Investigating the effects of arousal state on cognitive performance in individuals with and without mild head injury

We examined the cognitive and emotional sequelae following mild head injury (MHI; e.g., concussion) in high-functioning individuals and whether persons with MHI pre~ent, both physiologically and via self-report, in a manner different from (i.e., underaroused) that of persons who have no history of head injury. We also investigated the effect arousal state ~as on the cognitive performance of this population. Using a quasiexperimental research design (N = 91), we examined changes in attention, working memory, and cognitive flexibility (subtests ofthe WAIS-III, 1997,WMS-III, 1997, & DKEFS, 2002) as a function of manipulated arousal (i.e., induced psychosocial stress/activation; reduced activation/relaxation). In addition to self-reported arousal and state anxiety (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Speilberger, 1983a) measures, physiological indices of arousal state (i.e., electrodermal responsivity, heart rate, and respiration activity) were recorded (via Polygraph Professional Suite, 2008) across a 2.5 hour interval while completing various cognitive tasks. Students also completed the Post-concussive Symptom Checklist (Gouvier et aI., 1992). The results demonstrate that university students who report a history ofMHI (i.e., "altered state of consciousness") experience significantly lower levels of anxiety, were physiologically underaroused, and were less responsive to stressors in their environment, compared to their non-~HI cohorts. As expected, cognitive flexibility (but not other neuropsychological measures of cognition) was advantaged with increased stress, and disadvantaged with reduced stress, in persons with reported MHI, but not for those without reported MHI which provided limited support for our hypothesis. Further, university students who had no complaints related to their previous MHI endorsed a greater number of traditional post-concussive symptoms in terms of intensity, duration and frequency as compared to students who did not report a MHI. The underarousal in traumatic brain injury has been associated with (ventromedial prefrontal cortex) VMPFC disruption and may be implicated in MHI generally. Students who report sustaining a previous MHI may be less able to physiologically respond and/or cognitively appraise, stressful experiences as compared to their no-MHI cohort and experience persistent, long-lasting consequences despite the subtle nature of a history of head injury.

Parameterising ecological validity and integrating individual differences within second-person neuroscience

This commentary situates the second person account within a broader framework of ecological validity for experimental paradigms in social cognitive neuroscience. It then considers how individual differences at psychological and genetic levels can be integrated within the proposed framework.

What the cognitive neurosciences mean to me

Cognitive Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary area of research that combines measurement of brain activity (mostly by means of neuroimaging) with a simultaneous performance of cognitive tasks by human subjects. These investigations have been successful in the task of connecting the sciences of the brain (Neurosciences) and the sciences of the mind (Cognitive Sciences). Advances on this kind of research provide a map of localization of cognitive functions in the human brain. Do these results help us to understand how mind relates to the brain? In my view, the results obtained by the Cognitive Neurosciences lead to new investigations in the domain of Molecular Neurobiology, aimed at discovering biophysical mechanisms that generate the activity measured by neuroimaging instruments. In this context, I argue that the understanding of how ionic/molecular processes support cognition and consciousness cannot be made by means of the standard reductionist explanations. Knowledge of ionic/molecular meclianisms can contribute to our understanding of the human mind as long as we assume an alternative form of explanation, based on psycho-physical similarities, together with an ontological view of mentality and spirituality as embedded in physical nature (and not outside nature, as frequently assumed in western culture).

