The stationary distribution of a continuously varying strategy in a class-structured population under mutation-selection-drift balance.

Many traits and/or strategies expressed by organisms are quantitative phenotypes. Because populations are of finite size and genomes are subject to mutations, these continuously varying phenotypes are under the joint pressure of mutation, natural selection and random genetic drift. This article derives the stationary distribution for such a phenotype under a mutation-selection-drift balance in a class-structured population allowing for demographically varying class sizes and/or changing environmental conditions. The salient feature of the stationary distribution is that it can be entirely characterized in terms of the average size of the gene pool and Hamilton's inclusive fitness effect. The exploration of the phenotypic space varies exponentially with the cumulative inclusive fitness effect over state space, which determines an adaptive landscape. The peaks of the landscapes are those phenotypes that are candidate evolutionary stable strategies and can be determined by standard phenotypic selection gradient methods (e.g. evolutionary game theory, kin selection theory, adaptive dynamics). The curvature of the stationary distribution provides a measure of the stability by convergence of candidate evolutionary stable strategies, and it is evaluated explicitly for two biological scenarios: first, a coordination game, which illustrates that, for a multipeaked adaptive landscape, stochastically stable strategies can be singled out by letting the size of the gene pool grow large; second, a sex-allocation game for diploids and haplo-diploids, which suggests that the equilibrium sex ratio follows a Beta distribution with parameters depending on the features of the genetic system.

Heterogeneity, selection and labor market disparities

We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firmsand workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costlyscreening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of theresulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the bestworkers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs.In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is not sufficiently dispersed to justify screening,thereby confirming the belief that effort is not so important. The model has implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, sorting patternsbetween firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explaining observedcross-country variation in socio-economic and labor market outcomes.

Statistical Inference for Computable General Equilibrium Models with Application to a Model of the Moroccan Economy

We study the problem of measuring the uncertainty of CGE (or RBC)-type model simulations associated with parameter uncertainty. We describe two approaches for building confidence sets on model endogenous variables. The first one uses a standard Wald-type statistic. The second approach assumes that a confidence set (sampling or Bayesian) is available for the free parameters, from which confidence sets are derived by a projection technique. The latter has two advantages: first, confidence set validity is not affected by model nonlinearities; second, we can easily build simultaneous confidence intervals for an unlimited number of variables. We study conditions under which these confidence sets take the form of intervals and show they can be implemented using standard methods for solving CGE models. We present an application to a CGE model of the Moroccan economy to study the effects of policy-induced increases of transfers from Moroccan expatriates.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Bayesian estimation and selection of nonlinear vector error correction models: The case of the sugar-ethanol-oil nexus in Brazil

Nonlinear adjustment toward long-run price equilibrium relationships in the sugar-ethanol-oil nexus in Brazil is examined. We develop generalized bivariate error correction models that allow for cointegration between sugar, ethanol, and oil prices, where dynamic adjustments are potentially nonlinear functions of the disequilibrium errors. A range of models are estimated using Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain algorithms and compared using Bayesian model selection methods. The results suggest that the long-run drivers of Brazilian sugar prices are oil prices and that there are nonlinearities in the adjustment processes of sugar and ethanol prices to oil price but linear adjustment between ethanol and sugar prices.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Dominance and the maintenance of polymorphism in multiallelic migration-selection models with two demes

The maintenance of genetic variation in a spatially heterogeneous environment has been one of the main research themes in theoretical population genetics. Despite considerable progress in understanding the consequences of spatially structured environments on genetic variation, many problems remain unsolved. One of them concerns the relationship between the number of demes, the degree of dominance, and the maximum number of alleles that can be maintained by selection in a subdivided population. In this work, we study the potential of maintaining genetic variation in a two-deme model with deme-independent degree of intermediate dominance, which includes absence of G x E interaction as a special case. We present a thorough numerical analysis of a two-deme three-allele model, which allows us to identify dominance and selection patterns that harbor the potential for stable triallelic equilibria. The information gained by this approach is then used to construct an example in which existence and asymptotic stability of a fully polymorphic equilibrium can be proved analytically. Noteworthy, in this example the parameter range in which three alleles can coexist is maximized for intermediate migration rates. Our results can be interpreted in a specialist-generalist context and (among others) show when two specialists can coexist with a generalist in two demes if the degree of dominance is deme independent and intermediate. The dominance relation between the generalist allele and the specialist alleles play a decisive role. We also discuss linear selection on a quantitative trait and show that G x E interaction is not necessary for the maintenance of more than two alleles in two demes.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Integration versus Outsourcing in Stable Industry Equilibrium with Communication Networks

For the selection of a firm's structure between vertical integration and arm's-length outsourcing, the importance of the thickness of the market had been emphasized in the previous literature. Here we take account of communication networks such as telephone, telex, fax, and the Internet. By doing so, we could illustrate the relationship between communication networks and the make-or-buy decision. With communication network technology differing in each type of firm, both vertically integrated firms and arm's-length outsourcing firms coexist, which was never indicated in the previous literature. However, when common network technology is introduced, such coexistence generically does not occur.

