Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Nominal versus indexed debt: A quantitative horse race

The main arguments in favor and against nominal and indexed debts are the incentive to default through inflation versus hedging against unforeseen shocks. We model and calibrate these arguments to assess their quantitative importance. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortion, government outlays uncertainty, and contingent-debt service. Our framework also recognizes that contingent debt can be associated with incentive problems and lack of commitment. Thus, the benefits of unexpected inflation are tempered by higher interest rates. We obtain that costs from inflation more than offset the benefits from reducing tax distortions. We further discuss sustainability of nominal debt in developing (volatile) countries. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Stabilization constraints from different-average public debt levels in a Monetary Union with country-size asymmetry

In the sequence of the recent financial and economic crisis, the recent public debt accumulation is expected to hamper considerably business cycle stabilization, by enlarging the budgetary consequences of the shocks. This paper analyses how the average level of public debt in a monetary union shapes optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary stabilization policies and affects stabilization welfare. We use a two-country micro-founded New-Keynesian model, where a benevolent central bank and the fiscal authorities play discretionary policy games under different union-average debt-constrained scenarios. We find that high debt levels shift monetary policy assignment from inflation to debt stabilization, making cooperation welfare superior to noncooperation. Moreover, when average debt is too high, welfare moves directly (inversely) with debt-to-output ratios for the union and the large country (small country) under cooperation. However, under non-cooperation, higher average debt levels benefit only the large country.

Deflation and monetary policy: A look into Japan and the Euro Area

With more than two decades of weak economic performance since the bubble burst in the ‘90s, the Japanese deflationary scenario has become the economic fate every developed economy fears to become. As the euro area continues to experience sustained low inflation, studying the Japanese monetary policy may shed light on how to prevent persistent deflation. Using an SVAR methodology to understand the monetary transmission mechanism, we find some evidence that the euro area may possess characteristics that would eventually lead to a deflationary scenario. The extent of whether it would suffer the same Japanese fate would depend on how macroeconomic policies are timely coordinated as a response to its liquidity problem and increasing public debt across member states.

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

"Published online: 19 Oct 2015"

Interactions between fiscal and monetary policy

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

We analyse the implications of optimal taxation for the stochastic behaviour of debt. We show that when a government pursues an optimal fiscal policy under complete markets, the value of debt has the same or less persistence than other variables in the economy and it declines in response to shocks that cause the deficit to increase. By contrast, under incomplete markets debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases in response to shocks that cause a higher deficit. Data for US government debt reveals diametrically opposite results from those of complete markets and is much more supportive of bond market incompleteness.

Fiscal insurance and debt management in OECD economies

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

When is Monetary Policy All we Need?

We consider optimal monetary and scal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need - analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, rstly, that this is even when true when allowing for in ation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as long as there is no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative prices rather than demand.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

Indexed versus nominal government debt under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed bonds a much better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds become a better store of value relative to indexed bonds. These results are robust to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that indexation is lagged is crucial. From a policy perspective, a key finding is that accounting for optimal indexation has important welfare implications for comparisons of IT and PT.

Shocking policy coefficients

This paper proposes an empirical framework to study the effects of a policy regime change defined as an unpredictable and permanent change in the policy parameters. In particular I show how to make conditional forecast and perform impulse response functions and counterfactual analysis. As an application, the effects of changes in fiscal policy rules in the US are investigated. I find that discretionary fiscal policy has become more countercyclical over the last decades. In absence of such a change, surplus would have been higher, debt lower and output gap more volatile but only until mid 80s. An increase in the degree of counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy has a positive effect on output gap in periods where the level of debt-to-GDP ratio is low and a zero or negative effect when the ratio is high. This explains why a more countercylical stance of the systematic fiscal policy taking place in 2008:II is predicted to be rather ineffective for recovering from the crisis.

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

This paper tests for the market environment within which US fiscal policyoperates, that is we test for the incompleteness of the US government bondmarket. We document the stochastic properties of US debt and deficits andthen consider the ability of competing optimal tax models to account forthis behaviour. We show that when a government pursues an optimal taxpolicy and issues a full set of contingent claims, the value of debthas the same or less persistence than other variables in the economyand declines in response to higher deficit shocks. By contrast, ifgovernments only issue one-period risk free bonds (incomplete markets),debt shows more persistence than other variables and it increases inresponse to expenditure shocks. Maintaining the hypothesis of Ramseybehavior, US data conflicts.

Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary accommodation

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumptionexpenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking placewhen monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times.The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may havemoderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansionsaccompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains buttheir success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade opennessand the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude ofthe multipliers.

Debt sustainability in historical perspective: The role of fiscal repression

This article examines the debt history of two contenders for European hegemony: 16th-centurySpain and 18th-century Britain. We analyze their fiscal behavior using measures of overborrowingand fiscal policy functions. Our results suggest that stringency was not key for Britain ssuccess in avoiding default. Instead, fiscal repression allowed the United Kingdom to borrowat below-market rates, thereby outspending its continental rivals.