Breve histórico sobre o desenvolvimento do lobbying no Brasil

Inclui bibliografia

Taiwanese Lobbying in the European Union: ‘Workable Diplomacy’ and its Limitations. EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2015

The policy of the European Union (EU) towards Taiwan has mostly been analysed either as a by-product of EU-China relations or with reference to the general lack of a European geopolitical approach towards East Asia. By adopting a lobbying approach which focusses on Taiwan’s different ‘channels of influence’ within the complex European foreign policy system in Brussels, this study provides new insights into the functioning of EU-Taiwan relations. It also sheds new light on the implications of the radical change in Taiwanese diplomacy after 2008, when Chen Shui-bian’s assertive and identity-based diplomacy was replaced with the Kuomintang’s new dogma of ‘workable diplomacy’. Based on semi-guided interviews with Taiwanese and European actors, this paper examines why Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels, albeit very active and professional, is not salient enough to meet the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese competition and from the increasing proliferation of regional trade agreements – with active EU participation – in the Asia-Pacific region. It argues that the pragmatic ‘workable diplomacy’ approach, while smoothing out working-level relations between Taiwan and the EU, fails to attract a sufficient degree of political and public attention in Europe to the Taiwan question and thus fosters the neglect of Taiwan by European foreign policy-makers. The main challenge faced by Taiwanese diplomacy, however, is not simply one of convincing through technical arguments, but one of agenda setting, that is, of redefining European priorities in Taiwan’s favour.

Something Worth Fighting For: The Evolution of Lobbying Coalitions in the Emissions Trading System. Bruges Political Research Papers 50/2015.

This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers it primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU policy area can form and develop.

Information Guide: Civil Society, Stakeholders, Pressure Groups and Lobbying in the European Union

A guide to information sources on civil society, stakeholders, pressure groups and lobbying in the European Union, with hyperlinks to further sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites.

Allegations of improper lobbying by Department of Defense personnel of the C-5B and B-1B aircraft and sale to Saudi Arabia of the airborne warning and control system : report together with separate views of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session, December 30, 1982.

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of the Lobbying Activities of the American Retail Federation : hearings before the United States House Special Committee To Investigate American Retail Federation, Seventy-Fourth Congress, first session.

Title varies: [v. 2-4] Investigation of the trade practices of big scale retail and wholesale buying and selling organizations.

Investigation of lobbying on utility holding company bills : hearings, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on H. Res. 288, a resolution authorizing and directing the Committee on Rules to investigate lobbying activities with respect to utility holding companies.

Hearings held July 9-17, 1935.

Giants and dwarfs:the multilevel lobbying strategies of national interest organizations

The article addresses the bias in interest representation within the EU by examining the lobbying strategies of national interest organisations within the EU’s multilevel political system. Both our theoretical framework, which includes the determinants of a national interest organisation's decision to act at the EU level, and the data analysis from the INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module (MLG) (www.intereuro.eu) reveal three main findings. Firstly, the greatest differentiation among interest organisations (IOs) appears to be between those IOs from the older member states (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands), which exhibit above-average levels of activity, and those from the newer EU member states (Sweden, Slovenia), which exhibit below-average levels of activity. Secondly, the variations in IO activity levels are much greater from country to country than from one policy field to another. Thirdly, although the IOs from all five countries in our study are more likely to employ media and publishing strategies (information politics) than to mobilise their members and supporters (protest politics), we can still observe national patterns in their selection of strategies and in the intensity of their instrumentalisation.

Lobbying informationnel et distorsion de l’agenda politique: le cas de signaux imparfaits

À l’aide d’un modèle théorique, je remets en question l’idée généralement admise que le lobbying informationnel ne peut pas être nuisible pour les citoyens puisque le décideur public possède davantage d’information. Dans mon modèle, un décideur public doit choisir de maintenir le statu quo ou implémenter la réforme pour chacune des deux problématiques présentes. Ces problématiques ont une importance relative qui diffère. Le décideur public peut donc désirer acquérir de l’information sur ces dernières afin de prendre la meilleure décision possible. Cependant, il fait face à deux contraintes. La première est qu’il ne peut pas nécessairement implémenter la réforme sur les deux problématiques, le décideur public doit établir un agenda. La seconde contrainte est qu’il ne dispose pas nécessairement des moyens pour acquérir de l’information sur les problématiques qu’il désire. Deux groupes d’intérêts sont également présents. Ces derniers tentent d’influencer le décideur public en lui transmettant de l’information. Ils peuvent ni la cacher, ni la modifier. Les groupes d’intérêts acquièrent d’abord de l’information de manière simultanée, puis le décideur public, après avoir observé leur information, décide s’il acquiert de l’information, et ce, de manière séquentielle. La présence des deux contraintes du décideur public, ainsi que l’importance relative différente des deux problématiques peuvent mener à la situation où les citoyens sont mieux sans les groupes d’intérêts, et ce malgré le fait que les préférences du décideur public sont alignées avec celle des citoyens. Cela s’explique par le fait que l’information transmise par les groupes d’intérêts peut venir modifier l’ordre d’importance des problématiques pour le décideur public en plaçant la problématique de moindre importance au-dessus de l’autre. Le lobbying informationnel peut donc être nuisible aux citoyens, malgré le fait que le décideur public ait davantage d’information.

Lobbying in a transatlantic comparison: opportunity structures and lobbying content in the US and the EU

Despite vast literatures on interest representation in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), few studies have tried to compare lobbying across the two cases. Those who do are interested primarily in the existence of different lobbying styles and distinguish between an aggressive pressure group approach in the US and a more consensus oriented informational lobbying in the EU. However, the origins of these differences have received little attention and references most often point to different political “cultures” and lobbying traditions. This paper takes issue with this cultural explanation and links the observed lobbying styles with differences in the design of the political institutions that private actors have to interact with. It argues that divided policy authority in the US allows for interest group bargaining while shared policy competencies in the EU constrain not only policy-makers but also lobbyists to adopt a more consensus-oriented approach. The effect of political institutions on the form of lobbying, in turn, can have important implications for the comparison of different policy areas across countries, because the policy stances of private actors cannot always be assumed to be exogenous to the policy process in which they are active.

Informational lobbying in the European Union: Explaining information supply to the European Commission

Information supply is an important instrument through which interest groups can exert influence on political decisions. However, information supply to decision-makers varies extensively across interest groups. How can this be explained? Why do some interest groups provide more information than others? I argue that variation in information supply can largely be explained by organizational characteristics, more specifically the resources, the functional differentiation, the professionalization and the decentralization of interest groups. I test my theoretical expectations based on a large new dataset: Using multilevel modeling, I examine information supply to the European Commission across 56 policy issues and a wide range of interest groups by combining an analysis of consultation submissions with a survey conducted among interest groups.