949 resultados para leftist governments
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The work aims at assessing the success of Brunetta’s reform (Legislative Decree n. 150/2009), a far-reaching reform that aimed at improving both organizational and individual performance in Italian public administration through a specific planning and control process (the performance cycle) and most of all through two new tools, Performance Plan and Performance Report. The success of the reform is assessed, with particular emphasis on local governments, analyzing the diffusion and use of these new tools. The study has been conducted using a deductive-inductive methodology. Thus, after a study of managerial reforms in Italy and performance measurement literature, a possible model (PerformEL Model) local governments could follow to draw up Performance Plan and Report as effective tools for performance measurement has been designed (deductive phase). Performance Plans 2011-2013 and Performance Report 2011 downloaded from Italian big sized municipalities’ websites have been analyzed in the light of PerformEL Model, to assess the diffusion of the documents and their coherence with legal requirements and suggestions from literature (inductive phase). Data arising from the empirical analysis have been studied to evaluate the diffusion and the effectiveness of big sized municipalities’ Performance Plans and Reports as performance measurement tools and thus to assess the success of the reform (feedback phase). The study shows a scarce diffusion of the documents; they are mostly drew up because of their compulsoriness or to gain legitimization. The results testify the failure of Brunetta’s reform, at least with regard to local governments.
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ABSTRACT Canada is an aging society. The number of people aged sixty-five and over is rising, while the number of people under twenty is declining. These two concurrent changes in the age structure have produced a sh~ft in the demographic composition of Canada which is commonly referred to as the aging phenomenon. Regardless of whether or not the number of people under twenty continues to decline, the number of elderly in Canada will almost double over the next twenty years. This rapidly growing elderly clientele will doubtless have an impact on Canadian governments. Federal, provincial and municipal governments are presently providing a variety of programs that have a special bearing on the aged and most senior citizens are beneficiaries of one or more of these programs. The ramifications of a rapidly growing elderly clientele are obvious. In order to cope with the impact of a significant increase in the number of elderly persons, the development and implementation of aging policy must be co-ordinated at each level of government and between and among levels of government. If aging policy is not co-ordinated, the results are likely to be: inappropriate policy decisions; duplication and overlap; and, ineffective and irresponsive services. No one benefits from these results. The need for co-ordination is apparent. The purpose of this thesis is to examine existing governmental efforts to co-ordinate policy in the field of aging. These efforts are examined by focusing on interactions directed at co-ordination between and among major actors in aging policy. A framework is used to structure the description and analysis of these interactions. The variables of formalisation and intensity and the concept of power are instrumental in analysing interactions for co-ordination. The underlying intent of this thesis is to discover some of the main gaps in existing governmental efforts to co~ordinate aging policy. Gaps are, in fact, discovered. Several explanations for the existence of gaps in interactions for co-ordination are discussed. A major hypothesis involving a relationship between a bureaucratic form of organisation and interactions for coordination is suggested. Finally, three recommendations for improving co-ordination in aging policy are offered.
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13th Congress, 3d session. House. Doc. no. 13.
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February 28, 1815. Printed by order of the Senate of the United States.
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13th Congress, 3d session. House. Doc. no. 13. October 28, 1814. Read, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Printed by A. and G. Way
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February 28, 1815. Printed by order of the Senate of the United States. Printed be Roger C. Weightman
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A booklet of rules and regulations for industrial alcohol. A portion of the preparatory note reads: "We endeavoured to bring together in this booklet as much information as possible regarding the Dominion and Provincial rules and regulations at present in force controlling the sale and use of Alcohol for manufacturing, etc."
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The Purpose of This Article Is to Show How Costs and Benefits of Geographical Decentralization of R&D Can Be Identified and Compared. the Benefits for the Region That Receives R&D Activities Are Studied in Section 1. They Stem From the Short-Run Multiplier Effect, the Amelioration of Human Capital and the Possible Modernization of the Local Industrial Structure. on the Cost Side Examined in Section 2, the Observable Impacts of the Decentralization of R&D Concern the Loss of Returns to Scale and of the Production of the R&D Output. It Is Shown, in Section 3, That the Flows of Costs and Benefits Must Be Discounted by the Social Cost of Capital. the Main Conclusion of This Article Is That the Decentralization of R&D in a Large Sparsely Populated Country Entails Social Cost and Would Weaken Its Competitive Position in World Commerce. on the Other Hand, the Issue of Decentralization Is More Crucial for Small Countries (In Terms of Population and Economic Size) Than for Large Ones, Like the U.S., Where Critical Masses of Research Efforts Cna Be Simulataneously Attained in Many Fields and in Many Places.
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Hindi
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In this paper I evaluate the impact of the 2001 decentralization reform in Colombia. I use data from Colombia's municipalities. I look at the effect of the 2001 reform on enrolment in pre-college schools. While all municipalities received earnmarked national transfers, withthe reform some of then now have more responsabilities to provide education (deeper decen-tralization) than others. Particulary important, the reform entitle the more decentralizedmunicipalities to sign subsidy contracts with private school. Departments (the regional gov-ernments) are entitle to sign this type of contracts for the less decentralized municipalities.Since the rule for municipalities to receive more responsabilities follows and exogenous popu-lation threshold, I can implement Regression Discontinuity Design. Enrolment is measuredthrough two variables: the number of students enroled in public schools and the number of subsidized students enroled in private schools. Results sugest that more decentralized mu-nicipalities subsidize more students in private schools. The difference is significant at all thelevels of pre-college school for the period 2004-2006. In 2005, the difference accounts for20% of enrolment in private schools and 3% of population of school age. Besides, there are not significant differences among municipalities regarding enrolment in public schools.