"The land is mine" : from tenancy to family farm ownership /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Ownership Structure, Board Composition and Entrepreneurship : Evidence from Family Firms and Venture-Capital Backed Firms

The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture-capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium-sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non-family firms that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often-argued-for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners’ inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.

Entrepreneurship and family firms : growth and survival

Family businesses dominate in a majority of economies (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma, 2005; Morck and Yeung, 2004). As entrepreneurial activities have been shown to be central to economic growth it is essential that family businesses, irrespective of ownership patterns, not only survive but also grow thus growing the economy overall. While a great deal is known about entrepreneurial activities and a body of knowledge is being developed in relation to entrepreneurial processes in family firms, more needs to be understood in relation to the dynamics of entrepreneurial activities at the individual family firm level. One area of particular interest is the dynamics within the business and the family and how these dynamics impact upon entrepreneurial activities. Specifically how relationships between and among family members engaged in the business can interact with professional non-family member senior executives. The senior executives can actively use their positions in such ways that initiatives suggested by family members are less successful than they might be. This paper addresses how ‘family’ aspects of a business can assist or impede the entrepreneurial activities of individuals. It takes into account some of the unique features of family businesses – such as the importance of ‘familiness’ as a competitive advantage; the direct links between ownership and control of a business and the recognition (often implicit) that individuals in families do make a difference to how the business functions (Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Sharma, 2004; and Tokarczyk, Hansen Green, and Down, 2007). This emphasis on individuals in families fits well with the idea of entrepreneur as individual, as expressed by Schumpeter (1934), Baumol et al (2007). The theoretical approach that adopted to explore the dynamics of processes occurring within family firms is structuration theory combined with a theory of embeddeness (Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999; Giddens, 1979, 1984, Jack and Anderson, 2002; and Sarason, Dean and Dillard, 2006).

Optimal monitoring in family-owned companies? Evidence from Asia

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. Research Findings: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Board of Directors, Family Firms, Monitoring.

Goreen Narrkwarren Ngrn-tuora : healthy family air : a literature review

This paper will focus on the literature review for Goreen Narrkwarren Ngrn-toura- Healthy Family Air, formerly known as Reducing smoking amongst pregnant Aboriginal women in Victoria: An Holistic Approach. Before we outline the findings from the literature review, we will provide some background information on the project, including why it is important and what and who are involved.

Why do family firms congregate in certain industries?

We propose that family firm involvement and performance across industries is not random and is related to specific industry conditions. Using the population of listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2007 we find that family firms are more involved in industries with more fixed assets, consistent with the long-term view of family owners, and in industry conditions that make it potentially easier for family owners to consume private benefits of control. Overall, we document a positive relationship between family firm involvement and performance, which indicates a net advantage for family firm shareholders in industries where family firms congregate. However, we also find that family firm performance is negatively affected when family firms use more debt and maintain a higher control wedge than their industry counterparts.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

Ownership, corporate governance and timeliness of price discovery : Australian evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s ownership and corporate governance affect its timeliness of price discovery, which is referred to as the speed of incorporation of value-relevant information into the stock price. Using a panel data of 1,138 Australian firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, we predict and find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of price discovery. We test the identity of the largest shareholder and find that only firms with family as the largest shareholder exhibit faster price discovery. There is no evidence that suggests that the presence of a second largest shareholder affects the timeliness of price discovery materially. Although we find a positive association between corporate governance quality and the timeliness of price discovery, as expected, there is no interaction effect between the largest shareholding and corporate governance in relation to the timeliness of price discovery. Further tests show no evidence of severe endogeneity problems in our study.

Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to stock liquidity in the Caribbean. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. The identity of the largest shareholder also matters: family firms and firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity.

Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings : Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.

Transfers of Family Businesses to Non-Family Buyers - The Selling Business Family Perspective

This study focuses on business families and how they handle transitions such as business transfers. It also tries to shift the balance of research away from successions and towards business transfers as a key topic for family business researchers. In addition, it contributes to the family business research field by further highlighting the importance of the various different contributions in the family business from business family members other than the entrepreneurial founder. Based on interviews with both business family members and business brokers, it appears as important for business families who are selling their family business that it is managed in a similar way in the future regardless of the shift in ownership and management. It is also important that the employees can stay with the business. However, employees are seldom regarded as potential buyers of the family business; most preferably, from the point of view of business family members, this should be somebody who is similar to themselves. Business transfers can be lengthy processes, but once the family business is sold, previous owners most often want to leave the family business. This disengagement can be difficult for business family members if they have not managed to build up some other identity outside the family business environment. Money may compensate for the loss in the short run, but something else is needed in the long run, since the management of money is usually not perceived as that interesting. A family business transfer can have great influence on the members of the business family who is selling, and therefore it is suggested that personal due diligence could be of some help when planning the transfer. That tool can help business family members to analyse their own personal situation, but it may also make it easier to understand how the other business family members feel about the forthcoming change. Everyone is influenced in different ways during a family business transfer, and awareness of this fact may make it easier for the whole business family to adjust to their new environment.

Joint ownership and beneficial entitlement: Stack v Dowden.

Explores the issue of the share of beneficial entitlement to the family home where the legal title is jointly owned, but where there has not been an express declaration of a beneficial joint tenancy. Discusses the House of Lords judgment in Stack v Dowden which addressed this point. Explains how the judges moved the focus away from the court imposing its own sense of fairness on the parties or imputing an intention based on the circumstances to one where the concentration will be on the parties' relevant conduct. Outlines three other points of interest referred to in the judgment: (1) whether an indirect financial contribution could support a constructive trust; (2) whether proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trusts should be assimilated; and (3) whether a mortgage liability is equivalent to a financial contribution.

Family Histories and Rural Inheritance in Kenya

Inheritance systems and practices have a key role in people’s ability to exit poverty, or, conversely, plunging them further into it. As land is the major asset in low-income developing countries, how property is passed on and divided between future generations is a significant factor. This paper looks at inheritance through minimally-structured interviews with several generations of Kenyan families, seeking to explain that the how and why of poverty can be understood in the wider family context. It analyses their fortunes and misfortunes over a given time period in the context of property ownership rights. It also looks at the impact of education and the inheritance of cultural capital. When both fertility and survival are high, traditional patterns of land inheritance can lead to progression sub-division of land with long-term adverse implications for sustainability. While inheritance in Kenya is male dominated, the paper nonetheless examines the position of women in the chain as vectors of male property rights. The application of male-oriented customary law where inheritance is concerned, rather than the use of statutory legislation, was found to be the reality for the overwhelming majority of the participants in the study.

Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance in Victorian Britain

Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.