Credit and liquidity components of corporate CDS spreads

This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.

Estudo das relações de paridade de juros para a economia brasileira no período recente

O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar se o ajustamento das condições de paridade de juros por expectativa do mercado (paridade descoberta) e por prêmios de risco (paridades coberta e descoberta) leva à validação da relação de não-arbitragem subjacente, ou pelo menos a resultados econométricos mais próximos de sua validação. Para isso, combinamos taxas de retornos de instrumentos de renda fixa domésticos e norte-americanos e aplicamos o arcabouço econométrico de séries de tempo. Como primeiro passo de investigação, aplicamos a paridade de juros (descoberta e coberta) na sua forma tradicional. No passo seguinte aplicamos os testes econométricos às condições de paridade ajustadas por um prêmio de risco. No caso da PDJ, não obtivemos resultados satisfatórios, mesmo ajustando pelos prêmios de risco. Esse ajuste propiciou uma mudança nos sinais dos coeficientes na direção correta, mas a magnitude do coeficiente da desvalorização cambial efetiva passou a destoar bastante da magnitude das outras séries. Apesar de termos obtido a validade da PCJ na forma tradicional, não esperaríamos este resultado, pois isso implicaria que o prêmio de risco país seria nulo para este período. Ajustando a PCJ pelo prêmio de risco de não-pagamento passa-se a não obter co integração entre as séries, ou seja, o prêmio de risco de não-pagamento teria um comportamento independente do prêmio futuro e do diferencial de juros. As possíveis causas para a não obtenção dos resultados esperados são: intervalo amostraI menor que 3 anos, erro de medida dos dados de survey ou tentativa do Banco Central de controlar a taxa de câmbio nominal e as taxas de juros domésticas simultaneamente.

Uma análise empírica do spread das companhias do setor de óleo e gás

Neste trabalho, utilizamos informações do mercado de credit default swap para medir os principais componentes do spread das empresas do setor de óleo e gás. Utilizando cerca de 20 empresas da indústria de óleo e gás composta por companhias de diversos ratings e aproximadamente 80 bonds, os resultados mostraram que a maior parte do spread corporativo do setor decorre do risco de inadimplemento. Também encontramos que o componente do spread não relacionado ao default é fortemente associado a algumas medidas de liquidez do mercado de bonds, sugerindo que a liquidez tem um papel importante na avaliação de títulos de renda fixa. Por outro lado, não encontramos evidências da importância de fatores tributários na explicação do componente do spread não relacionado à inadimplência.

Um teste de paridade coberta de juros, ajustada por prêmio de risco, para a economia brasileira entre 2007 e 2010

O conceito de paridade coberta de juros sugere que, na ausência de barreiras para arbitragem entre mercados, o diferencial de juros entre dois ativos, idênticos em todos os pontos relevantes, com exceção da moeda de denominação, na ausência de risco de variação cambial deve ser igual a zero. Porém, uma vez que existam riscos não diversificáveis, representados pelo risco país, inerentes a economias emergentes, os investidores exigirão uma taxa de juros maior que a simples diferença entre as taxas de juros doméstica e externa. Este estudo tem por objetivo avaliar se o ajustamento das condições de paridade coberta de juros por prêmios de risco é suficiente para a validação da relação de não-arbitragem para o mercado brasileiro, durante o período de 2007 a 2010. O risco país contamina todos os ativos financeiros emitidos em uma determinada economia e pode ser descrito como a somatória do risco de default (ou risco soberano) e do risco de conversibilidade percebidos pelo mercado. Para a estimação da equação de não arbitragem foram utilizadas regressões por Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários, parâmetros variantes no tempo (TVP) e Mínimos Quadrados Recursivos, e os resultados obtidos não são conclusivos sobre a validação da relação de paridade coberta de juros, mesmo ajustando para prêmio de risco. Erros de medidas de dados, custo de transação e intervenções e políticas restritivas no mercado de câmbio podem ter contribuído para este resultado.

Sobre o sistema de amortização linear crescente

Aiming to reach a compromise solution to the issues of default risk and the payment capacity of takers of housing loans, Jorge Oscar de Mello Flôres submited to the Banco Nacional de Habitação, which was then in charge of the Brazilian System of Housing Financing, what he named as the Linearly Increasing System of Amortization. (LISA). Following a critical analysis of the LISA, it is proposed the alternative named as the Generalyzed System of Mixed Amortization (GSMA).

