Lack of cross-scale linkages reduces robustness of community-based fisheries management.

Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these measures. The "tragedy of the commons" model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish, monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological research before (1997-2001), during (2002) and after (2003-2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included participant observation in >100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance. Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge, evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support can generate these incentives.

Institutional and ecological interplay for successful self-governance of community-based fisheries

The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the role of institutional arrangements and ecological factors that facilitate the emergence and sustainability of successful collective action in small-scale fishing social-ecological systems. Using a modified logistic growth function, we simulate how ecological factors (i.e. carrying capacity) affect small-scale fishing communities with varying degrees of institutional development (i.e. timeliness to adopt new institutions and the degree to which harvesting effort is reduced), in their ability to avoid overexploitation. Our results show that strong and timely institutions are necessary but not sufficient to maintain sustainable harvests over time. The sooner communities adopt institutions, and the stronger the institutions they adopt, the more likely they are to sustain the resource stock. Exactly how timely the institutions must be adopted, and by what amount harvesting effort must be diminished, depends on the ecological carrying capacity of the species at the particular location. Small differences in the carrying capacity between fishing sites, even under scenarios of similar institutional development, greatly affects the likelihood of effective collective action. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Integrating simultaneous prosocial and antisocial behavior into theories of collective action.

Trust and cooperation constitute cornerstones of common-pool resource theory, showing that "prosocial" strategies among resource users can overcome collective action problems and lead to sustainable resource governance. Yet, antisocial behavior and especially the coexistence of prosocial and antisocial behaviors have received less attention. We broaden the analysis to include the effects of both "prosocial" and "antisocial" interactions. We do so in the context of marine protected areas (MPAs), the most prominent form of biodiversity conservation intervention worldwide. Our multimethod approach relied on lab-in-the-field economic experiments (n = 127) in two MPA and two non-MPA communities in Baja California, Mexico. In addition, we deployed a standardized fishers' survey (n = 544) to verify the external validity of our findings and expert informant interviews (n = 77) to develop potential explanatory mechanisms. In MPA sites, prosocial and antisocial behavior is significantly higher, and the presence of antisocial behavior does not seem to have a negative effect on prosocial behavior. We suggest that market integration, economic diversification, and strengthened group identity in MPAs are the main potential mechanisms for the simultaneity of prosocial and antisocial behavior we observed. This study constitutes a first step in better understanding the interaction between prosociality and antisociality as related to natural resources governance and conservation science, integrating literatures from social psychology, evolutionary anthropology, behavioral economics, and ecology.

Continuation and discontinuation of local institution in community based natural resource management

Currently the push toward frontier areas, which until twenty years ago were still largely untouched by commercial agriculture, is taking place on a massive scale. This push is being driven not the least by global economic developments, such as the price increase of agriculture commodities like coffee and cocoa. In most cases the indigenous communities become trapped between the state monopoly in natural resource management and the competition for resources by external actors. In this processes the indigenous communities start to lose their access to resources. Another victim in this process is the environment where the natural resources are imbedded. International and national organizations working to conserve environment have became conscious of the important role that indigenous people could fulfill as partners in this endeavour. This partnership in struggle has produced a new discourse on the relationship between indigenous people and their environment. As a further consequence, programs were set up to develop what became known as Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) with its numerous variations. Based on a case study in a village on the eastern border of the Lore Lindu National Park in Central Sulawesi, this study questioned the basic assumption behind the concept of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Namely the assumption that communities living at the margin of forest are socially and culturally homogenous, still more or less egalitarian, and basically living in harmony with their natural environment. This study was inspired by the persistent critique – although still a minority – on the basic assumption the CBNRM from academicians and practitioners working through the Entitlement perspective. Another inspiration was the mounting critique toward the participatory approach. In its effort the study explore further the usefulness of certain approaches. One of the approach much relied on in this study was the local history of the community studied, through exerting oral and local written documents on local history, legends and local stories. These sources proofed quite capable in bringing the local history into the light. Another was the actor oriented approach, which later came to be supported by the concept of Social Pool Resources. The latter concept proofed to be useful as analytical instrument to integrate social institutions and the common pool resources, as a field of action for the different actors as human agencies.

