Negotiation mechanism for self-organized scheduling system with collective intelligence

Current Manufacturing Systems challenges due to international economic crisis, market globalization and e-business trends, incites the development of intelligent systems to support decision making, which allows managers to concentrate on high-level tasks management while improving decision response and effectiveness towards manufacturing agility. This paper presents a novel negotiation mechanism for dynamic scheduling based on social and collective intelligence. Under the proposed negotiation mechanism, agents must interact and collaborate in order to improve the global schedule. Swarm Intelligence (SI) is considered a general aggregation term for several computational techniques, which use ideas and inspiration from the social behaviors of insects and other biological systems. This work is primarily concerned with negotiation, where multiple self-interested agents can reach agreement over the exchange of operations on competitive resources. Experimental analysis was performed in order to validate the influence of negotiation mechanism in the system performance and the SI technique. Empirical results and statistical evidence illustrate that the negotiation mechanism influence significantly the overall system performance and the effectiveness of Artificial Bee Colony for makespan minimization and on the machine occupation maximization.

Caraterização da tomada de decisão em organizações hospitalares : impacto do estatuto jurídico

RESUMO - O decisor hospitalar tem como função decidir os recursos de uma organização de saúde, sejam estes financeiros, materiais ou humanos, sendo decisivo o conhecimento e informação que o apoiem na aplicabilidade nas tomadas de decisão e na solução dos problemas. As tomadas de decisão suportam-se em modelos reproduzidos pelos decisores, em processos, modelos, e em princípios, que podem ou não assumir intuição, objetividade, racionalidade e ética, bem como de técnicas várias que podem ser limitativas ou condicionadas, por força de fatores vários, como: a falta de informação inerente de uma multidisciplinaridade do processo; de condicionalismos organizacionais, internos ou externos, associados à envolvente e cultura organizacional e influências políticas e macroeconómicas; ao fator tempo; a tecnologia; a estrutura e desenho organizacional; a autoridade/poder e a autonomia para decidir; a liderança, e do estatuto jurídico que o hospital possui. Este último ponto será esmiuçado, mais profundamente, neste estudo. Iremos, através do estudo, compreender se os elementos componentes das decisões tomadas nos hospitais, são ou não adaptadas em consonância com diferentes políticas de governação hospitalar, em contextos e dinâmicas organizacionais diferenciadas, por diferentes Estatutos Jurídicos Hospitalares - EPE, SPA, PPP e Privados. Foi realizado um estudo de caráter exploratório, descritivo-correlacional e transversal, baseou-se num questionário aplicado a decisores hospitalares, incidindo nos dois vetores centrais do estudo, na tomada de decisão e no estatuto jurídico hospitalar. A decisão é então, um valiosíssimo veículo na persecução das estratégias e planos formulados pelo hospital, esperando-se destes produzir consequentes resultados eficientes, eficazes e efetivos na sua aplicação.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

De l'importance de la psychologie collective dans le sciences sociales: Serge Moscovici et les passions humaines

L'oeuvre de Moscovici se résume à une tentative de rapprochement du psychique et du social, ne serait-ce que parce que la rationalité et l'irrationalité sont transversales auz comportaments individuels et à l'activité sociale. En ce sens, l'individu n'est pas plus du ressort de la seule psychologie que la societé ne l'est de la seule sociologie. Simplifier la realité reviendrait à simplifier la connossaince de celle-ci. La psycho-sociologie de Moscovici nous invite donc à prendre en compte l'homme dans sa complétude, en tant que mixte de logique et de sentiments, de raison et de passions. On comprendra alors l'importance du paradigme écologique dans les sciences sociales comme forme de compréhension de ce qui relie l'homme à une entité plus vaste, le renvoyant aussi bien à la nature et à son ascendance animale qu'à la techinque et à sa destinée post-humaine.

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Environmental management problems, future generations and social decisions

The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Leadership in collective action

We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

Activités professionnelles et qualité de l'air des parcs de stationnement couvert : rapport d'expertise collective

[Table des matières] 1. Contexte, objet et modalités de traitement de la saisine. - 2. Préambule. - 3. Caractérisation des parcs de stationnement couverts et de leurs activités professionnelles en France (enquête Afsset). - 4. Observations de terrain et analyse d'activités professionnelles exercées dans les parcs de stationnement couverts (étude Anact). - 5. Evaluation des risques sanitaires. - 6. Recommandations. - Bibliographie. - Annexe 1 : Lettre de saisine. - Annexe 2 : Présentation des positions divergentes. - Annexe 3 : Synthèse des déclarations publiques d'intérêts des experts par rapport au champ de la saisine. - Annexe 4 : Réglementation et recommandations institutionnelles concernant la qualité de l'air dans les parcs de stationnement couverts, et l'hygiène et la sécurité des travailleurs. - Annexe 5 : Etude de coparly sur la mesure de polluants atmosphériques dans les parcs de stationnement - Informations générales. - Annexe 6 : Dépassement des valeurs cibles Afsset" limitant les risques pour la santé des travailleurs dans les parcs de stationnement (Coparly, 2009). - Annexe 7 : Enquête Asset - Méthode d'identification du code NAF le plus adapté. - Annexe 8 : Enquête Afsset - Questionnaire d'enquête. - Annexe 9 : Enquête Afsset - Villes d'implantation des parcs inclus dans l'étude. - Annexe 10 : Rapport de l'Anact : Activité professionnelle et qualité de l'air dans les parcs couverts de stationnement. - Annexe 11 : Résultats de mesures de la campagne du LCPP utilisés pour les scénarios d'exposition. - Annexe 12 : Résultats issus de l'enquête Afsset sur les activités professionnelles exercées dans les parcs de stationnement couverts. - Annexe 13 : Concentrations ubiquitaires dans différents "micro-environnements" (Afsset, 2007). - Annexe 14 : Facteurs d'abattement entre concentrations dans le local d'exploitation et dans le parc. - Annexe 15 : Limites des valeurs toxicologiques de référence (Afsset, 2007). - Annexe 16 : Exemples de solutions pour améliorer la qualité de l'air et réduire l'exposition des travailleurs.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

A well-posedness theory in measures for some kinetic models of collective motion

We present existence, uniqueness and continuous dependence results for some kinetic equations motivated by models for the collective behavior of large groups of individuals. Models of this kind have been recently proposed to study the behavior of large groups of animals, such as flocks of birds, swarms, or schools of fish. Our aim is to give a well-posedness theory for general models which possibly include a variety of effects: an interaction through a potential, such as a short-range repulsion and long-range attraction; a velocity-averaging effect where individuals try to adapt their own velocity to that of other individuals in their surroundings; and self-propulsion effects, which take into account effects on one individual that are independent of the others. We develop our theory in a space of measures, using mass transportation distances. As consequences of our theory we show also the convergence of particle systems to their corresponding kinetic equations, and the local-in-time convergence to the hydrodynamic limit for one of the models.