Caloric restriction induces energy-sparing alterations in skeletal muscle contraction, fiber composition and local thyroid hormone metabolism that persist during catch-up fat upon refeeding.

Weight regain after caloric restriction results in accelerated fat storage in adipose tissue. This catch-up fat phenomenon is postulated to result partly from suppressed skeletal muscle thermogenesis, but the underlying mechanisms are elusive. We investigated whether the reduced rate of skeletal muscle contraction-relaxation cycle that occurs after caloric restriction persists during weight recovery and could contribute to catch-up fat. Using a rat model of semistarvation-refeeding, in which fat recovery is driven by suppressed thermogenesis, we show that contraction and relaxation of leg muscles are slower after both semistarvation and refeeding. These effects are associated with (i) higher expression of muscle deiodinase type 3 (DIO3), which inactivates tri-iodothyronine (T3), and lower expression of T3-activating enzyme, deiodinase type 2 (DIO2), (ii) slower net formation of T3 from its T4 precursor in muscles, and (iii) accumulation of slow fibers at the expense of fast fibers. These semistarvation-induced changes persisted during recovery and correlated with impaired expression of transcription factors involved in slow-twitch muscle development. We conclude that diminished muscle thermogenesis following caloric restriction results from reduced muscle T3 levels, alteration in muscle-specific transcription factors, and fast-to-slow fiber shift causing slower contractility. These energy-sparing effects persist during weight recovery and contribute to catch-up fat.

Compositional data analysis of vote shares in the 2001 Australian Federal election

First application of compositional data analysis techniques to Australian election data

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.

A comparison of self-determined motivational experiences between participants and non-participants following the physical activity component of the CATCH Kid Club

The CATCH Kids Club (CKC) is an after-school intervention that has attempted to address the growing obesity and physical inactivity concerns publicized in current literature. Using Self-Determination Theory (SDT: Deci & Ryan, 1985) perspective, this study's main research objective was to assess, while controlling for gender and age, i f there were significant differences between the treatment (CKC program participants) and control (non- eKC) groups on their perceptions of need satisfaction, intrinsic motivation and optimal challenge after four months of participation and after eight months of participation. For this study, data were collected from 79 participants with a mean age of9.3, using the Situational Affective State Questionnaire (SASQ: Mandigo et aI., 2008). In order to determine the common factors present in the data, a principal component analysis was conducted. The analysis resulted in an appropriate three-factor solution, with 14 items loading onto the three factors identified as autonomy, competence and intrinsic motivation. Initially, a multiple analysis of co-variance (MANCOY A) was conducted and found no significant differences or effects (p> 0.05). To further assess the differences between groups, six analyses of co-variance (ANeOY As) were conducted, which also found no significant differences (p >0 .025). These findings suggest that the eKC program is able to maintain the se1fdetermined motivational experiences of its participants, and does not thwart need satisfaction or self-determined motivation through its programming. However, the literature suggests that the CKe program and other P A interventions could be further improved by fostering participants' self-determined motivational experiences, which can lead to the persistence of healthy PA behaviours (Kilpatrick, Hebert & Jacobsen, 2002).

Shares Certificate - Gladstone Mines and Reduction Company

A shares certificate for Gladstone Mines and Reduction Company in the amount of 200 shares. The certificate is dated 13 March 1925 and is signed by the secretary F.J. Carr and the president Charles Stoddart. The price is one dollar per share and it is made out to W.H. Cowan.

Barnes Wines, Limited, Shares Certificate, 1957

Share certificate No. BP001, registered to Mrs. Bessie A. Barnes Barkley. The certificate has several shares transactions listed. The final number of shares redeemed on April 11th, 1957 is 316.

Barnes Wines, Limited, Shares Certificate, 1934

A shares certificate issued to The National Trust Company for two hundred shares.

Certificate for Twenty-One Shares of Capital Stock in Nicola Valley Coal and Coke Company

Certificate for 21 shares of capital stock in Nicola Valley Coal and Coke Company to Welland D. Woodruff, Oct. 16, 1905.

Certificate for One Thousand Shares of Capital Stock in Lincoln-Nipissing Development Co. Ltd.

Certificate for 1,000 shares of capital stock in Lincoln-Nipissing Development Co. Ltd. to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Feb. 21, 1907.

Certificate for Six Shares of Capital Stock in Gove Motor Car Company, Detroit, Michigcan

Certificate for 6 shares of common capital stock in Gove Motor Car Company, Detroit, Michigan to Hamilton K. Woodruff, June 13, 1921.

Certificate for Two Shares of Preferred Capital Stock in Gove Motor Car Company, Detroit, Michigan

Certificate for 2 shares of preferred capital stock in Gove Motor Car Company, Detroit, Michigan to Hamilton K. Woodruff, June 13, 1921.

Certificate for Two Shares of Capital Stock in The Henley Aquatic Association Limited

Certificate for 2 shares of capital stock in Henley Aquatic Association Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Oct. 15, 1921.

Certificate for Sixty Shares of Capital Stock in High Pressure Oil and Gas Syndicate, Limited

Certificate for 60 shares of capital stock in High Pressure Oil and Gas Syndicate, Limited to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Nov. 1, 1922.

Certificate for Five Hundred Shares in La Paz Oil Corporation

Certificate for 500 shares in La Paz Oil Corporation to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Jan. 24, 1923.