Mathematical models of cognitive processes

The research activity carried out during the PhD course was focused on the development of mathematical models of some cognitive processes and their validation by means of data present in literature, with a double aim: i) to achieve a better interpretation and explanation of the great amount of data obtained on these processes from different methodologies (electrophysiological recordings on animals, neuropsychological, psychophysical and neuroimaging studies in humans), ii) to exploit model predictions and results to guide future research and experiments. In particular, the research activity has been focused on two different projects: 1) the first one concerns the development of neural oscillators networks, in order to investigate the mechanisms of synchronization of the neural oscillatory activity during cognitive processes, such as object recognition, memory, language, attention; 2) the second one concerns the mathematical modelling of multisensory integration processes (e.g. visual-acoustic), which occur in several cortical and subcortical regions (in particular in a subcortical structure named Superior Colliculus (SC)), and which are fundamental for orienting motor and attentive responses to external world stimuli. This activity has been realized in collaboration with the Center for Studies and Researches in Cognitive Neuroscience of the University of Bologna (in Cesena) and the Department of Neurobiology and Anatomy of the Wake Forest University School of Medicine (NC, USA). PART 1. Objects representation in a number of cognitive functions, like perception and recognition, foresees distribute processes in different cortical areas. One of the main neurophysiological question concerns how the correlation between these disparate areas is realized, in order to succeed in grouping together the characteristics of the same object (binding problem) and in maintaining segregated the properties belonging to different objects simultaneously present (segmentation problem). Different theories have been proposed to address these questions (Barlow, 1972). One of the most influential theory is the so called “assembly coding”, postulated by Singer (2003), according to which 1) an object is well described by a few fundamental properties, processing in different and distributed cortical areas; 2) the recognition of the object would be realized by means of the simultaneously activation of the cortical areas representing its different features; 3) groups of properties belonging to different objects would be kept separated in the time domain. In Chapter 1.1 and in Chapter 1.2 we present two neural network models for object recognition, based on the “assembly coding” hypothesis. These models are networks of Wilson-Cowan oscillators which exploit: i) two high-level “Gestalt Rules” (the similarity and previous knowledge rules), to realize the functional link between elements of different cortical areas representing properties of the same object (binding problem); 2) the synchronization of the neural oscillatory activity in the γ-band (30-100Hz), to segregate in time the representations of different objects simultaneously present (segmentation problem). These models are able to recognize and reconstruct multiple simultaneous external objects, even in difficult case (some wrong or lacking features, shared features, superimposed noise). In Chapter 1.3 the previous models are extended to realize a semantic memory, in which sensory-motor representations of objects are linked with words. To this aim, the network, previously developed, devoted to the representation of objects as a collection of sensory-motor features, is reciprocally linked with a second network devoted to the representation of words (lexical network) Synapses linking the two networks are trained via a time-dependent Hebbian rule, during a training period in which individual objects are presented together with the corresponding words. Simulation results demonstrate that, during the retrieval phase, the network can deal with the simultaneous presence of objects (from sensory-motor inputs) and words (from linguistic inputs), can correctly associate objects with words and segment objects even in the presence of incomplete information. Moreover, the network can realize some semantic links among words representing objects with some shared features. These results support the idea that semantic memory can be described as an integrated process, whose content is retrieved by the co-activation of different multimodal regions. In perspective, extended versions of this model may be used to test conceptual theories, and to provide a quantitative assessment of existing data (for instance concerning patients with neural deficits). PART 2. The ability of the brain to integrate information from different sensory channels is fundamental to perception of the external world (Stein et al, 1993). It is well documented that a number of extraprimary areas have neurons capable of such a task; one of the best known of these is the superior colliculus (SC). This midbrain structure receives auditory, visual and somatosensory inputs from different subcortical and cortical areas, and is involved in the control of orientation to external events (Wallace et al, 1993). SC neurons respond to each of these sensory inputs separately, but is also capable of integrating them (Stein et al, 1993) so that the response to the combined multisensory stimuli is greater than that to the individual component stimuli (enhancement). This enhancement is proportionately greater if the modality-specific paired stimuli are weaker (the principle of inverse effectiveness). Several studies have shown that the capability of SC neurons to engage in multisensory integration requires inputs from cortex; primarily the anterior ectosylvian sulcus (AES), but also the rostral lateral suprasylvian sulcus (rLS). If these cortical inputs are deactivated the response of SC neurons to cross-modal stimulation is no different from that evoked by the most effective of its individual component stimuli (Jiang et al 2001). This phenomenon can be better understood through mathematical models. The use of mathematical models and neural networks can place the mass of data that has been accumulated about this phenomenon and its underlying circuitry into a coherent theoretical structure. In Chapter 2.1 a simple neural network model of this structure is presented; this model is able to reproduce a large number of SC behaviours like multisensory enhancement, multisensory and unisensory depression, inverse effectiveness. In Chapter 2.2 this model was improved by incorporating more neurophysiological knowledge about the neural circuitry underlying SC multisensory integration, in order to suggest possible physiological mechanisms through which it is effected. This endeavour was realized in collaboration with Professor B.E. Stein and Doctor B. Rowland during the 6 months-period spent at the Department of Neurobiology and Anatomy of the Wake Forest University School of Medicine (NC, USA), within the Marco Polo Project. The model includes four distinct unisensory areas that are devoted to a topological representation of external stimuli. Two of them represent subregions of the AES (i.e., FAES, an auditory area, and AEV, a visual area) and send descending inputs to the ipsilateral SC; the other two represent subcortical areas (one auditory and one visual) projecting ascending inputs to the same SC. Different competitive mechanisms, realized by means of population of interneurons, are used in the model to reproduce the different behaviour of SC neurons in conditions of cortical activation and deactivation. The model, with a single set of parameters, is able to mimic the behaviour of SC multisensory neurons in response to very different stimulus conditions (multisensory enhancement, inverse effectiveness, within- and cross-modal suppression of spatially disparate stimuli), with cortex functional and cortex deactivated, and with a particular type of membrane receptors (NMDA receptors) active or inhibited. All these results agree with the data reported in Jiang et al. (2001) and in Binns and Salt (1996). The model suggests that non-linearities in neural responses and synaptic (excitatory and inhibitory) connections can explain the fundamental aspects of multisensory integration, and provides a biologically plausible hypothesis about the underlying circuitry.

