Editorial: Special Issue on Secure Physical Layer Communications

In wireless networks, the broadcast nature of the propagation medium makes the communication process vulnerable to malicious nodes (e.g. eavesdroppers) which are in the coverage area of the transmission. Thus, security issues play a vital role in wireless systems. Traditionally, information security has been addressed in the upper layers (e.g. the network layer) through the design of cryptographic protocols. Cryptography-based security aims to design a protocol such that it is computationally prohibitive for the eavesdropper to decode the information. The idea behind this approach relies on the limited computational power of the eavesdroppers. However, with advances in emerging hardware technologies, achieving secure communications relying on protocol-based mechanisms alone become insufficient. Owing to this fact, a new paradigm of secure communications has been shifted to implement the security at the physical layer. The key principle behind this strategy is to exploit the spatial-temporal characteristics of the wireless channel to guarantee secure data transmission without the need of cryptographic protocols.

Prediction and Privacy in Healthcare Analytics

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-03

Sécurité polynomiale en cryptographie

Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons des protocoles cryptographiques d'échange de clef, de mise en gage, et de transfert équivoque. Un premier protocole de transfert équivoque, primitive cryptographique universelle pour le calcul multi-parties, s'inspire du protocole d'échange de clef par puzzle de Merkle, et améliore les résultats existants. Puis, nous montrons qu'il est possible de construire ces mêmes primitives cryptographiques sans l'hypothèse des fonctions à sens unique, mais avec le problème 3SUM. Ce problème simple ---dans une liste de n entiers, en trouver trois dont la somme a une certaine valeur--- a une borne inférieure conjecturée de Omega(n^2).

On Distributed Oblivious Transfer

The paper has been presented at the International Conference Pioneers of Bulgarian Mathematics, Dedicated to Nikola Obreshkoff and Lubomir Tschakaloff , Sofia, July, 2006. The material in this paper was presented in part at INDOCRYPT 2002

Language-based Techniques for Practical and Trustworthy Secure Multi-party Computations

Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to collaboratively compute, using cryptographic protocols, a function over their private data in a way that the participants do not see each other's data, they only see the final output. Typical MPC examples include statistical computations over joint private data, private set intersection, and auctions. While these applications are examples of monolithic MPC, richer MPC applications move between "normal" (i.e., per-party local) and "secure" (i.e., joint, multi-party secure) modes repeatedly, resulting overall in mixed-mode computations. For example, we might use MPC to implement the role of the dealer in a game of mental poker -- the game will be divided into rounds of local decision-making (e.g. bidding) and joint interaction (e.g. dealing). Mixed-mode computations are also used to improve performance over monolithic secure computations. Starting with the Fairplay project, several MPC frameworks have been proposed in the last decade to help programmers write MPC applications in a high-level language, while the toolchain manages the low-level details. However, these frameworks are either not expressive enough to allow writing mixed-mode applications or lack formal specification, and reasoning capabilities, thereby diminishing the parties' trust in such tools, and the programs written using them. Furthermore, none of the frameworks provides a verified toolchain to run the MPC programs, leaving the potential of security holes that can compromise the privacy of parties' data. This dissertation presents language-based techniques to make MPC more practical and trustworthy. First, it presents the design and implementation of a new MPC Domain Specific Language, called Wysteria, for writing rich mixed-mode MPC applications. Wysteria provides several benefits over previous languages, including a conceptual single thread of control, generic support for more than two parties, high-level abstractions for secret shares, and a fully formalized type system and operational semantics. Using Wysteria, we have implemented several MPC applications, including, for the first time, a card dealing application. The dissertation next presents Wys*, an embedding of Wysteria in F*, a full-featured verification oriented programming language. Wys* improves on Wysteria along three lines: (a) It enables programmers to formally verify the correctness and security properties of their programs. As far as we know, Wys* is the first language to provide verification capabilities for MPC programs. (b) It provides a partially verified toolchain to run MPC programs, and finally (c) It enables the MPC programs to use, with no extra effort, standard language constructs from the host language F*, thereby making it more usable and scalable. Finally, the dissertation develops static analyses that help optimize monolithic MPC programs into mixed-mode MPC programs, while providing similar privacy guarantees as the monolithic versions.