Como el agua entre los dedos. Estudio de los impactos de un proyecto hidroeléctrico, y de las frágiles y débiles acciones colectivas en la defensa de un río: Caso Hidrosogamoso

La acción colectiva en el manejo y gobierno de los recursos de uso común (RUC) seguirá siendo uno de los asuntos que genera mayores controversias (especialmente cuando se trata de recursos naturales y procesos de gobernanza y gestión del agua), debido a los diversos enfoques que sobre el desarrollo se tienen. El presente estudio aborda el análisis de la acción colectiva en el manejo y gobierno de los recursos de uso común a partir del caso Hidrosogamoso en Santander. Además de ofrecer un análisis de los impactos ambientales, sociales y económicos, ventajas y efectos nocivos que puede tener un proyecto hidroeléctrico, se examinan algunos de los postulados básicos de la teoría de la acción colectiva y los RUC, con alguna alusión al enfoque de la bioeconomía. También se describe una de las experiencias comunitarias de autogobierno y preservación del río. Asimismo se estudia el contexto de interacción estratégica en la zona, en el conflicto entre quienes defienden el río y quienes abogan por el proyecto; se ubican las principales oportunidades políticas y aliados influyentes de los opositores durante la fase de construcción de la hidroeléctrica. Al final se insinúan posibles alternativas que podrían ayudar en la visibilización de las problemáticas generadas por el megaproyecto.

Gobernanza Democrática Territorial - Una aproximación analítica y cuantitativa

La Gobernanza Democrática Territorial (GDT) constituye un enfoque conceptual en torno a las formas de “organización” de los agentes locales y regionales, que se expresa en un modelo o modo de gobierno. Este enfoque emerge desde la década de los años noventa como una opción ó una alternativa frente a otros modelos de gobierno (el modelo burocrático y el modelo gerencial). La diferencia entre este concepto y otros afines – como la gobernabilidad, la gobernabilidad democrática y el buen gobierno – no es de grado sino de naturaleza. Así se deriva del análisis comparado entre estos conceptos.

Strategic review of enhancements and culture-based fisheries

Enhancements are interventions in the life cycle of common-pool aquatic resources. Enhancement technologies include culture-based fisheries, habitat modifications, fertilization, feeding and elimination of predators/competitors. Enhancements are estimated to yield about two million mt per year, mostly from culture-based fisheries in fresh waters where they account for some 20 percent of capture, or 10 percent of combined capture and culture production. Marine enhancements are still at an experimental stage, but some have reached commercial production. Enhancements use limited external feed and energy inputs, and can provide very high returns for labour and capital input. Moreover, enhancement initiatives can facilitate institutional change and a more active management of aquatic resources, leading to increased productivity, conservation and wider social benefits. Enhancements may help to maintain population abundance, community structure and ecosystem functioning in the face of heavy exploitation and/or environmental degradation. Negative environmental impacts may arise from ecological and genetic interactions between enhanced and wild stocks. Many enhancements have not realised their full potential because of a failure to address specific institutional, technological, management and research requirements emanating from two key characteristics. Firstly, enhancement involves investment in common-pool resources and can only be sustained under institutional arrangements that allow regulation of use and a flow of benefits to those who bear the costs of enhancement. Secondly, interventions are limited to certain aspects of the life cycle of stocks, and outcomes are strongly dependent on natural conditions beyond management control. Hence, management must be adapted to local conditions to be effective, and certain conditions may preclude successful enhancement altogether. Governments have a major role to play in facilitating enhancement initiatives through the establishment of conducive institutional arrangements, appropriate research support, and the management of environmental and other impacts on and from enhancements.

Governando os comuns ou para os comuns?: gestão de áreas protegidas e os arranjos institucionais da política ambiental no Estado de São Paulo

Desde o século XIX, quando foi instituído o primeiro parque nacional, a gestão de áreas protegidas foi evoluindo e se aprimorando, sendo um importante mecanismo para a conservação da biodiversidade e uma das ações de maior intervenção estatal. Neste sentido, esta dissertação apresenta uma análise dos arranjos institucionais da política ambiental que impactam o uso comum dos recursos naturais por populações residentes do Parque Estadual da Serra do Mar. Para esta discussão, são analisados: o embate teórico entre ambientalismo e socioambientalismo; a problemática do uso de acesso comum, associada a necessidade, ou não, de intervenção governamental; os programas e ações do Governo do Estado de São Paulo para a consolidação das unidades de conservação de proteção integral; e as variáveis que compõe os arranjos institucionais da política ambiental dos casos avaliados, na Cota 400 e Água Fria, no município de Cubatão. Face aos arranjos institucionais da política ambiental para gestão de áreas protegidas, esta dissertação busca compreender qual a melhor situação para a conservação dos recursos naturais, com estudos aplicados a luz do modelo proposto por Elinor Ostrom. A análise dos casos permitiu verificar uma performance institucional frágil da comunidade para o uso sustentável dos recursos de acesso comum.

