Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.

‘Bibi strikes back’. Israeli elections in a transforming domestic and international landscape. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2015

On 17 March 2015 Israeli citizens massively headed to the polls to renew the composition of the Knesset, the country’s legislative body, thereby also electing a new government after the early termination of the ruling coalition elected in 2013.

Infospective on the European Elections and the European Parliament. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 12, May 2014

With the 2014 European Elections just round the corner, the EU Centre has published an infospective (Background Brief 12) by Devi Shree Malarvanan and Dexter Lee (EU Centre in Singapore) entitled “Infospective on the European Elections and the European Parliament” This infospective covers the history of the European Parliament, highlighting the legislative powers that Parliament has since the 1960s. It also covers the issues and results of the previous 7 European elections, and will feature a sneak peak of the upcoming 2014 European Elections which will be held later in May.

Congressional-legislative-judicial apportionment maps and descriptions.

Description based on: 1972.

Extended, suspended and rescheduled elections.

Mode of access: Internet.

A randomized and controlled trial of a participative ergonomics intervention to reduce injuries associated with manual tasks: physical risk and legislative

A participative ergonomics approach to reducing injuries associated with manual tasks is widely promoted; however only limited evidence from uncontrolled trials has been available to support the efficacy of such an approach. This paper reports on a randomized and controlled trial of PErforM, a participative ergonomics intervention designed to reduce the risks of injury associated with manual tasks. One hundred and seventeen small to medium sized food, construction, and health workplaces were audited by government inspectors using a manual tasks risk assessment tool (ManTRA). Forty-eight volunteer workplaces were then randomly assigned to Experimental and Control groups with the Experimental group receiving the PErforM program. Inspectors audited the workplaces again, 9 months following the intervention. The results showed a significant decrease in estimates of manual task risk and suggested better legal compliance in the Experimental group.

Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil`s Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2006

This article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states` legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences.

Partidos políticos e direito de oposição a Pirro

Art. 114º da Constituição da República Portuguesa: “1. Os partidos políticos participam nos órgãos baseados no sufrágio universal e directo, de acordo com a sua representatividade eleitoral. 2. É reconhecido às minorias o direito de oposição democrática, nos termos da Constituição e da lei. 3. Os partidos políticos representados na Assembleia da República e que não façam parte do Governo gozam, designadamente, do direito de serem informados regular e directamente pelo Governo sobre o andamento dos principais assuntos de interesse público, de igual direito gozando os partidos políticos representados nas Assembleias Legislativas das regiões autónomas e em quaisquer outras assembleias designadas por eleição directa relativamente aos correspondentes executivos de que não façam parte.”. § Article 114 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. "1. Political parties shall participate in organs based on direct and universal suffrage, according to their electoral representation. 2. It is recognized minorities the right to democratic opposition, under the Constitution and the law. 3. Political parties represented in Parliament and not forming part of the Government shall, in particular, the right to be informed regularly and directly by the Government on the progress of the main matters of public interest, equal rights enjoying the political parties represented in Legislative Assemblies of the autonomous regions and any other assemblies formed through direct elections with respect to the corresponding executives who are not part. ".

Nominations across gender: An empirical investigation of Brazilian municipal elections

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of national and international observers in democratic elections: A randomized control trial from the Mozambican elections of 2009

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics