From Rights to Compassion: The D Case and Contemporary Abortion Politics

This chapter is concerned with exploring the dynamics of contemporary debate on women’s reproductive choices and rights in the somewhat transformed social, political and economic context of the Republic of Ireland. News coverage of the events of April and May 2007 provide the focus of attention, as the case of ‘D’, a 17 year old in the temporary care of the state, seeking to terminate her pregnancy after a diagnosis of severe foetal abnormality, became yet again a focus of public debate on abortion access within the state. The analysis explores how the issues this case raised were framed in the public domain, in order to consider the shifting moral grammar shaping the debate. The paper explores the ways in which this case illustrates the ongoing tensions between changing characterisations of Irishness, and the social dynamics of access to reproductive rights, particularly for national minors in the care of the state.

Preliminary Results of a Prospective Randomized Trial of Restrictive Versus Standard Fluid Regime in Elective Open Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Repair

Background: Open abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repair is associated with a significant morbidity (primarily respiratory and cardiac complications) and an overall mortality rate of 4% to 10%. We tested the hypothesis that perioperative fluid restriction would reduce complications and improve outcome after elective open AAA repair.

The current state of abortion law and practice in Northern Ireland

This paper reviews current abortion law and practice in Northern Ireland (NI). It explores the origins of NI's abortion law and its complexity in relation to current practice. it reviews issues relating to women seeking terminations in NI and Great Britain and reviews attempts by the Family Planning Association NI to require the Department of Health and Social Services and Public Safety NI to provide guidance for health professionals engaged in this practice. The paper also discusses some of the issues surrounding abortion in NI and seeks to explain why this subject is causing controversy and debate, especially following a judicial review in February and Marie Stopes opening a termination service in Belfast.

Framing Wrongs, Performing Rights in Northern Ireland: Toward a Butlerian Approach to Life in Abortion Strategising

Feminist strategising on abortion has been dominated by a “pro-choice” frame. Increasingly, however, pro-choice discourse is being viewed as inadequate to meet contemporary and complex feminist aims and analyses, in particular due to the individualising ontological framework upon which it appears to be based. The work of Judith Butler is one location where such concerns have been explored and an alternative approach based upon a renewed analysis of the concept of “life” has been asserted. Foregrounding the fundamental precariousness of intersubjective life and opening the socio-political conditions sustaining precarious life to democratic public engagement carries significant implications for feminist strategising for Butler, and envisages a reconceptualisation of debate on abortion. In this article Butler’s work on life will be combined with her theoretical tool of the frame to explore space which may exist within pro-choice strategising to potentially work towards such a renewed approach to life in social debate on abortion. This space may be used to rethink feminist strategising on abortion beyond pro-choice discourse, and presents an accessible starting point from which to do so. In carrying out this analysis insights will be drawn from feminist advocacy and activism in the contingent location of Northern Ireland where recent employment of a health frame and a rights frame demonstrate instances of pro-choice strategising which may be reiterated to shift feminist activism towards more radical engagement with life as a precarious social process demanding critical attention.

You Can't Always Get What You Want: A Gewirthian Model of Rational Autonomy in Abortion

The law regulating the availability of abortion is problematic both legally and morally. It is dogmatic in its requirements of women and doctors and ignorant of would-be fathers. Practically, its usage is liberal - with s1(1)(a) Abortion Act 1967 treated as a ‘catch all’ ground - it allows abortion on demand. Yet this is not reflected in the ‘law’. Against this outdated legislation I propose a model of autonomy which seeks to tether our moral concerns with a new legal approach to abortion. I do so by maintaining that a legal conception of autonomy is derivable from the categorical imperative resulting from Gewirth’s argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency: Act in accordance with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. This model of Gewirthian Rational Autonomy, I suggest, provides a guide for both public and private notions of autonomy and how our autonomous interests can be balanced across social structures in order to legitimately empower choice. I claim, ultimately, that relevant rights in the context of abortion are derivable from this model.

Rights, Rationality and Reproduction: Balancing Interests in the Abortion Debate

As medical technology has advanced, so too have our attitudes towards the level of control we can or should expect to have over our procreative capacities. This creates a multidimensional problem for the law and family planning services in terms of access to services – whether to avoid conception or terminate a pregnancy – and the negligent provision of these services. These developments go to the heart of our perception of autonomy. Unsurprisingly, these matters also raise a moral dilemma for the law. Distinctively, discourse in this area is dominated by assertions of subjective moral value; in relation to life, to personal choice and to notions of the archetypal family. Against this, I stress that a model of objective morality can answer these challenging questions and resolve the inherent problems of legal regulation. Therefore, I argue that notions of autonomy must be based on a rational, action-based understanding of what it means to be a ‘moral agent’. I claim that from this we might support a legal standard, based on objective rational morality, which can frame our constitutional norms and our conception of justice in these contentious areas. This paper claims that the current regulation of abortion is outdated and requires radical reform. It proposes a scheme that would shift the choice towards the mother (and the father), remove the unnecessarily broad disability ground and involve doctors having a role of counsel (rather than gatekeeper).