Modeling and Verification of Privacy Enhancing Protocols

Privacy enhancing protocols (PEPs) are a family of protocols that allow secure exchange and management of sensitive user information. They are important in preserving users’ privacy in today’s open environment. Proof of the correctness of PEPs is necessary before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable security approach, though well established for verifying cryptographic primitives, is not applicable to PEPs. We apply the formal method of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of a representative PEP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the CPN specification allow us to reason about various security properties of PIEMCP using state space analysis techniques. This investigation provides us with preliminary insights for modeling and verification of PEPs in general, demonstrating the benefit of applying the CPN-based formal approach to proving the correctness of PEPs.

Compliant cryptologic protocols

Literally, the word compliance suggests conformity in fulfilling official requirements. The thesis presents the results of the analysis and design of a class of protocols called compliant cryptologic protocols (CCP). The thesis presents a notion for compliance in cryptosystems that is conducive as a cryptologic goal. CCP are employed in security systems used by at least two mutually mistrusting sets of entities. The individuals in the sets of entities only trust the design of the security system and any trusted third party the security system may include. Such a security system can be thought of as a broker between the mistrusting sets of entities. In order to provide confidence in operation for the mistrusting sets of entities, CCP must provide compliance verification mechanisms. These mechanisms are employed either by all the entities or a set of authorised entities in the system to verify the compliance of the behaviour of various participating entities with the rules of the system. It is often stated that confidentiality, integrity and authentication are the primary interests of cryptology. It is evident from the literature that authentication mechanisms employ confidentiality and integrity services to achieve their goal. Therefore, the fundamental services that any cryptographic algorithm may provide are confidentiality and integrity only. Since controlling the behaviour of the entities is not a feasible cryptologic goal,the verification of the confidentiality of any data is a futile cryptologic exercise. For example, there exists no cryptologic mechanism that would prevent an entity from willingly or unwillingly exposing its private key corresponding to a certified public key. The confidentiality of the data can only be assumed. Therefore, any verification in cryptologic protocols must take the form of integrity verification mechanisms. Thus, compliance verification must take the form of integrity verification in cryptologic protocols. A definition of compliance that is conducive as a cryptologic goal is presented as a guarantee on the confidentiality and integrity services. The definitions are employed to provide a classification mechanism for various message formats in a cryptologic protocol. The classification assists in the characterisation of protocols, which assists in providing a focus for the goals of the research. The resulting concrete goal of the research is the study of those protocols that employ message formats to provide restricted confidentiality and universal integrity services to selected data. The thesis proposes an informal technique to understand, analyse and synthesise the integrity goals of a protocol system. The thesis contains a study of key recovery,electronic cash, peer-review, electronic auction, and electronic voting protocols. All these protocols contain message format that provide restricted confidentiality and universal integrity services to selected data. The study of key recovery systems aims to achieve robust key recovery relying only on the certification procedure and without the need for tamper-resistant system modules. The result of this study is a new technique for the design of key recovery systems called hybrid key escrow. The thesis identifies a class of compliant cryptologic protocols called secure selection protocols (SSP). The uniqueness of this class of protocols is the similarity in the goals of the member protocols, namely peer-review, electronic auction and electronic voting. The problem statement describing the goals of these protocols contain a tuple,(I, D), where I usually refers to an identity of a participant and D usually refers to the data selected by the participant. SSP are interested in providing confidentiality service to the tuple for hiding the relationship between I and D, and integrity service to the tuple after its formation to prevent the modification of the tuple. The thesis provides a schema to solve the instances of SSP by employing the electronic cash technology. The thesis makes a distinction between electronic cash technology and electronic payment technology. It will treat electronic cash technology to be a certification mechanism that allows the participants to obtain a certificate on their public key, without revealing the certificate or the public key to the certifier. The thesis abstracts the certificate and the public key as the data structure called anonymous token. It proposes design schemes for the peer-review, e-auction and e-voting protocols by employing the schema with the anonymous token abstraction. The thesis concludes by providing a variety of problem statements for future research that would further enrich the literature.