Teaching Cognitive Modeling Using PDP++

PDP++ is a freely available, open source software package designed to support the development, simulation, and analysis of research-grade connectionist models of cognitive processes. It supports most popular parallel distributed processing paradigms and artificial neural network architectures, and it also provides an implementation of the LEABRA computational cognitive neuroscience framework. Models are typically constructed and examined using the PDP++ graphical user interface, but the system may also be extended through the incorporation of user-written C++ code. This article briefly reviews the features of PDP++, focusing on its utility for teaching cognitive modeling concepts and skills to university undergraduate and graduate students. An informal evaluation of the software as a pedagogical tool is provided, based on the author’s classroom experiences at three research universities and several conference-hosted tutorials.

Eye Movement Measures of Cognitive Control in Children with Tourette Syndrome

Tourette Syndrome begins in childhood and is characterized by uncontrollable repetitive actions like neck craning or hopping and noises such as sniffing or chirping. Worst in early adolescence, these tics wax and wane in severity and occur in bouts unpredictably, often drawing unwanted attention from bystanders. Making matters worse, over half of children with Tourette Syndrome also suffer from comorbid, or concurrent, disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). These disorders introduce anxious thoughts, impulsivity, inattention, and mood variability that further disrupt children with Tourette Syndrome from focusing and performing well at school and home. Thus, deficits in the cognitive control functions of response inhibition, response generation, and working memory have long been ascribed to Tourette Syndrome. Yet, without considering the effect of medication, age, and comorbidity, this is a premature attribution. This study used an infrared eye tracking camera and various computer tasks requiring eye movement responses to evaluate response inhibition, response generation, and working memory in Tourette Syndrome. This study, the first to control for medication, age, and comorbidity, enrolled 39 unmedicated children with Tourette Syndrome and 29 typically developing peers aged 10-16 years who completed reflexive and voluntary eye movement tasks and diagnostic rating scales to assess symptom severities of Tourette Syndrome, ADHD, and OCD. Children with Tourette Syndrome and comorbid ADHD and/or OCD, but not children with Tourette Syndrome only, took longer to respond and made more errors and distracted eye movements compared to typically-developing children, displaying cognitive control deficits. However, increasing symptom severities of Tourette Syndrome, ADHD, and OCD correlated with one another. Thus, cognitive control deficits were not specific to Tourette Syndrome patients with comorbid conditions, but rather increase with increasing tic severity, suggesting that a majority of Tourette Syndrome patients, regardless of a clinical diagnosis of ADHD and/or OCD, have symptoms of cognitive control deficits at some level. Therefore, clinicians should evaluate and counsel all families of children with Tourette Syndrome, with or without currently diagnosed ADHD and/or OCD, about the functional ramifications of comorbid symptoms and that they may wax and wane with tic severity.

Turning univalent stimuli bivalent: Synesthesia can cause cognitive conflict in task switching

In this study we investigated whether synesthetic color experiences have similar effects as real colors in cognitive conflict adaptation. We tested 24 synesthetes and two yoke-matched control groups in a task-switching experiment that involved regular switches between three simple decision tasks (a color decision, a form decision, and a size decision). In most of the trials the stimuli were univalent, that is, specific for each task. However, occasionally, black graphemes were presented for the size decisions and we tested whether they would trigger synesthetic color experiences and thus, turn them into bivalent stimuli. The results confirmed this expectation. We were also interested in their effect for subsequent performance (i.e., the bivalency effect). The results showed that for synesthetic colors the bivalency effect was not as pronounced as for real colors. The latter result may be related to differences between synesthetes and controls in coping with color conflict.

What do brain network interactions tell about cognitive processes? How to seek causality?

Optimal adjustment of brain networks allows the biased processing of information in response to the demand of environments and is therefore prerequisite for adaptive behaviour. It is widely shown that a biased state of networks is associated with a particular cognitive process. However, those associations were identified by backward categorization of trials and cannot provide a causal association with cognitive processes. This problem still remains a big obstacle to advance the state of our field in particular human cognitive neuroscience. In my talk, I will present two approaches to address the causal relationships between brain network interactions and behaviour. Firstly, we combined connectivity analysis of fMRI data and a machine leaning method to predict inter-individual differences of behaviour and responsiveness to environmental demands. The connectivity-based classification approach outperforms local activation-based classification analysis, suggesting that interactions in brain networks carry information of instantaneous cognitive processes. Secondly, we have recently established a brand new method combining transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and EEG. We use the method to measure signal transmission between brain areas while introducing extrinsic oscillatory brain activity and to study causal association between oscillatory activity and behaviour. We show that phase-matched oscillatory activity creates the phase-dependent modulation of signal transmission between brain areas, while phase-shifted oscillatory activity blunts the phase-dependent modulation. The results suggest that phase coherence between brain areas plays a cardinal role in signal transmission in the brain networks. In sum, I argue that causal approaches will provide more concreate backbones to cognitive neuroscience.

Development of reasoning:Behavioral evidence to support reinforcement over cognitive control accounts

Speed's theory makes two predictions for the development of analogical reasoning. Firstly, young children should not be able to reason analogically due to an undeveloped PFC neural network. Secondly, category knowledge enables the reinforcement of structural features over surface features, and thus the development of sophisticated, analogical, reasoning. We outline existing studies that support these predictions and highlight some critical remaining issues. Specifically, we argue that the development of inhibition must be directly compared alongside the development of reasoning strategies in order to support Speed's account. © 2010 Psychology Press.

A study of ignorance: suffering and freedom in early Buddhist teachings and parallels in modern neuroscience

What might early Buddhist teachings offer neuroscience and how might neuroscience inform contemporary Buddhism? Both early Buddhist teachings and cognitive neuroscience suggest that the conditioning of our cognitive apparatus and brain plays a role in agency that may be either efficacious or non-efficacious. Both consider internal time to play a central role in the efficacy of agency. Buddhism offers an approach that promises to increase the efficacy of agency. This approach is found in five early Buddhist teachings that are re-interpreted here with a view to explaining how they might be understood as a dynamic basis for ‘participatory will’ in the context of existing free will debates and the neuroscientific work of Patrick Haggard (et al.). These perspectives offer Buddhism and neuroscience a basis for informing each other as the shared themes of: (1) cognition is dynamic and complex/aggregate based, (2) being dynamic, cognition lacks a fixed basis of efficacy, and (3) efficacy of cognition may be achieved by an understanding of the concept of dynamic: as harmony and efficiency and by means of Buddha-warranted processes that involve internal time.

Do left and right asymmetries of hemispheric preference interact with attention to predict local and global performance in applied tasks?

Many cognitive neuroscience studies show that the ability to attend to and identify global or local information is lateralised between the two hemispheres in the human brain; the left hemisphere is biased towards the local level, whereas the right hemisphere is biased towards the global level. Results of two studies show attention-focused people with a right ear preference (biased towards the left hemisphere) are better at local tasks, whereas people with a left ear preference (biased towards the right hemisphere) are better at more global tasks. In a third study we determined if right hemisphere-biased followers who attend to global stimuli are likely to have a stronger relationship between attention and globally based supervisor ratings of performance. Results provide evidence in support of this hypothesis. Our research supports our model and suggests that the interaction between attention and lateral preference is an important and novel predictor of work-related outcomes.

Dopamine transporter genotype predicts behavioural and neural measures of response inhibition

The ability to inhibit unwanted actions is a heritable executive function that may confer risk to disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Converging evidence from pharmacology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that response inhibition is instantiated within frontostriatal circuits of the brain with patterns of activity that are modulated by the catecholamines dopamine and noradrenaline. A total of 405 healthy adult participants performed the stop-signal task, a paradigmatic measure of response inhibition that yields an index of the latency of inhibition, termed the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT). Using this phenotype, we tested for genetic association, performing high-density single-nucleotide polymorphism mapping across the full range of autosomal catecholamine genes. Fifty participants also underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging to establish the impact of associated alleles on brain and behaviour. Allelic variation in polymorphisms of the dopamine transporter gene (SLC6A3: rs37020; rs460000) predicted individual differences in SSRT, after corrections for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, activity in frontal regions (anterior frontal, superior frontal and superior medial gyri) and caudate varied additively with the T-allele of rs37020. The influence of genetic variation in SLC6A3 on the development of frontostriatal inhibition networks may represent a key risk mechanism for disorders of behavioural inhibition.

Semantic context and visual feature effects in object naming : an fMRI study using arterial spin labeling

Previous behavioral studies reported a robust effect of increased naming latencies when objects to be named were blocked within semantic category, compared to items blocked between category. This semantic context effect has been attributed to various mechanisms including inhibition or excitation of lexico-semantic representations and incremental learning of associations between semantic features and names, and is hypothesized to increase demands on verbal self-monitoring during speech production. Objects within categories also share many visual structural features, introducing a potential confound when interpreting the level at which the context effect might occur. Consistent with previous findings, we report a significant increase in response latencies when naming categorically related objects within blocks, an effect associated with increased perfusion fMRI signal bilaterally in the hippocampus and in the left middle to posterior superior temporal cortex. No perfusion changes were observed in the middle section of the left middle temporal cortex, a region associated with retrieval of lexical-semantic information in previous object naming studies. Although a manipulation of visual feature similarity did not influence naming latencies, we observed perfusion increases in the perirhinal cortex for naming objects with similar visual features that interacted with the semantic context in which objects were named. These results provide support for the view that the semantic context effect in object naming occurs due to an incremental learning mechanism, and involves increased demands on verbal self-monitoring.

Fusiform activation to animals is driven by the process, not the stimulus

Previous studies have found that the lateral posterior fusiform gyri respond more robustly to pictures of animals than pictures of manmade objects and suggested that these regions encode the visual properties characteristic of animals. We suggest that such effects actually reflect processing demands arising when items with similar representations must be finely discriminated. In a positron emission tomography (PET) study of category verification with colored photographs of animals and vehicles, there was robust animal-specific activation in the lateral posterior fusiform gyri when stimuli were categorized at an intermediate level of specificity (e.g., dog or car). However, when the same photographs were categorized at a more specific level (e.g., Labrador or BMW), these regions responded equally strongly to animals and vehicles. We conclude that the lateral posterior fusiform does not encode domain-specific representations of animals or visual properties characteristic of animals. Instead, these regions are strongly activated whenever an item must be discriminated from many close visual or semantic competitors. Apparent category effects arise because, at an intermediate level of specificity, animals have more visual and semantic competitors than do artifacts.