From hard-peg to hard landing?: recent experiences of Argentina and Ecuador

Includes bibliography

Associação entre Síndrome de burnout, uso prejudicial de álcool e tabagismo em profissionais de enfermagem nas unidades de teripa intensiva do Hospital das Clínicas de Botucatu-UNESP

Pós-graduação em Saúde Coletiva - FMB

Credibility for sale

We develop a model where a sovereign’s incentive to repay its debt depends on the identity of its creditors. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives and thus credibility, for instance, because default would jeopardize the benefits from membership in a club (such as EU or EMU). But higher exposure also carries costs, because of reduced flexibility ex post and because official lenders may collude to extract rents. We characterize the equilibrium composition of debt across creditor groups as well as equilibrium debt prices. Our model can account for an important— and still unexplained—feature of sovereign debt crises: Official lending to sovereigns takes place only in times of debt distress and carries a favorable rate. It also offers a novel perspective on the interaction between deficits, debt overhang and the availability of official funds in determining default risk.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

Információs paradoxon a vállalkozások hitelezésében nem fizető vevő esetén (An innovation paradox in enterprise financing where buyers fail to pay)

Cikkünkben a vállalkozók külső finanszírozásának modelljét terjesztjük ki arra az - irodalom által eddig nem tárgyalt - esetre, amikor a vállalkozónak van nem fizető vevője. Szerződéselméleti megközelítésünkben a vállalkozó hitelképességére vonatkozó információ aszimmetrikus a tranzakcióban részt vevő felek között, s ez morális kockázatnak ad teret. Megfigyelhető, hogy ilyenkor a pontosan fizető vevők számára is hitelszűke lép fel. A vállalkozó és a finanszírozó közötti optimális szerződés nem fizető vevő hatására további hitelszűkösséget generál. Két esetet vizsgálunk: az egyikben a vállalkozó információs előnyben van a vevő nemfizetésére vonatkozóan, a másikban nincs ilyen előny. A két modellváltozat alapján információs paradoxon jellemzi a kialakuló finanszírozási helyzetet: a vállalkozó kisebb összegű hitelhez jut az említett információs előnye esetén, mint amikor közte és a finanszírozó között szimmetrikus az információ. A modell azt a - magyar kis- és középvállalkozóknál látott - jelenséget írja le, amikor nem transzparens a szállító-vevő viszonya, és a finanszírozó bank e miatt az információs hátrány miatt kevesebb hitelt nyújt kis- és középvállalati ügyfeleinek. _____ The model of external financing of the firm is extended here to cases where there may be defaults on account receivables. Information asymmetry between entrepreneur and lender on a firm's creditworthiness leads to moral hazard and credit rationing, even in the absence of default risk. The authors show an optimal debt contract that formulates the situation, and focus on two cases: where the entrepreneur has an information advantage on defaults on receivables, and where the information is symmetric. A comparison of these cases revealed a paradoxical knowledge issue in external financing: a better informed entrepreneur may be able to afford a smaller financing ability. The model describes a frequent phenomenon in small businesses, when the relationship between buyer and seller lacks transparency, and lenders offer lower amount of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises.

Monetáris hatásosság közösségi szinten (The community level efficiency of monetary policy)

A monetáris integráció központi szereplője a Közösség jegybankja. A közös valuta értékállóságának közvetlenül fő meghatározója a jegybank. Mozgásterét azonban több tényező alakítja. E tanulmány az intézményi és stratégiai, a tagállami (decentralizált fiskális) és a pénzpiaci környezet függvényében vizsgálja az Európai Központi Bank (ECB) lehetőségeit és monetáris politikájának hatásosságát. / === / The efficiency of the European Economic and Monetary Union is a big dilemma of European applied economics. The first part introduces the monetary policy made by ECB. Rates and objectives are the framework of efficiency analysis. The second part details the common pool resource problem in the community of EMU countries, and describes the prisoner's dilemma of indebting in a currency community. The EMU practice shows free riding behavior of many member states what generally causes higher default risks. The increasing indebtedness shows dysfunction too, as the ECB must adjust the interest rate to the higher default risk which means cost premiums for fiscally disciplined countries as well. The third part analyses the efficiency of the ECB through the standards of monetary transmission. The updated criteria can explain any success or failure of the ECB in a not perfectly homogeneous community. The measures of transmission used in the study are the way of financing (banks vs. market), terms of financing, structure of the banking sector, private sector indebtedness, structure of savings and wealth, price elasticity, interest rate elasticity, wage elasticity. They show that the single monetary policy can create tension in the community not only because of the fiscal differences but also due to money market discrepancies.

Essays on Banking Competition

I study local shocks to consumer credit supply arising from the opening

of bank-related retail stores. Bank-related store openings coincide with

sharp increases in credit card placements in the neighborhood of the

store, in the months surrounding the store opening, and with the bank

that owns the store. I exploit this relationship to instrument for new

credit cards at the individual level, and find that obtaining a new

credit card sharply increases total borrowing as well as default risk,

particularly for risky and opaque borrowers. In line with theories of

default externality, I observe that existing lenders react to the

increased consumer borrowing and associated riskiness by contracting

their own supply. In particular, in the year following the issuance of a

new credit card, banks without links to stores reduce credit card limits

by 24-51%, offsetting most of the initial increase in total credit

limits.

Leverage, Volatile Future Earnings Growth and Expected Stock Returns

We provide theory and evidence to complement Choi's [RFS, 2013] important new insights on the returns to equity in `value' firms. We show that higher future earnings growth ameliorates the value-reducing effect of leverage and, because the market for earnings is incomplete, reduces the earnings-risk sensitivity of the default option. Ceteris paribus, a levered firm with low (high) earnings growth is more sensitive to the first (second) of these effects thus generating higher (lower) expected returns. We demonstrate this by modeling equity as an Asian-style call option on net earnings and find significant empirical support for our hypotheses.