Funicularity and equilibrium for high-performance conceptual structural design

Las estructuras que trabajan por forma se caracterizan por la íntima e indisociable relación entre geometría y comportamiento estructural. Por consiguiente, la elección de una apropiada geometría es el paso previo indispensable en el diseño conceptual de dichas estructuras. En esa tarea, la selección de las posibles geometrías antifuniculares para las distribuciones de cargas permanentes más habituales son más bien limitadas y, muchas veces, son criterios no estructurales (adaptabilidad funcional, estética, proceso constructivo, etc.) los que no permiten la utilización de dichas geometrías que garantizarían el máximo aprovechamiento del material. En este contexto, esta tesis estudia la posibilidad de obtener una estructura sin momentos flectores incluso si la geometría no es antifunicular para sus cargas permanentes. En efecto, esta tesis presenta un procedimiento, basado en la estática gráfica, que demuestra cómo un conjunto de cargas adicionales, introducidas a través de un sistema de pretensado exterior con elementos post-tesos, puede eliminar los momentos flectores debidos a cargas permanentes en cualquier geometría plana. Esto se traduce en una estructura antifunicular que proporciona respuestas innovadoras a demandas conjuntas de versatilidad arquitectónica y optimización del material. Dicha metodología gráfica ha sido implementada en un software distribuido libremente (EXOEQUILIBRIUM), donde el análisis estructural y la variación geométrica están incluidos en el mismo entorno interactivo y paramétrico. La utilización de estas herramientas permite más versatilidad en la búsqueda de nuevas formas eficientes, lo cual tiene gran importancia en el diseño conceptual de estructuras, liberando al ingeniero de la limitación del propio cálculo y de la incomprensión del comportamiento estructural, facilitando extraordinariamente el hecho creativo a la luz de una metodología de este estilo. Esta tesis incluye la aplicación de estos procedimientos a estructuras de cualquier geometría y distribución inicial de cargas, así como el estudio de diferentes posibles criterios de diseño para optimizar la posición del sistema de post-tesado. Además, la metodología ha sido empleada en el proyecto de maquetas a escala reducida y en la construcción de un pabellón hecho enteramente de cartón, lo que ha permitido obtener una validación física del procedimiento desarrollado. En definitiva, esta tesis expande de manera relevante el rango de posibles geometrías antifuniculares y abre enormes posibilidades para el diseño de estructuras que combinan eficiencia estructural y flexibilidad arquitectónica.Curved structures are characterized by the critical relationship between their geometry and structural behaviour, and selecting an appropriate shape in the conceptual design of such structures is important for achieving materialefficiency. However, the set of bending-free geometries are limited and, often, non-structural design criteria (e.g., usability, architectural needs, aesthetics) prohibit the selection of purely funicular or antifunicular shapes. In response to this issue, this thesis studies the possibility of achieving an axial-only behaviour even if the geometry departs from the ideally bending-free shape. This dissertation presents a new design approach, based on graphic statics that shows how bending moments in a two-dimensional geometry can be eliminated by adding forces through an external post-tensioning system. This results in bending-free structures that provide innovative answers to combined demands on versatility and material optimization. The graphical procedure has been implemented in a free-downloadable design-driven software (EXOEQUILIBRIUM) where structural performance evaluations and geometric variation are embedded within an interactive and parametric working environment. This provides greater versatility in finding new efficient structural configurations during the first design stages, bridging the gap between architectural shaping and structural analysis. The thesis includes the application of the developed graphical procedure to shapes with random curvature and distribution of loads. Furthermore, the effect of different design criteria on the internal force distribution has been analyzed. Finally, the construction of reduced- and large-scale models provides further physical validation of the method and insights about the structural behaviour of these structures. In summary, this work strongly expands the range of possible forms that exhibit a bending-free behaviour and, de facto, opens up new possibilities for designs that combine high-performing solutions with architectural freedom.

In vitro selection of RNA molecules that displace cocaine from the membrane-bound nicotinic acetylcholine receptor

The nicotinic acetylcholine receptor (AChR) controls signal transmission between cells in the nervous system. Abused drugs such as cocaine inhibit this receptor. Transient kinetic investigations indicate that inhibitors decrease the channel-opening equilibrium constant [Hess, G. P. & Grewer, C. (1998) Methods Enzymol. 291, 443–473]. Can compounds be found that compete with inhibitors for their binding site but do not change the channel-opening equilibrium? The systematic evolution of RNA ligands by exponential enrichment methodology and the AChR in Torpedo californica electroplax membranes were used to find RNAs that can displace inhibitors from the receptor. The selection of RNA ligands was carried out in two consecutive steps: (i) a gel-shift selection of high-affinity ligands bound to the AChR in the electroplax membrane, and (ii) subsequent use of nitrocellulose filters to which both the membrane-bound receptor and RNAs bind strongly, but from which the desired RNA can be displaced from the receptor by a high-affinity AChR inhibitor, phencyclidine. After nine selection rounds, two classes of RNA molecules that bind to the AChR with nanomolar affinities were isolated and sequenced. Both classes of RNA molecules are displaced by phencyclidine and cocaine from their binding site on the AChR. Class I molecules are potent inhibitors of AChR activity in BC3H1 muscle cells, as determined by using the whole-cell current-recording technique. Class II molecules, although competing with AChR inhibitors, do not affect receptor activity in this assay; such compounds or derivatives may be useful for alleviating the toxicity experienced by millions of addicts.