Design and analysis of group key exchange protocols

A group key exchange (GKE) protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a common secret session key over a public network. In this thesis, we focus on designing efficient GKE protocols using public key techniques and appropriately revising security models for GKE protocols. For the purpose of modelling and analysing the security of GKE protocols we apply the widely accepted computational complexity approach. The contributions of the thesis to the area of GKE protocols are manifold. We propose the first GKE protocol that requires only one round of communication and is proven secure in the standard model. Our protocol is generically constructed from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We also suggest an efficient KEM from the literature, which satisfies the underlying security notion, to instantiate the generic protocol. We then concentrate on enhancing the security of one-round GKE protocols. A new model of security for forward secure GKE protocols is introduced and a generic one-round GKE protocol with forward security is then presented. The security of this protocol is also proven in the standard model. We also propose an efficient forward secure encryption scheme that can be used to instantiate the generic GKE protocol. Our next contributions are to the security models of GKE protocols. We observe that the analysis of GKE protocols has not been as extensive as that of two-party key exchange protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for GKE protocols. We model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure against KCI attacks. A new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol is given under the revised model assuming random oracles. Subsequently, we treat the security of GKE protocols in the universal composability (UC) framework. We present a new UC ideal functionality for GKE protocols capturing the security attribute of contributiveness. An existing protocol with minor revisions is then shown to realize our functionality in the random oracle model. Finally, we explore the possibility of constructing GKE protocols in the attribute-based setting. We introduce the concept of attribute-based group key exchange (AB-GKE). A security model for AB-GKE and a one-round AB-GKE protocol satisfying our security notion are presented. The protocol is generically constructed from a new cryptographic primitive called encapsulation policy attribute-based KEM (EP-AB-KEM), which we introduce in this thesis. We also present a new EP-AB-KEM with a proof of security assuming generic groups and random oracles. The EP-AB-KEM can be used to instantiate our generic AB-GKE protocol.

An integrated approach to cryptographic mitigation of denial-of-service attacks

Gradual authentication is a principle proposed by Meadows as a way to tackle denial-of-service attacks on network protocols by gradually increasing the confidence in clients before the server commits resources. In this paper, we propose an efficient method that allows a defending server to authenticate its clients gradually with the help of some fast-to-verify measures. Our method integrates hash-based client puzzles along with a special class of digital signatures supporting fast verification. Our hash-based client puzzle provides finer granularity of difficulty and is proven secure in the puzzle difficulty model of Chen et al. (2009). We integrate this with the fast-verification digital signature scheme proposed by Bernstein (2000, 2008). These schemes can be up to 20 times faster for client authentication compared to RSA-based schemes. Our experimental results show that, in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, fast verification digital signatures can provide a 7% increase in connections per second compared to RSA signatures, and our integration of client puzzles with client authentication imposes no performance penalty on the server since puzzle verification is a part of signature verification.

Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols

Key establishment is a crucial cryptographic primitive for building secure communication channels between two parties in a network. It has been studied extensively in theory and widely deployed in practice. In the research literature a typical protocol in the public-key setting aims for key secrecy and mutual authentication. However, there are many important practical scenarios where mutual authentication is undesirable, such as in anonymity networks like Tor, or is difficult to achieve due to insufficient public-key infrastructure at the user level, as is the case on the Internet today. In this work we are concerned with the scenario where two parties establish a private shared session key, but only one party authenticates to the other; in fact, the unauthenticated party may wish to have strong anonymity guarantees. We present a desirable set of security, authentication, and anonymity goals for this setting and develop a model which captures these properties. Our approach allows for clients to choose among different levels of authentication. We also describe an attack on a previous protocol of Øverlier and Syverson, and present a new, efficient key exchange protocol that provides one-way authentication and anonymity.

