Proposal for a Stabilisation Fund for the EMU. CEPS Working Document No. 385, 14 October 2013

This paper argues that it should be possible to complement Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union with an insurance-type shock absorption mechanism to increase the resilience of member countries to economic shocks and reduce output volatility. Such a mechanism would neither require the establishment of a central authority, nor would it lead to permanent transfers between countries. For this mechanism to become a reality, however, it would be necessary to overcome certain technical problems linked to the difficulty of anticipating correctly the position of an economy in the business cycle.

Policy recommendations for the new European Commission: priorities for stabilising EMU. EPC Discussion Paper, 30 September 2014

The euro area crisis exposed substantial structural flaws in the currency area’s architecture. Addressing these flaws this discussion paper explores the ways in which the European Institutions can re-evaluate and overcome challenges for a more positive European future. To do this, Janis A. Emmanouilidis, Jan David Schneider, and Fabian Zuleeg recommend that the coming European Commission should develop a new framework to assess the real returns to growth of public and social investment, which could open the path for more flexibility on deficits in future. In close coordination with the European Parliament, the Commission should also review the Country Specific Recommendations with a stronger focus on a smaller number of key priorities for each country. The construction of a fiscal capacity should be made a priority in the new political cycle to resolve the absence of a mechanism to provide effective ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the Eurozone. Furthermore, to boost growth, there is a need to encourage private, public and social investment through a European Investment Programme (EIP) in the short term. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the implementation of an EIP is compatible with the long term goals of a fiscal capacity.

The growth challenge for Europe and the EMU. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22- Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

The European economy is slowly and painfully striving to reemerge from the last six years of crisis. It was a crisis of enormous intensity and contagiousness, given the unprecedented depth of global financial integration combined with the systemic flaws in the EMU architecture. And it is not over, as the high levels of unemployment and the growing divergence between Member States testify. The threat of fragmentation is imminent as ever: fragmentation between euro-ins and euro-outs; fragmentation between North and South; fragmentation within societies, with increasing income inequality and a growing number of, what used to be, the middle class population slipping through the social safety net and below poverty lines. Policies of front-loaded fiscal consolidation have left welfare states in economically weaker countries severely underfunded. According to OECD data, the number of people living in households without any income from work has doubled in Greece, Ireland and Spain, and has risen by 20% or more in Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovenia. Fertility rates have dropped further since the crisis, deepening the demographic and fiscal challenges of ageing. There are long-term implications from these deteriorating trends, regarding people's long-term health, education and upward mobility from low-income families. It is also highly likely that many of the people unemployed for a long period of time will never again be able to gain proper access to the job market and build a normal career track. The enduring effects of the crisis risk creating vicious cycles of low growth, high debt levels, austerity, declining productivity, and stagnation. These developments carry heavy implications for the future growth prospects of the European economies, for future prosperity, and for the sustainability of pension systems and welfare states. They must be urgently reversed.

Designing a Genuine EMU: Which "Unions" for EU and Eurozone? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 34/2014

The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.

A stronger, growth-oriented surveillance for EMU. EuropEos Commentary No. 1, 19 April 2010

This Commentary finds that the recent adjustment measures taken by the Greek government in combination with the financial support proffered by the Eurogroup may not be sufficient to deal with the risk of instability in EMU in the longer term. The author argues that other imbalances, most notably the current account imbalances within EMU, need to be addressed to avoid a deflation spiral that would aggravate sustainability problems in highly indebted countries. The Greek crisis highlights the need to take steps to strengthen the economic governance of the euro area. A key component of these steps would be a stronger, growth-oriented, surveillance.

Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This CEPS Special Report investigates ways to enhance the legitimacy of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without introducing Treaty changes. It suggests changes in the governance framework at both the institutional and economic level. Input-oriented legitimacy can be improved by increasing parliamentary oversight on decisions related to EMU and increasing the accountability of the Eurogroup. Output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to reduce the emergence of negative externalities and to mitigate their impact, through market and fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms.

EMU Convergence: Reason for Encouragement. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 6, 2007

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether convergence is actually occurring within Europe, which groups of countries are converging, and the macroeconomic indicators for which such convergence is apparent. Free trade and a single currency should lead to convergence in rates of inflation, but perhaps not in unemployment rates or in GDP growth. These latter aspects of economic performance are politically important, because the voters become decidedly displeased if unemployment is high and growth slow, as has been the case in France, Germany, and Italy during recent years.