A demographic approach to selection

The concepts of demography provide a means of combining the ecological approach to population growth with the genetical approach to natural selection. We have utilized the demographic theory of natural selection developed by Norton and Charlesworth to analyze life history schedules of births and deaths for populations of genotypes in Drosophila pseudoobscura. Our populations illustrate a stable genetic equilibrium, an unstable genetic equilibrium, and a case of no equilibrium. We have estimated population growth rates and Darwinian fitnesses of the genotypes and have explored the role of population growth in determining natural selection. The age-specific rates of births and deaths provide insights into components of selection. Both viability and fertility are important components in our populations.

Petroleomics By Electrospray Ionization Ft-icr Mass Spectrometry Coupled To Partial Least Squares With Variable Selection Methods: Prediction Of The Total Acid Number Of Crude Oils.

Negative-ion mode electrospray ionization, ESI(-), with Fourier transform ion cyclotron resonance mass spectrometry (FT-ICR MS) was coupled to a Partial Least Squares (PLS) regression and variable selection methods to estimate the total acid number (TAN) of Brazilian crude oil samples. Generally, ESI(-)-FT-ICR mass spectra present a power of resolution of ca. 500,000 and a mass accuracy less than 1 ppm, producing a data matrix containing over 5700 variables per sample. These variables correspond to heteroatom-containing species detected as deprotonated molecules, [M - H](-) ions, which are identified primarily as naphthenic acids, phenols and carbazole analog species. The TAN values for all samples ranged from 0.06 to 3.61 mg of KOH g(-1). To facilitate the spectral interpretation, three methods of variable selection were studied: variable importance in the projection (VIP), interval partial least squares (iPLS) and elimination of uninformative variables (UVE). The UVE method seems to be more appropriate for selecting important variables, reducing the dimension of the variables to 183 and producing a root mean square error of prediction of 0.32 mg of KOH g(-1). By reducing the size of the data, it was possible to relate the selected variables with their corresponding molecular formulas, thus identifying the main chemical species responsible for the TAN values.

Selection And Validation Of Reference Genes For Functional Studies In The Calliphoridae Family.

The genera Cochliomyia and Chrysomya contain both obligate and saprophagous flies, which allows the comparison of different feeding habits between closely related species. Among the different strategies for comparing these habits is the use of qPCR to investigate the expression levels of candidate genes involved in feeding behavior. To ensure an accurate measure of the levels of gene expression, it is necessary to normalize the amount of the target gene with the amount of a reference gene having a stable expression across the compared species. Since there is no universal gene that can be used as a reference in functional studies, candidate genes for qPCR data normalization were selected and validated in three Calliphoridae (Diptera) species, Cochliomyia hominivorax Coquerel, Cochliomyia macellaria Fabricius, and Chrysomya albiceps Wiedemann . The expression stability of six genes ( Actin, Gapdh, Rp49, Rps17, α -tubulin, and GstD1) was evaluated among species within the same life stage and between life stages within each species. The expression levels of Actin, Gapdh, and Rp49 were the most stable among the selected genes. These genes can be used as reliable reference genes for functional studies in Calliphoridae using similar experimental settings.

Strict Criteria For Selection Of Laparoscopy For Women With Adnexal Mass.

We compared the indication of laparoscopy for treatment of adnexal masses based on the risk scores and tumor diameters with the indication based on gynecology-oncologists' experience. This was a prospective study of 174 women who underwent surgery for adnexal tumors (116 laparotomies, 58 laparoscopies). The surgeries begun and completed by laparoscopy, with benign pathologic diagnosis, were considered successful. Laparoscopic surgeries that required conversion to laparotomy, led to a malignant diagnosis, or facilitated cyst rupture were considered failures. Two groups were defined for laparoscopy indication: (1) absence of American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) guideline for referral of high-risk adnexal masses criteria (ACOG negative) associated with 3 different tumor sizes (10, 12, and 14 cm); and (2) Index of Risk of Malignancy (IRM) with cutoffs at 100, 200, and 300, associated with the same 3 tumor sizes. Both groups were compared with the indication based on the surgeon's experience to verify whether the selection based on strict rules would improve the rate of successful laparoscopy. ACOG-negative and tumors ≤10 cm and IRM with a cutoff at 300 points and tumors ≤10cm resulted in the same best performance (78% success = 38/49 laparoscopies). However, compared with the results of the gynecology-oncologists' experience, those were not statistically significant. The selection of patients with adnexal mass to laparoscopy by the use of the ACOG guideline or IRM associated with tumor diameter had similar performance as the experience of gynecology-oncologists. Both methods are reproducible and easy to apply to all women with adnexal masses and could be used by general gynecologists to select women for laparoscopic surgery; however, referral to a gynecology-oncologist is advisable when there is any doubt.