A região metropolitana da Baixada Santista: uma análise a partir dos fatores que favorecem a capacidade de governança e governabilidade regional

As regiões metropolitanas são reconhecidas como locus estratégico para o desenvolvimento econômico e social das sociedades modernas, porém ainda têm dificuldades em responder às crescentes demandas e problemas complexos. São inúmeras as soluções buscadas e aplicadas para melhor responder às demandas coletivas em áreas metropolitanas, no entanto, o que se observam ainda são sucessos parciais, que evidenciam os desafios deste tema para a gestão pública. Desta forma, o presente estudo busca contribuir tanto para a discussão teórica quanto para a base empírica dos estudos de regiões metropolitanas. Por meio de levantamento bibliográfico, foram identificados oito fatores apontados como favoráveis à governança e governabilidade em regiões metropolitanas. Com a realização de entrevistas semiestruturadas e o levantamento de dados e informações, foi possível analisar esses fatores a partir do caso da Região Metropolitana da Baixada Santista e avançar no debate sobre os limites e potencialidades relativos às ações regionais.

Estudo da concessão do benefício de auxílio-saúde e a teoria dos jogos

Por ano são gastos mais de R$ 15 bilhões de reais entre os benefícios de auxílio-saúde emitidos pelo INSS e os custos para viabilizar o processo. São realizadas, em torno de 7 milhões de pericias, das quais mais de 2 milhões tem resultado contrário por parte do médico perito. O objetivo deste trabalho é realizar uma leitura do processo de concessão de benefícios de auxílio-saúde pelo INSS sob a ótica da Teoria dos Jogos, com a análise da estrutura das interações entre segurado e perito com o INSS e os incentivos indesejados resultantes desta estrutura. Sendo que o segurado é incentivado a buscar o benefício mesmo sem ter, de fato, a necessidade. Resultando num aumento na quantidade de perícias realizadas por ano, diminuindo sua qualidade e eventualmente concedendo benefícios desnecessários. O perito, por sua vez, se defronta com uma atividade de alta complexidade e não dispõe do tempo necessário para uma análise cautelosa. Além disso, tem o incentivo a, em momentos de incerteza, conceder o benefício mesmo que o segurado não se enquadre corretamente nos requisitos necessários. Isto pode ocorrer, dentre outros fatores, devido ao tempo disponibilizado ao perito para analisar o caso com a atenção necessária não ser suficiente. Uma vez traçado o paralelo com a Teoria dos Jogos e os problemas de Common Pool Resources (CPR), é feita uma pesquisa nessa literatura em busca de maneiras de mitigar problemas similares ao pesquisado. Este paralelo também traz a possibilidade de pesquisar a literatura de Market Design acerca do redesenho da estrutura de mercados, com intuito de corrigir e desenvolver estes mercados. Estudos recentes apresentaram resultados positivos, sendo indicado, portanto, para trabalhos futuros, a implementação desta metodologia para o processo de concessão de benefícios de auxílio-saúde.

The Contested Floodplain. Institutional Change of the Commons in the Kafue Flats, Zambia

The Contested Floodplain tells the story of institutional changes in the management of common pool resources (pasture, wildlife, and fisheries) among Ila and Balundwe agro-pastoralists and Batwa fishermen in the Kafue Flats, in southern Zambia. It explains how and why a once rich floodplain area, managed under local common property regimes, becomes a poor man’s place and a degraded resource area. Based on social anthropological field research, the book explains how well working institutions in the past, regulating communal access to resources, have turned into state property and open access or privatization. The study focuses on the historic developments taking place since pre-colonial and colonial times up to today. Haller shows how the commons had been well regulated by local institutions in the past, often embedded in religious belief systems. He then explains the transformation from common property to state property since colonial times. When the state is unable to provide well-functioning institutions due to a lack in financial income, it contributes to de facto open access and degradation of the commons. The Zambian copper-based economy has faced crisis since 1975, and many Zambians have to look for economic alternatives and find ways to profit from the lack of state control (a paradox of the present-absent state). And while the state is absent, external actors use the ideology of citizenship to justify free use of resources during conflicts with local people. Also within Zambian communities, floodplain resources are highly contested, which is illustrated through conflicts over a proposed irrigation scheme in the area.