Inflation and Unemployment In EMU and the United States. ACES Working Papers No. 10, 2008

The original purpose of this paper was to see why the Phillips Curve numbers seem to be so much worse for the EMU countries than the United States since EMU was began operation in 1990. The problem is that there is no evidence of a Phillips curve relationship in EMU or in the United States during this seventeen year period. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, it just is not there. In about half the years unemployment and inflation moved in the opposite direction, as Phillips would predict, but in other half of the years they moved in the same direction. This may be a matter of time lags, with unemployment lagging inflation, but it seems clear that the Phillips curve is a poor tool for explaining these year to year outcomes in Europe or the United States.

Case sequence segments for EMU, ECB and Eurozone: A Eurozone country profile and related Euro matters. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

No European country employs a U.S.-style electoral college in presidential elections. Presidents with largely ceremonial functions are elected in some countries by the national parliament or a special assembly (Germany, Italy, Estonia, Turkey and others) or by the people in other countries (Greece, Poland, Slovakia and others). The presidents of Cyprus, Finland, France, Russia and Ukraine -- who have real decision-making power -- are elected directly by the voters. Keep in mind that no two countries are exactly alike in their institutional and electoral arrangements; all of these institutions and electoral systems are capable of being modified and adapted to suit national peculiarities and preferences.

Current Account ‘Core-Periphery Dualism’ in the EMU. CEPS Working Document No. 406/March 2015

Current account dispersion within EU member states has been increasing since the 1990s. Interestingly, the persistent deficits in many peripheral countries have not been accompanied by a significant growth process that is able to stimulate a long-run rebalancing, as neoclassical theory predicts. To shed light on the issue this paper investigates the determinants of eurozone current account imbalances, focusing on the role played by financial integration. The analysis considers two samples of 22 OECD and 15 EU countries; three time horizons corresponding to various steps in European integration; different control variables; and several panel econometric methods. The results suggest that within the OECD and EU groups, financial integration helped to explain CA deterioration in the peripheral countries, especially in the post-EMU period. The business cycle seems to have played a growing role over time, whereas the role of competiveness seems to have diminished.

The politics of the “EMU governance”. European Policy Brief No. 7, February 2012

On 6 February 2012, Yves Bertoncini participated in a conference on European economic governance organized by Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations. This Policy Brief is based on his intervention at the conference. The author pleads for a more encompassing form of EMU governance, which should be accompanied by a clarification of its democratic dimension.

Banking Union: are the EMU design mistakes being repeated? European Policy Brief No. 12, October 2012

This Policy Brief pleads for an unambiguous commitment by eurozone leaders to establishing a Banking Union that is based on all three of its pillars: common supervision, a single bank resolution authority and a joint deposit insurance. There is a clear risk that the EU will agree on common supervision, but subsequently fails to put in place the remaining elements of its Banking Union. By doing so, the EU would make the same mistake as when it designed EMU, namely, creating a system with built-in flaws that risks leading to huge costs and a questioning of the European project as such.

Is the EMU ready for future shocks? An overview of available backstops. European Policy Brief No. 20, March 2014

In recent years much has been accomplished to make the EMU more resilient to banking crises, sovereign-debt crises or balance-of-payment crises. Several ‘backstops’ or financial safety nets were progressively put in place to absorb the shocks that could have otherwise broken the EMU as a system. These substantial advances reflected a gradual, trial-and-error approach rather than a grand design that would have completely overhauled the EMU architecture. While flexibility and realism have advantages, complacency is a clear risk. With no roadmap to follow, efforts to complete the architecture of the EMU may fade with time. Maintaining a sense of direction is crucial while potential vulnerabilities remain.

Europe on the Road to the Third Stage of EMU: Recent Evidence. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.2, 1996

The paper deals with Europe's effort to proceed to the thud stage of EMU and establish a common currency. It is argued that the success of the common currency experiment will greatly depend on the fulfillment of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, on the adoption of the proper adjustment policies as well as on the political desirability of the project. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 deals briefly with the index of criteria that define an OCA. Section 2 examines the extent to which Europe experiences common demand disturbances, while sections 3 and 4 focus on evidence about the mobility of factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital. Section 5 examines the possibility of an increase in trade volume across the EU under fixed exchange rates or a common currency regime. Section 6 sheds light on the possibility of the EURO (the ex-ECU} to become a vehicle currency in the international financial system, and Section 7 is concerned with the benefits and costs of the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB), paying special attention to seigniorage revenues. Section 8 deals with the necessity of establishing an EU federal mechanism facilitating adjustment. Section 9 sketches out a proper role for a hegemonic power in a common currency regime. Finally, section 10 examines EMU prospects during the transitional period. The paper closes with some concluding remarks, where the role of politics and coordination of economic policies are particularly emphasized as of cardinal importance on the road to the third stage of EMU.