Crítica do crescimento com poupança externa

O presente artigo é uma formalização da crítica à estratégia do crescimento com poupança externa. Apesar dos países de renda média serem pobres em capital, os déficits em conta corrente (poupança externa), financiados por empréstimos ou investimentos diretos externos, não necessariamente farão aumentar a taxa de acumulação de capital ou, mesmo, terão pouco impacto sobre ela, de forma que os déficits em conta serão associados a taxas de câmbio apreciadas, altos salários e ordenados reais e altos níveis de consumo. Conseqüentemente, o país se endividará para consumir, e não para investir e crescer. Apenas quando há grandes oportunidades de investimento, estimulados por uma diferença considerável entre a taxa de lucro esperada e a taxa de juros a longo prazo, o lucro adicional produzido pelo fluxo de capital estrangeiro será usado para investimento, e este trade-off entre a redução da poupança externa e interna não ocorrerá

Crises financeira nos anos 1990 e poupança externa

Ao contrário do que afirma a análise econômica convencional, a causa das crises financeiras dos anos 1990 no México, Ásia, Brasil e Argentina não foi principalmente fiscal, mas sim a decisão dos governos de crescerem com poupança externa, isto é, com déficits em conta corrente. Essas foram crises de balanço de pagamento geradas pela sobreapreciação da moeda local e pelo alto nível de dívida externa e/ou rápido crescimento de déficit de conta corrente. Assim, repentinamente os credores externos se convenceram de que o país não enfrenta apenas um problema de liquidez, mas de solvência, e para de rolar a dívida. Um teste econométrico demonstra essas afirmações

Why the ‘Rest’ doesn’t need foreign finance

The Rest will be able to catch up and grow faster than the West only if it goes against a “received truth”, namely that capital-rich countries should transfer their capital to capital-poor countries. This intuitive truth is the mantra that the West cites to justify its occupation of the markets of developing countries with its finance and its multinationals. Classical Developmentalism successfully criticized the unequal exchange involved in trade liberalization, but it didn’t succeed in criticizing foreign finance. This task has been recently achieved by New Developmentalism and its developmental macroeconomics, which shows that countries will invest and grow more if they don’t run current account deficits, even when these deficits are financed by foreign direct investment

From hard-peg to hard landing?: recent experiences of Argentina and Ecuador

Includes bibliography

International migration, capital flows and the global economy: a long run view

Includes bibliography

Capital Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments

For six years, the global economy has been driven by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s policies of easy money. Liquidity has flowed from developed to developing economies, financing infrastructure and corporate investment and allowing consumers to indulge in credit-fuelled retail spending. Thus the effective ending of the Fed’s third round of asset purchases (QE3) at the end of October represents both a watershed and the beginning of a new stage in the world economy. The end of asset-purchases comes at a challenging time for emerging markets, with China’s economy slowing, the Euro zone struggling to avoid a recession and the Japanese economy already in recession. The unwinding of the U.S. monetary stimulus, while the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan step up their monetary stimulus, has underpinned an appreciation by the U.S. dollar, in which most commodities are priced. An appreciated dollar makes dollar-denominated commodities more expensive to buyers, thereby creating pressure for sellers to lower their prices. Latin American markets ended the third quarter of 2014 under pressure from a stronger U.S. dollar. In this changing external context, there are many signs that a slowdown in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) financial markets, particularly debt markets, which have been breaking issuance records for the past six years, may slowdown from now on. Commodity prices – including those of oil, base metals and some goods – are in a prolonged slump. The Bloomberg commodity price index, a benchmark of commodity investments, has fallen to a five-year low as China’s economy slows down, and with it the demand for commodities. Investment into the LAC region has decelerated, in large part because of a deceleration of mining investments. Latin American currencies have suffered depreciations, as current account deficits have widening for a number of countries. And LAC companies, having issued record amounts of foreign currency bonds may now struggle to service their debt. In October, credit-rating agency Moody’s downgraded the bonds of Brazil’s Petrobras to tow notches above speculative grade because of the impact of falling oil prices and the weaker real on its debt. Growth prospects look brighter in 2015 relative to 2014, but a strengthening U.S. dollar, uneven global growth and weakness in commodity prices are skewing the risk toward the downside for the 2015 forecasts across the region. The Institute of International Finance expects the strengthening of the dollar to have a divergent impact across the region, however, depending on trade and financial linkages. The Institute of International Finance, Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, October 2, 2014. A stronger dollar lifts U.S. purchasing power, supporting exports, growth and capital inflows in countries with close trade links to the U.S. economy. However, rising dollar financing costs will increase pressure on countries with weak external positions. Given the effects of falling oil prices and a stronger dollar, some companies in the region, having issued record amounts of foreign currency bonds, may now struggle to service their debts. Prospects of Fed rate hikes resulting in tighter global liquidity amid the rapid rise in the corporate external bond stock has indeed raised concerns over some companies. However, there is still a shortage of bonds at a global level and the region still enjoys good economic policy management for the most part, so LAC debt markets may continue to enjoy momentum despite occasional bursts of high volatility – even if not at the record levels of recent years.