Making business in the open: coping with economic and institutional risk and insecurity in the Kafue flats, Zambia

This paper deals with the difference between risk and insecurity from an anthropological perspective using a critical New Institutionalist approach. Risk refers to the ability to reduce undesirable outcomes, based on a range of information actors have on possible outcomes; insecurity refers to the lack of this information. With regard to the neo-liberal setting of a resource rich area in Zambia, Central Africa, local actors – men and women – face risk and insecurity in market constellations between rural and urban areas. They attempt to cope with risk using technical means and diversification of livelihood strategies. But as common-pool resources have been transformed from common property institutions to open access, also leading to unpredictability of competitors and partners in “free” markets, actors rely on magic options to reduce insecurity and transform it into risk-assessing strategies as an adaptation to modern times. Keywords: Risk, insecurity, institutional change, neo-liberal market, common pool resources, livelihood strategies, magic, Zambia.

Policy processes and collective action in water reforms: the cases of Nicaragua and Suriname

Las reformas de agua en países en desarrollo suelen llevarse a cabo junto con cambios institucionales más profundos o, incluso, acompañadas de cambios constitucionales o de régimen político. Por lo tanto, los marcos institucionales adaptados a países gobernados sujetos al estado de derecho pueden no ser apropiados para contextos gobernados fundamentalmente, al menos en sus inicios, por instituciones informales o poco maduras. Esta tesis toma las reformas de agua como punto de partida y pretende contribuir a la literatura mediante una serie de análisis empíricos tanto del ámbito general como del plano individual o sujeto personal de la política del agua. En el ámbito general, el foco se pone en los factores que explican el fallo de la acción colectiva en dos contextos diferentes: 1) en la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua y 2) en el mantenimiento y revitalización de las instituciones de riego en Surinam. En el plano del individuo, la investigación se centra en las decisiones de los usuarios de los recursos y analiza el papel crítico de las variables sociales para la gestión de los recursos comunes. Para ello, el método de investigación utilizado es mixto, combinando el análisis de entrevistas, encuestas y experimentos. En el ámbito general, los resultados muestran que las principales barreras para la implementación de la nueva Ley de Aguas de Nicaragua podrían tener su reflejo en el lenguaje de la Ley y, por tanto, en la forma en la que se definen y configuran las instituciones incluidas en dicha Ley. Así, la investigación demuestra que la implementación de políticas no puede ser estudiada o entendida sin tener en cuenta tanto el diseño de la propia política como el marco socio-ecológico en el que se enmarca. El contexto específico de Nicaragua remarca la importancia de considerar tanto las instituciones formales como informales en los procesos de transición política. A pesar de que las reformas de agua requieren plazos largos para su implementación, el hecho de que exista una diferencia entre las reglas tal cual se definen formalmente y las reglas que operan en la realidad merece una mayor consideración en el diseño de políticas basadas fundamentalmente en instituciones formales. En el ámbito de la conducta individual, el análisis de la acción colectiva ofrece una serie de observaciones empíricas interesantes. En el caso de Nicaragua, los resultados indican que la intensidad de las relaciones sociales, el tipo de agentes dispuestos a proporcionar apoyo social y el nivel de confianza en la comunidad son factores que explican de manera significativa la participación en la comunidad. Sin embargo, el hecho de que la gestión colectiva de riego se produzca, en la mayoría de casos, en torno a lazos familiares sugiere que las variables de capital social críticas se definen en gran medida en la esfera familiar, siendo difícil que se extiendan fuera de estos nexos. El análisis experimental de los resultados de un juego de uso de recurso común y contribución al bien público muestra que las preferencias pro-sociales de los individuos y la heterogeneidad del grupo en términos de composición por sexo son factores que explican significativamente los resultados y las decisiones de apropiación a lo largo del juego. En términos del diseño de las políticas, es fundamental tener en cuenta las dinámicas de participación y uso de los recursos comunes de manera que los niveles de cooperación puedan mantenerse en el largo plazo, lo cual, como se observa en el caso de Surinam, no es siempre posible. Finalmente, el caso de Surinam es un ejemplo ilustrativo de los procesos de acción colectiva en economías en transición. El análisis del fallo de la acción colectiva en Surinam muestra que los procesos políticos vinculados al período colonial y de independencia explican en gran medida la falta de claridad en las reglas operacionales y colectivas que gobiernan la gestión de los sistemas de riego y drenaje. Los resultados empíricos sugieren que a pesar de que la acción colectiva para la provisión de los servicios de riego y drenaje estaba bien establecida bajo el régimen colonial, la auto-organización no prosperó en un contexto dependiente del apoyo externo y