraient être considérés licites eu égard au droit de la concurrence. Nous trouvons, d’une part, que les pratiques exclusives sont suspectes vu qu’elles réduisent la liberté contractuelle du producteur et du distributeur. Cette restriction est susceptible d’entraver la concurrence à cause du pouvoir de marché qu’elle crée et elle peut, de ce fait, engendrer le monopole. La Loi sur la concurrence interdit de tels agissements. Les contrats de distribution exclusive peuvent, d’autre part, favoriser réellement la concurrence. Ils constituent un instrument stratégique utilisé par les entrepreneurs dans leur lutte pour accroître leur part de marché. La distribution exclusive, en portant les acteurs commerciaux à chercher les meilleures stratégies, renforce la concurrence. Celle-ci doit être entendue non seulement comme une constante rivalité entre toutes les entreprises, mais elle doit aussi inclure la coopération entre certaines entreprises en vue de mieux concurrencer d’autres à un niveau plus général. Une juste appréciation de la concurrence dans les contrats de distribution exclusive requiert le recours à l’analyse économique du droit. Cette analyse permet une évaluation de la concurrence basée sur le critère de l’efficience économique. En vue de déterminer si une pratique donnée augmente ou non le bien-être général (sur quoi l’analyse de l’efficience met l’accent), les effets négatifs de cette pratique devraient être mis en balance avec ses effets positifs résultant des gains en efficience. C’est dans ce sens que le droit de la concurrence a évolué tant dans l’Union européenne qu’aux États-Unis et au Canada pour permettre les ententes qui entraînent des gains nets d’efficience. Ce qu’on aurait pu condamner autrefois pour entrave à la concurrence, peut maintenant paraître comme une stratégie commerciale licite et saine. Compte tenu de ce récent développement, notre analyse nous conduit à la conclusion que les accords de distribution exclusive devraient être considérés licites dans la mesure où ils améliorent le bien-être du consommateur.

Análisis de los procesos de internacionalización en el sector petrolero : Ecopetrol, Petrobras Y Exxonmobil

El presente trabajo se centra en el fenómeno de la internacionalización dentro del sector petrolero. Para esto, se escogió a tres empresas: Ecopetrol, por ser la empresa colombiana más grande; Petrobras, el mayor representante de Latinoamérica; y Exxon Mobil, un gigante del petróleo a nivel mundial. Estas empresas, que se encuentran en diferentes etapas dentro de su proceso de la internacionalización, muestran comportamientos estratégicos similares. Son precisamente estas similitudes las que permitieron proponer un modelo de internacionalización generalizado para las diferentes empresas que componen dicho sector económico. Para alcanzar dicho modelo, se recurrió a diferentes teorías de internacionalización desarrolladas por varias escuelas de negocios en el mundo, tales como el Modelo Ecléctico, el de Uppsala o la Teoría de Redes. Cabe destacar que dicho modelo propuesto es una aproximación teórica a la realidad empresarial de las compañías petroleras, usando como marco de referencia una muestra pequeña de este tipo de organizaciones. Dentro de este modelo, los altos matices de complejidad propios del fenómeno de la internacionalización se ven reducidos de manera considerable, como parte del ejercicio académico propuesto en el presente estudio.