Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context : Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond /

After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan’s president is directly elected while Japan’s prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.

Optimal strategies in political elections

In the Majoritarian Parliamentary System, the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right provides the government a control to achieve its objective to remain in power for as long as possible. We model the early election problem mathematically using opinion polls data as a stochastic process to proxy the government's probability of re-election. These data measure the difference in popularity between the government and the opposition. We fit a mean reverting Stochastic Differential Equation to describe the behaviour of the process and consider the possibility for the government to use other control tools, which are termed 'boosts' to induce shocks to the opinion polls by making timely policy announcements or economic actions. These actions improve the government's popularity and have some impact upon the early-election exercise boundary. © Austral. Mathematical Soc. 2005.

Stochastic dynamic programming for election timing: A game theory approach

In this paper, we consider dynamic programming for the election timing in the majoritarian parliamentary system such as in Australia, where the government has a constitutional right to call an early election. This right can give the government an advantage to remain in power for as long as possible by calling an election, when its popularity is high. On the other hand, the opposition's natural objective is to gain power, and it will apply controls termed as "boosts" to reduce the chance of the government being re-elected by introducing policy and economic responses. In this paper, we explore equilibrium solutions to the government, and the opposition strategies in a political game using stochastic dynamic programming. Results are given in terms of the expected remaining life in power, call and boost probabilities at each time at any level of popularity.

Between plurality and proportionality: an analysis of vote transfer systems

The paper considers a general model of electoral systems combining district-based elections with a compensatory mechanism in order to implement any outcome between strictly majoritarian and purely proportional seat allocation. It contains vote transfer and allows for the application of three different correction formulas. Analysis in a two-party system shows that a trade-off exists for the dominant party between the expected seat share and the chance of obtaining majority. Vote transfer rules are also investigated by focusing on the possibility of manipulation. The model is applied to the 2014 Hungarian parliamentary election. Hypothetical results reveal that the vote transfer rule cannot be evaluated in itself, only together with the share of constituency seats. With an appropriate choice of the latter, the three mechanisms can be made functionally equivalent.

Determinants and effects of electoral party coalitions: The case of Brazil

Since the 1985 return to democracy, Brazilian politicians have resorted to vote-pooling arrangements to elect representatives. A puzzle thus presents itself: What drives parties to join these electoral cartels? The dissertation unraveled the incentives party elites have to participate in coalitions under a presidencialist system of government. I also investigated the effect of electoral coalitions on congressional representation. I applied a model of binary outcomes and relied on standard deviations to assess the ideological homogeneity/heterogeneity of electoral coalitions. I also calculated the Index of Disproportionality to measure the gaps between the proportion of votes and seats received by all parties in Brazil with and without electoral coalitions. Finally, I assessed the effects of the electoral formula on proportionality. An unexpected exogenous factor resulted crucial in explaining proportional electoral coalition building: The district's majoritarian election for governor. In each district, political actors often synchronize coalition partners to maximize winning results while minimizing electoral efforts.

The Occupy Movement: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back

The op-ed evaluates the successes and limitations of the Occupy Movement in the United States. Ronald W. Cox argues that the Movement was inspirational in directing media focus to the trends of growing inequality and the privileges and power of the one percent. The critique of establishment parties and progressive organizations was a key part of the Occupiers efforts to rethink the meaning of social change. The limitations of the Movement became evident, however, in its extremely decentralized structures that emphasized consensus over majoritarian decision-making, and in its refusal to acknowledge and hold accountable its own leaders.

Estudio comparado de las barreras o umbrales electorales implícitos y explícitos en el sistema electoral

"...En el presente estudio se parte, en primera instancia, de la necesaria conceptualización del término, en general y particular, y en función de ello, posteriormente, a su tipificación, sistematización y análisis especifico en Latinoamérica, mientras que ofrece un panorama general de la aplicación de las barreras electorales explicitas en diferentes regiones del mundo, para luego analizar el caso colombiano en general y visualizar el impacto de la implementación de las barreras electorales explícitas a través del acto legislativo 01 de 2003 y sus efectos en los comicios nacionales de 2006."--introducción

Los cambios del sistema político colombiano en virtud de los preceptos de Arend Lijphart y sus efectos en la oposición durante el periodo 2006 – 2013

El interés principal de esta monografía es demostrar, cómo dentro del marco institucional colombiano, cambió el tipo de Democracia en dos periodos de gobierno, y cómo dicho cambio afectó negativamente al sistema de partidos y específicamente a los partidos de oposición. Esto será analizado desde la teoría de Arend Lijphart sobre Democracia mayoritaria y Democracia consensual, incluyendo dentro del análisis, el marco institucional donde se desenvuelve el sistema político colombiano. Para un mayor entendimiento de la temática, se realiza un recuento de la institucionalidad de los partidos políticos en Colombia desde su formación hasta el día de hoy, prestando principal interés a los periodos de Gobierno comprendidos entre 2006 y 2013.