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997

Incluye Bibliografía.

Exchange Rate Policy and Economic Growth after the Financial Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe

In a paper on the effects of the global financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the author reacts to a paper of Åslund (2011) published in the same issue of Eurasian Geography and Economics on the influence of exchange rate policies on the region’s recovery. The author argues that post-crisis corrections in current account deficits in CEE countries do not in themselves signal a return to steady economic growth. Disagreeing with Åslund over the role of loose monetary policy in fostering the region’s economic problems, he outlines a number of competitiveness problems that remain to be addressed in the 10 new EU member states of CEE, along with improvements in framework conditions supporting future macroeconomic growth.

An evaluation of exchange rate policy and economic adjustment in Nicaragua, 1993--1995

Since the late 1970's, but particularly since the mid-1980s, the economy of Nicaragua has had persistent and large macroeconomic imbalances, while GDP per-capita has declined to 1950s' levels. By the second half of the 1990s, huge fiscal deficits and a reduction of foreign financing resulted in record hyperinflation. The Sandinista government's (1979–1990) harsh stabilization program in 1988–89 had only modest and short-lived success. It was doomed by their inability to lower the public sector deficit due to the war, plus diminishing financial support from abroad. Hyperinflation stopped only after their 1990 electoral defeat ended the war and massive aid began to flow in. Five years later, macroeconomic stability is still very fragile. A sluggish recovery of export agriculture plus import liberalization, have impeded a reduction of huge trade and current account deficits. Facing the prospects of diminished aid flows, the government's strategy has hinged on the achievement of a real devaluation through a crawling-peg adjustment of the nominal rate. However, at the end of 1995 the situation of the external accounts was still critical, and the modest progress achieved was attributable to cyclical terms-of-trade improvement and changes in the political outlook of agricultural producers. Using a Computable General Equilibrium Model and a Social Accounting Matrix constructed for this dissertation, the importance of structural rigidities in production and demand in explaining such outcome is shown. It is shown that under the plausible structural assumptions incorporated in the model, the role of devaluation in the adjustment process is restricted by structural rigidities. Moreover, contrary to the premise of the orthodox economic thinking behind the economic program, it is the contractionary effect of devaluation more than its expenditure-switching effects that provide the basis for is use in solving the external sector's problems. A fixed nominal exchange rate is found to lead to adverse results. The broader conclusion that emerges from the study is that a new social compact and a rapid increase in infrastructure spending plus fiscal support for the traditional agro-export activities is at the center of a successful adjustment towards external viability in Nicaragua. ^

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2006

Includes bibliography

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2010-2011: The region in the decade of the emerging economies

Incluye Bibliografía

Preliminary overview of the economies of the Caribbean 2012-2013

Includes bibliography

Honduras: evolución económica durante 2006 y perspectivas para 2007

Incluye Bibliografía

Diseño de instrumentos para configurar una política industrial en España basada en los postulados de la economía evolutiva