Computationally sound automated proofs of cryptographic schemes

Proving security of cryptographic schemes, which normally are short algorithms, has been known to be time-consuming and easy to get wrong. Using computers to analyse their security can help to solve the problem. This thesis focuses on methods of using computers to verify security of such schemes in cryptographic models. The contributions of this thesis to automated security proofs of cryptographic schemes can be divided into two groups: indirect and direct techniques. Regarding indirect ones, we propose a technique to verify the security of public-key-based key exchange protocols. Security of such protocols has been able to be proved automatically using an existing tool, but in a noncryptographic model. We show that under some conditions, security in that non-cryptographic model implies security in a common cryptographic one, the Bellare-Rogaway model [11]. The implication enables one to use that existing tool, which was designed to work with a different type of model, in order to achieve security proofs of public-key-based key exchange protocols in a cryptographic model. For direct techniques, we have two contributions. The first is a tool to verify Diffie-Hellmanbased key exchange protocols. In that work, we design a simple programming language for specifying Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange algorithms. The language has a semantics based on a cryptographic model, the Bellare-Rogaway model [11]. From the semantics, we build a Hoare-style logic which allows us to reason about the security of a key exchange algorithm, specified as a pair of initiator and responder programs. The other contribution to the direct technique line is on automated proofs for computational indistinguishability. Unlike the two other contributions, this one does not treat a fixed class of protocols. We construct a generic formalism which allows one to model the security problem of a variety of classes of cryptographic schemes as the indistinguishability between two pieces of information. We also design and implement an algorithm for solving indistinguishability problems. Compared to the two other works, this one covers significantly more types of schemes, but consequently, it can verify only weaker forms of security.

A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol candidates

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently developing the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.3. The transparency of this standardization process allows comprehensive cryptographic analysis of the protocols prior to adoption, whereas previous TLS versions have been scrutinized in the cryptographic literature only after standardization. This is even more important as there are two related, yet slightly different, candidates in discussion for TLS 1.3, called draft-ietf-tls-tls13-05 and draft-ietf-tls-tls13-dh-based. We give a cryptographic analysis of the primary ephemeral Diffie–Hellman-based handshake protocol, which authenticates parties and establishes encryption keys, of both TLS 1.3 candidates. We show that both candidate handshakes achieve the main goal of providing secure authenticated key exchange according to an augmented multi-stage version of the Bellare–Rogaway model. Such a multi-stage approach is convenient for analyzing the design of the candidates, as they establish multiple session keys during the exchange. An important step in our analysis is to consider compositional security guarantees. We show that, since our multi-stage key exchange security notion is composable with arbitrary symmetric-key protocols, the use of session keys in the record layer protocol is safe. Moreover, since we can view the abbreviated TLS resumption procedure also as a symmetric-key protocol, our compositional analysis allows us to directly conclude security of the combined handshake with session resumption. We include a discussion on several design characteristics of the TLS 1.3 drafts based on the observations in our analysis.

Profiling side-channel attacks on cryptographic algorithms

Traditionally, attacks on cryptographic algorithms looked for mathematical weaknesses in the underlying structure of a cipher. Side-channel attacks, however, look to extract secret key information based on the leakage from the device on which the cipher is implemented, be it smart-card, microprocessor, dedicated hardware or personal computer. Attacks based on the power consumption, electromagnetic emanations and execution time have all been practically demonstrated on a range of devices to reveal partial secret-key information from which the full key can be reconstructed. The focus of this thesis is power analysis, more specifically a class of attacks known as profiling attacks. These attacks assume a potential attacker has access to, or can control, an identical device to that which is under attack, which allows him to profile the power consumption of operations or data flow during encryption. This assumes a stronger adversary than traditional non-profiling attacks such as differential or correlation power analysis, however the ability to model a device allows templates to be used post-profiling to extract key information from many different target devices using the power consumption of very few encryptions. This allows an adversary to overcome protocols intended to prevent secret key recovery by restricting the number of available traces. In this thesis a detailed investigation of template attacks is conducted, along with how the selection of various attack parameters practically affect the efficiency of the secret key recovery, as well as examining the underlying assumption of profiling attacks in that the power consumption of one device can be used to extract secret keys from another. Trace only attacks, where the corresponding plaintext or ciphertext data is unavailable, are then investigated against both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms with the goal of key recovery from a single trace. This allows an adversary to bypass many of the currently proposed countermeasures, particularly in the asymmetric domain. An investigation into machine-learning methods for side-channel analysis as an alternative to template or stochastic methods is also conducted, with support vector machines, logistic regression and neural networks investigated from a side-channel viewpoint. Both binary and multi-class classification attack scenarios are examined in order to explore the relative strengths of each algorithm. Finally these machine-learning based alternatives are empirically compared with template attacks, with their respective merits examined with regards to attack efficiency.

An adaptable and scalable asymmetric cryptographic processor

In this paper a novel scalable public-key processor architecture is presented that supports modular exponentiation and Elliptic Curve Cryptography over both prime GF(p) and binary GF(2) extension fields. This is achieved by a high performance instruction set that provides a comprehensive range of integer and polynomial basis field arithmetic. The instruction set and associated hardware are generic in nature and do not specifically support any cryptographic algorithms or protocols. Firmware within the device is used to efficiently implement complex and data intensive arithmetic. A firmware library has been developed in order to demonstrate support for numerous exponentiation and ECC approaches, such as different coordinate systems and integer recoding methods. The processor has been developed as a high-performance asymmetric cryptography platform in the form of a scalable Verilog RTL core. Various features of the processor may be scaled, such as the pipeline width and local memory subsystem, in order to suit area, speed and power requirements. The processor is evaluated and compares favourably with previous work in terms of performance while offering an unparalleled degree of flexibility. © 2006 IEEE.

Studies,Design and Development of Network Security Enhancement Services Using Novel Cryptographic Algorithms

Internet today has become a vital part of day to day life, owing to the revolutionary changes it has brought about in various fields. Dependence on the Internet as an information highway and knowledge bank is exponentially increasing so that a going back is beyond imagination. Transfer of critical information is also being carried out through the Internet. This widespread use of the Internet coupled with the tremendous growth in e-commerce and m-commerce has created a vital need for infonnation security.Internet has also become an active field of crackers and intruders. The whole development in this area can become null and void if fool-proof security of the data is not ensured without a chance of being adulterated. It is, hence a challenge before the professional community to develop systems to ensure security of the data sent through the Internet.Stream ciphers, hash functions and message authentication codes play vital roles in providing security services like confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the data sent through the Internet. There are several ·such popular and dependable techniques, which have been in use widely, for quite a long time. This long term exposure makes them vulnerable to successful or near successful attempts for attacks. Hence it is the need of the hour to develop new algorithms with better security.Hence studies were conducted on various types of algorithms being used in this area. Focus was given to identify the properties imparting security at this stage. By making use of a perception derived from these studies, new algorithms were designed. Performances of these algorithms were then studied followed by necessary modifications to yield an improved system consisting of a new stream cipher algorithm MAJE4, a new hash code JERIM- 320 and a new message authentication code MACJER-320. Detailed analysis and comparison with the existing popular schemes were also carried out to establish the security levels.The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) I Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is one of the most widely used security protocols in Internet. The cryptographic algorithms RC4 and HMAC have been in use for achieving security services like confidentiality and authentication in the SSL I TLS. But recent attacks on RC4 and HMAC have raised questions about the reliability of these algorithms. Hence MAJE4 and MACJER-320 have been proposed as substitutes for them. Detailed studies on the performance of these new algorithms were carried out; it has been observed that they are dependable alternatives.