Islamic project financing implementation for sustainable infrastructure development in Indonesia

Islamic financing in Indonesia infrastructure projects development has not been optimally implemented. Therefore this paper serves as a catalyst to explore alternative financial scheme such as Islamic financing for infrastructure development. The purpose of this paper is to explore the enablers and barriers in implementing Islamic project financing for public infrastructure development. The findings are then culminated into enablers and barriers in the implementation of Islamic project financing. The two main enablers are the readily availability of huge fund that can be used to support infrastructure projects; and the acceptability of the concept of shariah-compliant financing. On the other hand, the barriers include: high cost of funding; lack of financial institution capability; lack of government policy and regulation; insufficient government support and commitment; conflict between infrastructure and Islamic finance business practices; profit oriented mindset; lack of understanding of Islamic project financing knowledge in infrastructure; and insufficient project preparation.

Paper, prices and politics : an evaluation of the Swedish support to the Bai Bang project in Vietnam : a Sida evaluation report

Sweden’s protest against the Vietnam War was given tangible form in 1969 through the decision to give economic aid to the Government of North Vietnam. The main outcome was an integrated pulp and paper mill in the Vinh Phu Province north-west of Hanoi. Known as Bai Bang after its location, the mill became the most costly, one of the longest lasting and the most controversial project in the history of Swedish development cooperation. In 1996 Bai Bang produced at its full capacity. Today the mill is exclusively managed and staffed by the Vietnamese and there are plans for future expansion. At the same time a substantial amount of money has been spent to reach these achievements. Looking back at the cumbersome history of the project the results are against many’s expectations. To learn more about the conditions for sustainable development Sida commissioned two studies of the Bai Bang project. Together they touch upon several important issues in development cooperation over a period of almost 30 years: the change of aid paradigms over time, the role of foreign policy in development cooperation, cultural obstacles, recipient responsibility versus donor led development etc. The two studies were commissioned by Sida’s Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit which is an independent department reporting directly to Sida’s Board of Directors. One study assesses the financial and economic viability of the pulp and paper mill and the broader development impact of the project in Vietnam. It has been carried out by the Centre for International Economics, an Australian private economic research agency. The other study analyses the decision-making processes that created and shaped the project over a period of two decades, and reflects on lessons from the project for development cooperation in general. This study has been carried out by the Chr. Michelsen Institute, a Norweigan independent research institution.

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Correcting trade distortions in a small open economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.

Logic of aid in an intertemporal setting

The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.

Non-preferential trading clubs

This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.

Buffer stocks are better stabilizers than quotas

Michael Pelcovits (1979, p. 307) recently showed that with an unstable foreign excess supply curve, either a fixed quota or a buffer stock program with a fixed tariff can be used to stabilize domestic price at a given level, and both policies 'will have the same effect on social welfare [so...t]he choice between [the two...] must then be made on the basis of administrative cost and feasibility'. However, he reached his conclusion by ranking the two policies on the basis of domestic welfare, and in this note we demonstrate with his same model that on the basis of foreign welfare the buffer stock is better than the quota. Thus, world welfre is higher under the buffer stock than under the quota. © 1981.

Bid-ask spreads and volatility in the foreign exchange market. An empirical analysis

Consistent with the implications from a simple asymmetric information model for the bid-ask spread, we present empirical evidence that the size of the bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange market is positively related to the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. The estimation results are based on an ordered probit analysis that captures the discreteness in the spread distribution, with the uncertainty of the spot exchange rate being quantified through a GARCH type model. The data sets consists of more than 300,000 continuously recorded Deutschemark/dollar quotes over the period from April 1989 to June 1989. © 1994.

On the functional relationship between tariffs and welfare

This paper uses a model of trade in two commodities between two countries to establish the following proposition. If the foreign offer curve has no points of inflection and if for each home rate of duty the equilibrium most favorable to the home country is selected (or else there is only one equilibrium), then as the rate of duty increases from zero, home welfare first rises then declines while foreign welfare steadily falls. © 1975.

The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly

Bhagwati demonstrated the nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas in the presence of monopoly. This paper also assumes domestic production to be monopolized and shows that giving import licenses or tariff revenues to the domestic producer may raise or lower the welfare cost of protection and the price paid by consumers from the price under other tariff and quota arrangements which maintain the same market share for the domestic producer. However, if the monopolist realizes that commercial policy is an instrument used to maximize the policymaker's welfare function, instead of being a goal in itself, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas re-emerges. © 1977.

Less of a Puzzle: a new look at the forward forex market

The two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology. The 'puzzles' in the forward market are re-examined. The model is able to account for: (a) the low volatility of the forward discount; (b) the higher volatility of expected forward speculative profit; (c) the even higher volatility of the spot return; (d) the persistence in the forward discount; (e) the martingale behavior of spot exchange rates; and (f) the negative covariance between the expected spot return and expected forward speculative profit. It is unable to account for the forward market bias because the volatility of the expected spot return is too large relative to the volatility of the expected forward speculative profit.