La evidencia empírica aplicada a países de cierto tamaño y desarrollo económico, muestra que existe una relación directa y positiva entre la intensidad de la industria manufacturera, medida como porcentaje de su PIB, y ciertas variables económicas como, el crecimiento, el desempleo y la balanza exterior de bienes y servicios. En el caso de esta última, se verifica empíricamente, que los países con una proporción de actividad manufacturera inferior al 20%, tienen una marcada tendencia a presentar déficits crónicos de balanza de bienes y servicios, lo que conduce a persistentes déficits por cuenta corriente, al ser el primer déficit el principal componente del segundo. Esto trae consigo un continuado incremento del endeudamiento externo que no cesa, y que terminará en algún momento por desequilibrar el conjunto de la economía de los países con esos déficits crónicos. Las anteriores conclusiones, abren una vía de orientación de la política económica, que tiene como objetivo la promoción de la industria manufacturera de cada país. Y esto es un hecho ya en 2014. Países relevantes, como Alemania o Francia en la UE, incluso los EEUU y últimamente el Reino Unido, y por supuesto países del área asiática como Japón, Corea del Sur y China, llevan años promoviendo su industria manufacturera. Resulta significativo, que el debate ideológico sobre la bondad de la aplicación política industrial por parte de los gobiernos, frente a las teorías liberales de mantener a los poderes públicos lejos de ese tipo de actividades, haya dado paso a un modelo generalizado de corte más bien horizontal, donde los países casi sin excepciones apoyan el desarrollo de sus empresas con numerosos instrumentos, que van bastante más lejos de los habituales de I+D. Se valora por tanto, la industria manufacturera como algo vital para el equilibrio económico. Incluso la UE, defensora durante décadas de la no intervención de los diferentes Estados miembros en actividades de promoción industrial más allá del apoyo a las actividades de I+D, realiza un giro copernicano, que termina en 2012 proclamando que la industria manufacturera es vital para el equilibrio económico de la UE, que hay que promoverla, e incluso marca un objetivo, precisamente del 20%, como contribución manufacturera a su PIB. Es decir, se da por asumido que los servicios no son un sustituto indefinido de la industria y que por tanto tienen un límite, lo que se contrapone frontalmente contra la anterior creencia de que el aumento de la participación de los servicios en la economía, no solo era bueno, sino un síntoma de desarrollo. Esta premisa ya ha dejado de ser cierta para esos y otros países. En cambio, en España nada de esto sucede en las dos últimas décadas, sino que la industria manufacturera no recibe especial atención de los poderes públicos y se desliza en una pendiente de disminución de su contribución al PIB, que incluso se acelera con la crisis económica que comienza en 2007, hasta alcanzar cifras del orden del 12% del PIB en 2013. La política económica que se aplica es la de la deflación de costes, con los efectos consecuentes sobre los salarios y sobre la capacidad de la economía de generar riqueza. Se apuesta por un modelo de mano de obra barata, que recuerda al de los años 60. Como indicador relevante de esta situación, lo que exporta la industria manufacturera española, no ha ganado en contenido tecnológico en los últimos quince años. Esta situación se ve empeorada por un hecho significativo adicional, y es que casi el 40% de las ventas de la industria manufacturera española provienen de empresas de propiedad extranjera, con lo que eso supone por una parte de dependencia tecnológica del exterior como en el caso del automóvil, y de incertidumbre sobre su futuro, al estar basadas en el mantenimiento en el futuro de una mano de obra barata, que frenará que los españoles que trabajan en esas empresas, progresen económicamente. La propuesta de esta Tesis, es en cambio apostar por un modelo de crecimiento para España que tenga como uno de sus pilares el desarrollo de una industria manufacturera sólida y con cada vez mayor contenido tecnológico. Para ello, se propone un Plan de política industrial, donde se incluye la creación de actores impulsores de este plan, que deben ser del máximo nivel político. Si los diferentes gobiernos no entienden y asumen esta necesidad de apoyo a la industria a largo plazo e independiente de los cambios políticos, no será posible llevar a cabo este Plan. Para su puesta en marcha, se propone la creación o refuerzo de numerosos instrumentos de apoyo a la industria manufacturera de carácter fundamentalmente horizontal que van mucho más allá de los habituales del I+D, y que en varios casos, tienen una clara semejanza con otros existentes ya en otros países desarrollados desde hace años. La promoción de la industria manufacturera necesita nuevos instrumentos, como una financiación a largo plazo para las empresas, una promoción ordenada y eficaz de la actividad internacional de las empresas exportadoras, la mayoría de las cuales exportan productos manufacturados, una educación y formación profesional que esté alineada con estos objetivos, unos instrumentos que apoyen en especial el desarrollo la industria manufacturera, o la participación minoritaria pero significativa, del Estado en empresas españolas pertenecientes a sectores estratégicos entre otros. En resumen, esta Tesis propone una alternativa de política económica radicalmente diferente a la de dejar la industria manufacturera española a su suerte, y basar el futuro económico de España en una mano de obra barata. ABSTRACT The empirical evidence, applied to countries of certain size and economic development, shows that there exists a direct and positive relationship between industrial manufacturing activity, measured as a percentage of GDP, and certain economic variables, such as growth, unemployment and the foreign balance of trade. In the case of the latter, it is verified empirically that the countries with a percentage of manufacturing activity below 20% have a marked tendency for chronic deficits of the