Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 1998

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 1999

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2000

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2001

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2002

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2003

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2004

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2005

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission of Iowa.

Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, 2007

Annual report of the Iowa Racing & Gaming Commission

Iowa Racing & Gaming Commission Annual Report, 2007

Annual report for the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission for the year 2007

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

State and industry in the 1940s: The Spanish automobile industry

The decade of the 1940s was one of the darkest periods in the country's history, with years of famine, repression, general misery, and impoverishment of all aspects of national life ranging from culture to the economy. During those years plans were made to establish a Spanish motor industry once the Civil War had come to an end in 1939. It seemed a propitious moment for private enterprise and various foreign motor companies presented proposals for manufacturing their entire vehicle range, from cars to trucks. However, the government plans were for a State monopoly, a policy which meant that any private projects which did not contemplate the regime taking management decisions were rejected out of hand. From 1941 onwards, any new initiative was required to meet the plans set by INI. The main argument running through this paper is that one can only understand the development of the modern Spanish motor industry if one grasps the haggling between motor companies and government regarding market entry and the impact of the regime's autarchic policies in the 1940s.