regido fundamentalmente por reglas diseñadas al nivel competencial del gobierno central. El sistema socio-ecológico que se desarrolló durante la transición post-colonial favoreció, así, la emergencia de comportamientos oportunistas, y posteriormente la inoperancia de los Water Boards (WBs) creados en la época colonial. En este sentido, cualquier intento por revitalizar los WBs y fomentar el desarrollo de la auto-organización de los usuarios necesitará abordar los problemas relacionados con los patrones demográficos, incluyendo la distribución de la tierra, el diseño de instituciones y la falta de confianza en el gobierno, además de las inversiones típicas en infraestructura y sistemas de información hidrológicos. El liderazgo del gobierno, aportando empuje de arriba-abajo, es, además, otro elemento imprescindible en Surinam. ABSTRACT Water reforms in developing countries take place along deeper institutional and even constitutional. Therefore, institutional frameworks that might result in positive outcomes in countries governed by the rule of law might not fit in contexts governed mainly by informal or immature institutions. This thesis takes water reforms as the starting point and aims to contribute to the literature by presenting several conceptual and empirical analyses at both general and individual levels. At the general national level, the focus is on the factors explaining failure of collective action in two different settings: 1) in the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law and 2) in sustaining and revitalizing irrigation institutions in Suriname. At the individual level, the research focuses on the actions of resource users and analyzes the critical role of social variables for common pool resources management. For this purpose, the research presented in this thesis makes use of a mixed-method approach, combining interviews, surveys and experimental methods. Overall, the results show that major barriers for the implementation of the new Nicaraguan Water Law have its reflection on the language of the Law and, therefore, on the way institutions are defined and configured. In this sense, our study shows that implementation cannot fruitfully be studied and understood without taking into account both the policy design and the social-ecological context in which it is framed. The specific setting of Nicaragua highlights the relevance of considering both formal and informal institutions when promoting policy transitions. Despite the unquestionable fact that water reforms implementation needs long periods of time, there is still a gap between the rules on paper and the rules on the ground that deserves further attention when proposing policy changes on the basis of formal institutions. At the level of the individual agent, the analysis of collective action provides a number of interesting empirical insights. In the case of Nicaragua, I found that the intensity of social networks, the type of agents willing to provide social support and the level of trust in the community are all significant factors in explaining collective action at community level. However, the fact that most collective irrigation relies on family ties suggests that critical social capital variables might be defined within the family sphere and making it difficult to go beyond it. Experimental research combining a common pool resource and a public good game in Nicaragua shows that individuals’ pro-social traits and group heterogeneity in terms of sex composition are significant variables in explaining efficiency outcomes and effort decisions along the game. Thus, with regard to policy design, it is fundamental to consider carefully the dynamics of agents' participation and use of common pool resources, for sustaining cooperation in the long term, which, as seen in the case and Surinam, is not always possible. The case of Suriname provides a rich setting for the analysis of collective action in transition economies. The analysis of decay of collective irrigation in Suriname shows that the lack of clear operational and collective choice rules appear to be rooted in deeper political processes that date back to the colonial period. The empirical findings suggest that despite collective action for the provision of irrigation and drainage services was well established during the colonial period, self-organization did not flourish in a context governed by colonial state-crafted rules and mostly dependent on external support. The social-ecological system developed during the post-colonial transition process favored the emergence of opportunistic behavior. In this respect, any attempt to revitalize WBs and support self-organization will need to tackle the problems derived from demographic patterns, including land allocation, institutions design and government distrust, in addition to the typical investments in both physical infrastructure and hydrological information systems. The leadership role of the government, acting as a top-down trigger, is another essential element in Suriname.

Climate change in game theory

The study provides an overview of the application possibilities of game theory to climate change. The characteristics of games are adapted to the topics of climate and carbon. The importance of uncertainty, probability, marginal value of adaptation, common pool resources, etc. are tailored to the context of international relations and the challenge of global warming.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.