balance of trade, leading to persistent deficits in the current account, being that the former deficit is the main component of the latter. This brings about a continued increase in foreign debt that does not cease, and that will end at some point by disrupting the economy of the countries with these chronic deficits. The previous conclusions open the way to a new direction for economic policy, which promotes industrial manufacturing in each country. This is already a fact in 2014. Relevant countries, such as Germany or France in the EU, even the US and ultimately the UK, and of course countries of East Asia such as Japan, South Korea and China, have been promoting their industrial manufacturing for years. It becomes significant that the ideological debate about the goodwill of the application of industrial policy by governments, against liberal theories that maintain public powers far from these kinds of activities, has taken a step towards a horizontal-cut generalized model, where countries, with almost no exception, rely on various instruments to develop their companies that go much further than the usual R&D. Industrial manufacture is therefore valued as vital for economic stability. Even the EU, proponent for decades of non-intervention policy that goes beyond R&D, has gone full circle, ending in 2012 by proclaiming that industrial manufacture is vital for the economic stability of the EU, that it must be promoted. They even mark precisely 20% as an objective for manufacturing as a percentage of GDP. In other words, it is a given that services are not an indefinite substitute for industry, and that therefore it has a limit as such. This rejects the notion that the increase in services at the cost of manufacture is not only healthy, but is also a symptom of development. This premise is no longer true for these and other countries. On the other hand, none of this happens in Spain, where industrial manufacture receives no special attention from the public authorities, and it slides on a downward slope of percentage contribution to GDP, which accelerates the economic crisis that begins in 2007, until manufacture reaches values of around 12% of GDP in 2013. The economic policy applied is that of cost deflation, with consequential effects on wages and the capacity of the economy to generate wealth. A model is proposed for cheaper labor, akin to that of the 1960s. As a relevant indicator of this situation, manufacturing exports from Spain have not grown technologically in the last 15 years. The situation is made worse by another significant fact: almost 40% of sales of the manufacturing industry originate from companies of foreign origin, which supposes on one hand a technological dependence on foreign countries, such as in the case of the automotive industry, and on the other hand uncertainty in its future, being that they are based on maintaining cheap labor in the future, which will slow economic progress of Spaniards working in these companies. The proposition of this Thesis is to bet on a growth model for Spain that has as one of its pillars the development of a solid manufacturing industry, with increasing technological content. For this, an industrial policy plan is proposed, which includes the creation of driving agents for this plan, which must be of maximum political level. If the various governments don’t understand and assume this necessity for support of industry in the long term, independent of political change, this plan will not be accomplished. To start it, the creation or reinforcement of numerous instruments to promote the manufacturing activities are proposed, with a fundamentally horizontal nature that goes far beyond the usual R&D, and that, in several cases, have a clear similarity with others existing in other countries, having been developed for years. The promotion of the manufacturing industry needs new instruments, such as the long-term financing of companies, an orderly and efficient promotion of international activity of exporting companies, the most of which export manufactured goods, education and professional training which is in tune with these objectives, some instruments which support in particular the development of the manufacturing industry, or the minor yet significant participation of the State in Spanish companies belonging to strategic sectors, among others. In summary, this Thesis proposes an different alternative to the economic policy of leaving the manufacturing industry of Spain to its chances, and to base the economic future of Spain on a cheaper labor force.

Les enjeux de la libéralisation des comptes de capital dans les pays du sud de la Méditerranée. = Challenges arising from Capital Account Liberalisation in the Countries of the South Mediterranean Region. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 11/March 2012

This MEDPRO Technical Report confirms the importance of commercial openness and macroeconomic performance (i.e. the control of inflation and stability of current account balance and exchange rate) on growth dynamics in the south Mediterranean countries. In particular, the positive impact of capital account liberalisation is conditioned by the imperative reinforcement of institutional quality, country risk reduction, and government stability. An examination of the Tunisian case shows that only sectors subject to tariff dismantlement within the framework of the Association Agreement with the EU appear to benefit from capital account liberalisation. Furthermore, the report shows that a scenario of capital account liberalisation requires the anticipation of monetary policy reaction functions. It follows that the mechanisms for interest rate adjustment, or inter alia, the interest rates’ reaction to price fluctuations, are weakly volatile. In turn, the analysis shows that an active control of inflation mismatches occurs essentially through exchange rate corrections, thus highlighting the greater interest central banks have in exchange rate stability over real stability. A capital account liberalisation scenario would hence impose a tightening of monetary policy.